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Arms Control With and Without Agreements
*Kenneth L. Adelman*

The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control
*McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan*
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A DIVIDED EUROPE

The Future of Yalta — *Zbigniew Brzezinski*
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*Henry Grunwald*

# FOREIGN POLICY UNDER REAGAN II

The second Reagan Administration has a rare opportunity to reshape American foreign policy. The opportunity obviously springs from President Reagan's overwhelming election victory, which, if he remains in office for four more years, will make him the first full two-term president since Eisenhower. This victory has further strengthened his already impressive capacity for political leadership, reinforcing his authority to deal with the factions of his own party, with the feuding wings of the bureaucracy, and with foreign countries. The question is whether he will seize that authority and will know how to use it. Which Reagan, and which group of Reagan advisers, will dominate the second term? Will it be the stubbornly hard-line or the flexible President, the "ideologues" or the "pragmatists" among his counselors?

That distinction is, of course, somewhat oversimplified; the divisions within, and around, the President are not quite so clear-cut. There are apocalyptic and rational ideologues; there are very tough and semi-tough pragmatists. Still, the familiar labels do describe a genuine conflict, and in the first term, the evolution of that conflict was quite evident: from ideology to pragmatism.

The Administration started out by confronting the world with a hard-line, aggressive and Manichean set of policies, or pronouncements, that in nearly every instance gave way to compromise and at least outward accommodation. This was true of attitudes toward the Soviet Union, arms control, Central America, the European allies, and support of the International Monetary Fund, among others. The retreat and reversal on the Soviet-European gas pipeline issue was typical of this trend. These accommodations happened only after bitter bureaucratic infighting, and in response to various outside pressures: public opinion, politics, allied complaints, the risk of diplomatic debacles.

The need to compromise was symbolized by the resort to more or less bipartisan commissions: the Scowcroft panel on

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the MX missile, the Kissinger group on Central America. These commissions did extremely useful work and produced sound, generally centrist recommendations, which by no reasonable standard could be described as weak. What remains to be seen is whether, in the second term, these and similar policies will prevail, demonstrating in effect a learning experience by the Administration, or whether the right-wing "true believers" will succeed in dismissing them as mere temporary, tactical adjustments and will try to reassert the ideological super-hard line. A great deal depends on the answer, including the possibility of reaching at least the rudiments of a new national consensus on foreign and defense policy.

II

In fairness, it should be said that, up to a point, the hard line was a useful corrective for weak and confused policies of the past and was welcomed in many quarters as a sign of a new American assertiveness. Administration critics almost automatically preface "ideology" with "right-wing." But there is liberal or left-wing ideology too, and its reading of Soviet intentions and of the causes of Third World instability often has been just as simplistic as right-wing interpretations, if not more so.

Besides, the Reagan Administration, often reckless in rhetoric but cautious in action, did have its successes. One of them was the championing of American military power. The arms buildup may have been excessive, and ill-advised in some particulars; very little was done to reform the armed services. But the buildup was plainly necessary and, despite much bickering, it was essentially supported by Congress and the public. It constitutes the most important single "foreign policy" action by Reagan so far.

Another clear achievement, of course, was the deployment of the Euromissiles for NATO, in the teeth of all-out Soviet opposition. In dealing with China, despite some early ideological rumbles and despite the baggage accumulated during decades of a deep Republican commitment to Taiwan, the Reagan Administration acted prudently and professionally. The same may be said, at the risk of considerable disagreement, about the Reagan policy toward South Africa. In other instances, policy was muddled through lack of skill and understanding, as in the Middle East.

On balance, the Reagan Administration often proved itself quite capable of realistic and largely nonideological policies, but they did not fit into any unified concept. Thus "more

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pragmatism" is not a sufficient foreign policy prescription for Reagan II. A pragmatism that merely and artificially splits the difference between sharply opposing views, or cobbles together a compromise for political and public relations effect, is hardly what we need. What is required is pragmatism within a framework of principle; firm assertion of American goals combined with a recognition that there are different ways of attaining them, and that some may be unattainable in the near future; a realization that, especially in foreign affairs, passion without skill can be worse than skill without passion. Reagan II, one would hope, will recognize that toughness, while indispensable, can take many forms. On the whole, the Administration has been deficient in seeing that strength has political and diplomatic components, that charging head-on at an objective is not necessarily the best way to reach it, and that guile and the ability to maneuver are every bit as important as muscle.

III

In perspective, the Reagan Administration's difficulties in dealing with the Soviet Union are familiar, almost traditional, even though pushed to extremes. From the outset, the Administration had difficulty coping with what can only be called the yes-but formula, which has been advanced for the last three decades by just about every specialist in the field: Yes, we must be strong, but at the same time flexible. Yes, we must understand that the Russians are relentless foes, but at the same time we must seek ways of coexisting. And so forth. As a general proposition, this formula is so obvious that it is no longer worth debating; the question is how it is to be applied specifically. Yet almost every new Administration comes into office paying lip service to the yes-but principle, while actually believing that a fresh start, a new approach—either softer or harder—will permit escape from the painful and laborious double track.

The Reagan Administration was particularly determined to reject the yes-but formula, which requires the ability to hold two opposite ideas at the same time (the mark of a first-rate intelligence, according to F. Scott Fitzgerald). This runs against the American tendency to see the world as good or evil, a mind-set not invented by Reagan, and to believe in solutions; the yes-but formula implies that U.S.-Soviet strains are not a problem to which there is a solution, but a more or less permanent condition that can only be alleviated, not cured.

In fact, each Administration sooner or later has been disappointed in its hope that these constraints can be escaped, the

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only exception being the Nixon Administration which knew better from the start. The fact is that the Reagan Administration is being pushed toward something that, by any other name, is still détente. Indeed, détente is constantly being reinvented, redefined or relabelled (as in Richard Nixon's afterthought, "hardheaded détente"). As long as it can be protected from the utopian left, which sees it as institutionalized brotherhood, and from the triumphalist right, which sees it as institutionalized surrender, and defined as no more or less than controlled conflict, it remains the inescapable intellectual framework for American policy.

It has been eloquently argued that arms control has been made to bear too much of the burden of U.S.-Soviet relations, and that there can be no hope for significant progress on arms control unless a degree of trust can be restored or created between the superpowers.[1] The notion brings to mind the observation by Salvador de Madariaga, writing about the 1930s in his memoirs, that "nations don't distrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they distrust each other. And therefore to want disarmament before a minimum of common agreement on fundamentals is as absurd as to want people to go undressed in winter." It is hard to quarrel with this insight, and yet it is equally hard to see how the United States and the Soviet Union can retrieve even a few clothes of confidence unless there is at least a possibility of moving, however slowly, toward an accord on nuclear arms.

In short, the argument is circular and irresistibly leads back to the imperative of arms control. Its achievements in the past have been modest at best. Progress has been glacial, and exaggerated expectations have been aroused by the process. But there is simply no convincing alternative to it.

## IV

The Reagan Administration has often acted as if any arms control proposal that might be acceptable to the Soviets must be automatically flawed, when in fact the Soviet Union, like the United States, will naturally accept only proposals it considers to be in its own self-interest. This negative attitude, plus the open contempt for arms control expressed by some members of the Reagan circle, plus the unrealistic proposals for cuts offered at the outset of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

[1] See Robert W. Tucker, "The Nuclear Debate," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1984.

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(START), has obscured a central fact: the major source of the problem lies in the Soviets' own aggressive nuclear buildup and their excessive view of what they require for their own security. It is therefore entirely possible that even a "reformed" Reagan Administration with a more tolerant approach to arms control may not get anywhere with the Soviets. There are certain concessions beyond which no administration can or should go in order to win an agreement. At the same time, President Reagan seems to have disavowed the possibility that America can permanently restore any significant nuclear superiority over the Russians. What is at issue is an acceptable but more realistic definition of parity.

It has become fashionable to say that arms control is virtually dead. This view is held not merely because of the acrimonious breakdown of both the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and START negotiations, but, more importantly, because it is argued that technology keeps outpacing the negotiators. While advancing technology immensely complicates arms control efforts, it is not beyond the reach of negotiated agreements.

Politically, of course, one of the vast problems about arms control and nuclear strategy is their complexity and the inability of the public—or of most politicians—to grasp the issues in any detail. Much of the arms control debate seems like a scholastic exercise about how many warheads can dance on the head of a missile. This frightful air of unreality has much to do with the desire both on the left and on the right, in a curious mirror image, to escape these dilemmas and to find simple and understandable solutions.

On the left, the desire to escape takes the form of a utopian belief in good will or in unilateral actions. (The widely proposed "mutual and verifiable" freeze would not assure balance and would take extensive negotiations.) On the right, it takes the form of a search for "superiority," in the belief that we can outspend the Soviets and outdo them more or less indefinitely in technology. The Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") is an elaboration of this view.

The Star Wars program has a certain appealing plausibility: defense is better than offense, safety behind a shield in the sky is better than the "balance of terror." Professional analysts of course do not commit such oversimplifications, or at least not obviously. Lieutenant General James A. Abrahamson, head of the Strategic Defense Initiative research program, admits that no system the United States deploys will ever be entirely

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foolproof. But he argues that a less than total but highly efficient defense, which might mean anywhere from 50-percent to 99-percent effectiveness, depending on the scale of the system deployed, would make it impossible for the Soviets to plan a first strike with any high degree of confidence. That circumstance will enhance deterrence. Furthermore, even a partially effective defense would be bound to save lives in the unlikely event of an attack.

For the moment, the Administration has committed itself only to a research and development program which the Department of Defense says will require about $26 billion over the next five years. Even the more optimistic scenarios see continued need for new offensive weapons, which would only gradually be reduced. And even the most sophisticated and cautious advocates of space-based defense seem to harbor the hankering for a short-cut to safety. They too seek somehow to transfer the task of peacekeeping from the precarious calculus of threat and counterthreat, from the area of human will, to a more or less automatic regime of laser beams and mirrors in orbit.

Technological feasibility aside, the opponents of Star Wars seem to have the better case. The prospect of one side more or less safe while the other side is open to attack is untenable in the nuclear age. Moreover, in the absence of a new bargain with the Soviets, such a situation is bound to be relatively short-lived. We have seen in the past that sooner or later the Soviets can catch up with American technology, the most notable example being multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). All of this would mean great instability during a development period that might run for 20 years and, eventually, instability at a much higher and more complicated level of weaponry.

But this does not mean that development of a defensive system should be banned independently of what is done about nuclear weapons in general. The Soviets seem genuinely afraid of a technological race with the United States in space defense. This fear should be used as a major bargaining chip for an overall arms control agreement.

After an initial test of its low-altitude anti-satellite system (ASAT), which is not part of Star Wars but which the Soviets want to include in any talks about space weapons, the United States should offer a temporary suspension of further tests. This should be followed by negotiations that would tie any

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arrangements for space weapons to the rest of arms control. If it is too late for a total ban on space-based weapons, a possible outcome could be to permit relatively small defense systems for both sides, tied to an arms control agreement (reductions) in offensive weapons.

V

Despite the breakdown of arms control talks, the elements of an agreement for offensive weapons exist. They are summed up in the phrase, "off-setting asymmetries"—in other words, the recognition that the Soviets will not make any significant cuts in their principal arsenal of ground-based missiles unless the United States makes certain concessions in an area where it is particularly strong, namely bombers, cruise missiles and, increasingly, submarine-launched ballistic missiles. This principle is recognized in various schemes, including the so-called framework approach advanced by the State Department in August 1983 but never adopted by the Administration and in the so-called double build-down scheme. This last was put forward in the summer of 1983 by a somewhat shakily bipartisan group of Senators and Representatives which in effect forced it on the Administration. Advanced at the START talks without full conviction or complete details, the double build-down was quickly rejected by the Soviets as a mere repackaging of old, unacceptable American proposals.

The concept underlying these schemes, no doubt subject to a great deal of tinkering with the numbers, should become the basis for the Administration's arms control negotiating position. Despite its great complexity and uncertain beginnings, it remains a promising approach.

All this, of course, assumes that the Russians will allow themselves to return to the bargaining table, despite their earlier vow that they would not do so unless the United States halts deployment of Euromissiles. There is strong evidence that the Russians regret having backed themselves into that particular corner and want to come out of it. (It is interesting to recall that in 1979 the Soviets said they would not even negotiate on INF if NATO adopted the "two-track" approach, but they did in fact come to the table by 1981.) The conditions for improved relations reiterated in October 1984 by Konstantin Chernenko, in his interview with *The Washington Post*, did not include any reference to INF, and seem to offer enough room

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for maneuver to resume talks without undue advance concessions by the United States.

The verification problem, of course, presents an extremely difficult obstacle. But given determined research, it is hard to believe that "national technical means" could not be steadily improved. The Russians have made some forthcoming noises about on-site inspection, but it is doubtful that this could provide a significant overall solution. At any rate, those who believe that verification problems vitiate arms control fail to say how the situation would improve *without* arms control; both sides would still be dependent on the fullest possible information about the armaments of the other side but without the (admittedly incomplete) help on verification that arms control agreements do and can provide.

Movement, if any, is likely to be excruciatingly slow. No big breakthroughs should be expected. At all events, what is needed is a merger or at least a link of INF and START negotiations plus space-defense negotiations. The talks need not be fully integrated right away; they could begin separately and be linked gradually. The drawbacks of such a procedure are all too familiar: complexity and, through INF, the problem of how to bring the allies into the picture without either compromising their sovereignty and independence or else allowing them a role in the START area where they do not belong.[2] Despite such difficulties, it is impossible to see how anything can be accomplished without ultimately treating the issues of nuclear arms and arms control in their entirety. There is simply not enough room for bargaining and trade-offs if things are to be fought out separately in different arenas.

The foregoing would represent a fairly drastic change in the Administration's position on arms control—at least in its earlier phase. But it would be necessary if the President really hopes to make progress in the area during his second term, and there is much evidence that he does. His sincerity would not be the issue. The question is one of intellectual capacity and will. To achieve anything he will have to become personally involved in the process, understanding it far better than he has so far, or else put policy and execution into the hands of a really trusted, high-level associate with the power to enforce his views.

The President will have to crack down hard on the guerrilla war between various parts of the Administration, an action that

[2] See James A. Thomson, "After Two Tracks: Integrating START and INF," *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1984.

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would go very much against his grain. Some bureaucratic infighting and genuine competition between ideas cannot and should not be prevented. But thanks to certain single-minded and obsessive positions on the civilian side of the Pentagon and elsewhere, throughout the first Reagan term, "negotiability" with the Russians was not the issue, but rather negotiability within the Administration.[3] This situation can only be ended by a firm and decisive President and very likely by a change in some of the principal cast of characters.

VI

While arms control is thus at the center of U.S.-Soviet dealings, it must not be allowed to distract us from the world of politics and psychology surrounding the enclaves of missiles and warheads. In that larger context, Reagan II would do well to take certain precepts to heart. One is that we have only very limited means of influencing events inside the Soviet Union. As has been amply observed, fierce rhetoric certainly will not do it. (During the past year, and especially during the last few weeks of the election campaign, the Administration's harsh language gave way to a much softer style, downright reminiscent of Beethoven's introduction to Schiller's *Ode to Joy*—"Not these tones, my friends, but let us raise more agreeable ones. . . .")

Criticism, of course, must not cease, but the United States must also be very cautious in linking condemnation to practical policy, or in suggesting, as has been done by members of the Administration, that peace requires drastic changes in the Soviet regime. A lesson from pre-Reagan days, but still applicable, involves one of the most destructive actions of U.S. foreign policy, which was championed by the usually very wise late Senator Henry M. Jackson: the attempt to force liberalization of Jewish emigration from the U.S.S.R. by denying Russia most-favored-nation treatment. Focusing on Jewish emigration as distinct from any other, possibly worse abuses in the Soviet system was not only arbitrary, it was clearly counterproductive.

The Reagan Administration also needs to get better at matching means and ends, as is suggested, for instance, by its reaction to the imposition of martial law in Poland. The means were at hand for a much faster and more forceful reaction,

[3] See Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984.

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notably suspension of the then still running INF talks and calling in the Polish debt to the international banks. But if for whatever reason it was decided not to react in that way, the mere denunciations and attempts at economic sanctions were futile. In fact, it can be argued that imposition of martial law was the minimal reaction that could have been expected from the Soviets and that no Communist state could ever permit an organization like Solidarity to subsist.

But aligning means with ends does not imply ceding anything to the Soviets that need not be ceded—and certainly not without exacting a price. True, the Soviet Union is a superpower with global interests that cannot be totally denied. Those who urge a last-ditch stand against Soviet influence in every corner of the globe, a sort of Churchillian resistance sometimes suggested by apocalyptic right-wingers, overestimate both our will and our resources. America must differentiate, without of course publicly drawing a map, between areas and situations of the first or second or fifth importance. Pressure on the Soviets and their surrogates should be applied everywhere, constantly, but in varying degrees. Above all, pressure should not cease without a quid pro quo, very likely in some other area.

Certain basics are beyond compromise. But many policies can and should be stopped or moderated in exchange for something else. American aid to resistance fighters in Afghanistan, for example, should continue. The embarrassment and material and human losses suffered by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan are of course beneficial to the West. But eventually there may come a point when the Soviets might be willing to curb certain actions elsewhere in the world in exchange for Western accommodation over Afghanistan. In such situations, there is always the risk that we will be outmaneuvered by the Soviets. But, despite such dangers, the willingness to deal at the right moment is essential.

This very much applies to an especially neuralgic area, Eastern Europe, currently in a state of considerable political restlessness. Any blunt, open political intervention there would be extremely, perhaps intolerably, provocative to the Soviets. But there should always be unpublicized, indirect probes, to be eased or stepped up in reaction to restrained or aggressive Soviet behavior elsewhere.

## VII

Certain other areas require specific consideration because they will continue to test the Administration in special if quite

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disparate ways. They are the North Atlantic Alliance, the Middle East and Central America.

Obviously, NATO is by far the most important to America's position in the world and to its permanent contest with the Soviets. The Administration started out on the wrong foot with the allies. Somewhat paranoid in the best of times, West European leaders and intellectuals were panicked by Reagan's rhetoric and image, by some of the rather casual if actually routine references to nuclear war, and especially by the attempt to veto the Soviet pipeline, which seemed to impose economic sacrifices on the West Europeans when the United States was lifting its grain embargo. Since those days of anger and suspicion, the atmosphere between the United States and the allies has improved considerably.

Today, NATO is widely proclaimed to be in crisis. The litany is familiar. Militarily, NATO strategy is seen in disarray: inadequate conventional forces to resist a possible Soviet attack, and a less than credible nuclear deterrent. Politically, Britain, Holland and West Germany harbor strong, more or less neutralist-pacifist forces which want to opt out of the East-West conflict—and, some would say, out of history. These forces are in the minority, but majority governments (which may not be in the majority forever) cannot afford to ignore them. West European countries tend to press for American accommodation with the Soviet Union, sometimes, it seems, at any price, refuse to support or understand American responsibilities in the Third World, and still take for granted the American defense of their territory.

Either in sorrow or in anger, various remedies or retaliations are being advocated and pressed on the Administration. These include what Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, calls "global unilateralism" (i.e., reducing forces in Europe so as to enhance U.S. flexibility to act in other regions) and "Atlantic reconstruction" (threatening withdrawal from NATO to provoke the allies into doing more for their own defense). The leading reconstructionist, Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), has called for American troop reductions in Europe unless the allies meet a detailed and sophisticated list of requirements to improve NATO's military footing. But the threat of troop withdrawal in the near future is likely to be counterproductive. The NATO commander, General Bernard W. Rogers, evangelizes tirelessly for larger European conventional forces to be equipped with dazzling new high-tech weapons. But the price tag is estimated to add a one-percent

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increase in defense spending to the three-percent pledge the allies have already made but few have kept.

Various military thinkers are advancing new strategies, including mobility and counterattack, to avoid what *The Economist* has called a Maginot Line mentality without a Maginot Line. But such schemes make the Europeans highly nervous. Henry A. Kissinger has advanced an imaginative plan for restructuring the Alliance, with an American secretary general and a European commander, to emphasize the need for greater responsibility by the Europeans for their own defense.[4] The plan was welcomed as highly thought-provoking, which presumably was its purpose, but few leaders in NATO countries are likely to do anything about it any time soon.

The Administration attitude toward much of this agitation about NATO was summed up by Burt, who conceded the need for improvements while adding: "There must also be limits to our departures" (his own version of "*Surtout, pas trop de zèle*").[5] That may not be a bad prescription for American policy toward the Alliance in the second term. A top priority must be to undercut and contain the potentially disastrous left-wing neutralist movements. This is best done through a stable, realistic policy toward the Soviets, including arms control. The Administration should continue to press for greater European defense contributions in various forms, even though this contribution is considerably more significant than popularly understood in the United States.[6] The Administration should encourage any proposals for greater military cooperation among European countries, including that ever-elusive goal, standardization of equipment.

Reagan II should also continue to press for greater cooperation to prevent the transfer of military technology to the Soviet Union, for greater solidarity in major East-West crises, and for more of a role by European countries in "out-of-area" contingencies. As always, these efforts will be frustrating and often futile. We will have to accept the fact that the European view of the world, and of the Soviet Union, is different from ours. We will continue to be lectured on proper global conduct by nations which achieved their present peaceable outlook not through wisdom or virtue, but through exhaustion, after

[4] *Time*, March 5, 1984.

[5] Address to the *Time* Conference on the Atlantic Alliance, April 1983, *Department of State Bulletin*, August 1983.

[6] See Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense*, Department of Defense, March 1984.

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hundreds of years of waging their own wars. But we will have to continue, even at great cost, to help hold the indispensable Alliance together. With much patience, some diplomatic skill, the quieter kind of public relations—and the almost always dependable help from the Soviet Union in the form of political overkill—the task is not beyond us.

A major problem between the United States and Western Europe lies in the economic area. There are major joint concerns about growth in an increasingly interdependent industrialized world, including policies toward the developing countries. The Europeans keep complaining about high American interest rates resulting from the deficits. While these complaints are justified, they are also excessive and tend to overshadow the Europeans' own responsibility for outmoded and ineffective trade and industrial policies. Fortunately there is a growing realization in Western Europe that central economic control and welfare statism are no longer working very well. It is not yet clear, however, what is to take their place.

As far as the developing countries are concerned, the debt crisis has been at least temporarily alleviated by the International Monetary Fund, backed by a somewhat reluctant United States and other Western industrialized states. Longer-range solutions remain elusive. There is a healthy realization among many Third World countries that prospects are very dim for achieving a "new international economic order" and the pieties of the Brandt Commission, all pointing to massive wealth transfers from the industrialized developing countries. The Reagan Administration's Third World prescription of capitalism, entrepreneurship and market incentives is theoretically sound, as has been acknowledged, indirectly, even by China. But in many developing societies, these prescriptions standing alone will not mean much or will be politically destructive. They will have to be part of a mixed economic system. Without going into details here, it is obvious that the Reagan Administration has a major opportunity in the economic area, including the international exchange system. It would also be useful if Reagan II could quietly abandon such dubious missionary efforts as trying to impose certain views about population control and abortion on other societies.

## VIII

In the Middle East, the Administration has swung from overactive and ill-conceived involvement (former Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig's whirlwind attempt to rally the area

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for an anti-Soviet "strategic consensus") to extreme caution bordering on inactivity. The attitude in the second term should be somewhere in between.

The Administration can base itself on one solid conceptual piece of work, the Reagan peace initiative of September 1982, essentially a distillation of many earlier comprehensive peace plans. But the Administration never followed through with further diplomatic action. Instead it got lost in maneuvers to bring about a settlement in Lebanon, having failed to keep the Israelis from invading, if not actually having condoned the move. Today there are some new factors in the area which offer some modest opportunities.

Israel has a new coalition government, however shaky, whose prime minister and Labor Party members hold somewhat more moderate views on West Bank policy and other issues than the Likud governments of Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir. Virtually all factions now want the Israeli army out of Lebanon, provided some kind of halfway reassuring security arrangements for South Lebanon can be achieved. Syria, enjoying the new prominence which it snatched from the jaws of defeat thanks to Soviet resupply and inept American diplomacy, is in no hurry to let the Israelis go. But it is finding its role as peacekeeper in Lebanon somewhat sticky. The ever-cautious King Hussein of Jordan has taken the very bold step—for him—of resuming diplomatic relations with Egypt while continuing his public refusal to have anything to do with the peace process. It is conceivable that Iraq may eventually follow Hussein in his move toward Cairo.

The United States should encourage what has already, if prematurely, been called the Egyptian-Jordanian axis. At the same time it must deal with Syria, treating it less as a Soviet dependency than as a regional mini-power with local interests and fears of its own. A tacit arrangement between Syria and Israel to stabilize the situation in Lebanon seems quite possible. That is a long way from a point at which Syria might stop vetoing any significant peace move, but under the circumstances in the Middle East one must be grateful for small mercies.

Some analysts argue that, ever since the Lebanese invasion, the Palestinians are no longer the key to the Middle East. The suggestion is that the Palestinian problem can be ignored with impunity.[7] It is obvious that the Palestine Liberation Organi-

[7] Robert W. Tucker, "Our Obsolete Middle East Policy," *Commentary*, May 1983.

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zation has been shattered, with one part merely a Syrian puppet organization and another part, under Yassir Arafat, a cause in search of a home. It is also true that among Arab states both the sympathy (always conditional) for, and the fear of, the PLO has been greatly overshadowed by a new concern with Islamic fundamentalism. Nevertheless, the Palestinian issue cannot be put aside permanently. The Administration should pressure the Israeli government to improve conditions on the West Bank and to place a freeze on new settlements. Prime Minister Shimon Peres may be receptive to this.

In U.N. Security Council votes and in other ways, the Administration should also attempt to restore at least some image of evenhandedness toward Israel and the Arab states. The Reagan peace initiative should be pursued behind the scenes, avoiding big public efforts that are too likely to end in disappointment. Meanwhile the Administration should look for every opportunity to take small bilateral steps to improve the situation and ease the atmosphere. In a postmortem on Lebanon, Richard W. Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, put it well: "We must work on the margins to protect our interests." He continued on this sobering note: "Lebanon reminded us that we cannot remake society, that we can work for peace but we cannot impose it. It also reminded us that the commitments we undertake must be ones that we as a government and as a people can sustain over time. We did not do well in that regard. Hence the need for both pragmatism and fortitude."[8]

## IX

Nothing is more futile or arid than the debate between those who argue that the chief cause of Third World insurgencies is economic and social injustice, and those who argue that it is interference by the Soviets or their surrogates. Obviously both forces are at work, reinforcing each other, and both must be coped with. The Reagan Administration has balanced the two approaches—the stress on force and the stress on development—more successfully than it is generally given credit for.

The Reagan team undoubtedly started with an excessively apocalyptic view of the situation. But it was essentially right in believing that a successful communist revolution in El Salvador, or neighboring countries, no matter how seriously driven by

[8] Richard W. Murphy, "The Response from the United States to Current Political Developments in the Middle East," *American-Arab Affairs*, Spring 1984.

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the thirst for social justice, would be an American defeat. It can be argued reasonably that such revolutions are not preventable at acceptable costs, but it cannot be maintained that, in the Central American context, they are not against American interests.

The Reagan Administration often gave the impression that it was unconcerned about human rights in the area, and that it regarded dealing with this problem as a sort of moralistic luxury that could not be indulged in the midst of a civil war. U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick's now celebrated analysis distinguishing between irreversible totalitarian regimes and reversible or improvable authoritarian ones is impeccable in theory. In practice it does not answer the question, crucial in many parts of the Third World, about just when an authoritarian regime, no matter how strong its anti-communist credentials, becomes so corrupt and unpopular that it loses all legitimacy and, in fact, opens the door to totalitarianism. This almost always involves excruciatingly difficult decisions. Under Carter these decisions were made too naïvely, and human rights policy was too simplistic and patronizing. But such phenomena as the death squads in El Salvador had to be coped with for the most practical of reasons.

For some time now the Reagan Administration seems to have understood this and has in fact used a great deal of influence to curb the squads' worst abuses. Without such progress, the election of President José Napoleón Duarte would have been impossible. This election was something of a turning point—and incidentally one that would not have occurred had the Administration followed the counsel of those congressmen who, since 1981, have sought to condition continued military aid to the Salvadoran government on the commencement of indiscriminate negotiations between the government and the guerrillas, which would have led to "power-sharing." The election had significant impact on foreign countries. In 1981, France and Mexico had issued a joint statement calling the Salvadoran rebels "a representative political force," which implicitly equated their legitimacy with that of the government; such a statement would hardly be issued today. Last July, on the occasion of Duarte's visit, the Bonn government resumed aid to El Salvador. An extremely useful move would be the repeal of the Helms Amendment, which bans U.S. aid to land reform in El Salvador.

It is painfully obvious that Duarte's position remains highly

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fragile. The slight improvement in the performance of the Salvadoran army may not last. The far right may yet succeed in sabotaging Duarte's regime, especially if he pursues his dialogue with the guerrilla leaders. Moreover it is far from clear what can come of this dialogue since, from the beginning, the guerrilla leadership has not been interested in the success of a moderate, reformist regime like Duarte's, but in revolution. There are signs that the guerrillas are flagging militarily, and that they are more than ever split into hostile factions. It is premature to hope that they will put down their arms, trusting in the government's security guarantees, and take part in elections. But that is in effect what happened in Venezuela in the late 1960s, as well as what is beginning to happen in Colombia today, and the prospect of a similar outcome in El Salvador is at least somewhat more plausible than it seemed a year ago.

The situation in Nicaragua is more complicated and less hopeful. In considering that situation one should, at the outset, discard a great deal of cant about nonintervention. President Anastasio Somoza was overthrown, at least in part, thanks to American intervention. The Sandinista regime is clearly supported from the outside with arms as well as thousands of Cuban, Soviet, East German and other East Bloc advisers who constitute a significant influence in a country of 2.9 million. The claim that the Sandinistas were forced into kicking out their democratic political partners and lining up with Cuba because of American hostility is plainly wrong. By January 1981, the Carter Administration had allotted to the Sandinista government $117 million in aid, the largest amount from any single country. In its first two years, the new government in Managua received five times more U.S. aid than Somoza received in his final two years. But it is now evident that the Sandinistas planned to build an enormous army (by Central American standards) long before the United States turned hostile.

Still, with all this conceded, it is not clear what the United States hopes to or can accomplish in Nicaragua. The choices for Washington are painfully limited. Much can be said in defense of aid to the counterrevolutionaries, or "contras." They are not simply mercenaries or holdovers from the Somoza National Guard, but a genuine anti-communist movement, and it is not absurd to call them freedom fighters. Yet there is no serious prospect that by themselves they could overthrow the

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Sandinista regime, much as that would be in the American national interest. But they have proved important as an instrument to make the regime more malleable; there is little evidence to support the opposite view, namely that they solidified the regime. By cutting off aid to the contras, Congress irresponsibly deprived the United States of an important bargaining counter.

Contadora can be useful, depending on how it is handled. The provisions of the original proposal are potentially far-reaching. As applied to Nicaragua they could, in effect, amount to interference in the country's internal affairs, in order to change and democratize the regime; and could, if pushed to their maximum, provide for the removal of Cuban and other foreign forces, prevent foreign bases, and eliminate arms assistance to other revolutionary forces elsewhere in the area.

But the problems are several. First, some of the language in the treaty drafts seen so far is slippery. Second, it is far from clear how effectively the provisions could be enforced. Third, barring special unilateral arrangements, the Contadora provisions could mean a cutoff of American military help to the Duarte regime and other democratic forces in Central America. A deal has been suggested whereby the Sandinistas promise to stop aiding the guerrillas in El Salvador in return for cessation of American support for the contras. In view of the congressional cutoff of funding for the contras, that may be academic; but at any rate it does not seem like a very advantageous deal for the United States. In general, the United States should continue working with Contadora, but press for foolproof enforcement and maximum interpretation of its provisions (including the rejection of the November Nicaraguan elections as legitimate). This may mean a lengthy delay, but America should not let itself be pressured into accepting a premature and incomplete agreement. Standing on principle and playing for time may not be the worst policy here. Obviously, the appearance in Nicaragua of sophisticated offensive weaponry could change the equation.

## X

Ultimately, the most important foreign policy goal for Reagan II lies in domestic politics: to achieve at least some measure of consensus on foreign and defense issues, especially regarding the Soviet Union.

Unfortunately, the more or less bipartisan approach to for-

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eign policy that prevailed from World War II till Korea—some would say till Vietnam—was neither typical nor natural. In a functioning democracy the major issues of how a country deals with other countries, how it copes with questions of war and peace, cannot for long be excluded from the political process. For these matters are close to a nation's sense of self, its perception of its values and its meaning. In most elections, including the last one, it is simply unrealistic to ask both sides to throw away a major weapon, namely the argument that the opposing side is wrongheaded about the world—naïve or villainous, weak or reckless. And this is not a matter of cynicism, or at least not primarily. The more sincere the disputants, the more implacable. Yet there are special moments—this may be one—when the normal partisan quarrel over foreign affairs can be muted if not suspended.

It will be very difficult, putting it mildly, to persuade the fervent ideologues in the Republican Party of this. They are riding high, and they see the election as a clear mandate for the hard-line Reagan and for their more extreme goals. Nor will the right wing necessarily hesitate to attack the President if it considers him too weak.[9] While victorious, President Reagan will also increasingly be a lame duck. Nevertheless, he remains a hero to a majority of Americans, and thus a huge asset to the party; the right-wingers will have to be careful not to go against him too blatantly. Besides, he benefits from what might be called the Nixon-China syndrome: his anti-communist credentials are so strong that the country at large would have a hard time accepting the notion that he had gone soft.

The experience of the first term has shown that extreme hard-line positions not only fail to work with the Russians, but fail to work in domestic politics as well. An analysis of preelection polls and the election returns themselves makes clear that voters liked Reagan's patriotism, his emphasis on American strength and even rearmament. Especially blue-collar workers liked his macho image. But at the same time, voters wanted far more serious effort in arms control and peaceful diplomacy. The fact that President Reagan moved in that direction in recent months neutralized the peace issue, which was one of Walter Mondale's big potential assets, and helped increase the Reagan landslide.

The race for 1988 has already begun. If the President wants

[9] See Norman Podhoretz, "Appeasement by Any Other Name," *Commentary*, July 1983.

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to play to history, leaving a legacy of better relations with the Soviets, as well as gain a serious chance of another Republican victory in 1988, everything indicates that he must follow more or less centrist policies. The best hope for the Democrats would be a Republican candidate and a set of policies to revive the "warmonger" fear of the earlier Reagan days. Moreover, despite his huge victory, Reagan will have to deal with a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives, where the Republicans made only modest gains. And even if North Carolina's Senator Jesse Helms were to assume the chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, President Reagan would not have clear sailing for his policies in the Senate (in fact, he might occasionally need Democrats to protect him from Helms' more outrageous positions). Thus, for political reasons as well as for idealistic ones, Reagan has every incentive to reach out to the Democrats in search of consensus.

Would the Democrats have any incentive to meet him even halfway? There is a strong case that they do. They have learned that the peace issue is highly complicated. Just as Reagan had to move to the center, they did too. Although there was much emotional support for a nuclear freeze and for the notion of banning nuclear weapons from outer space, voters did not favor positions they suspected might mean unilateral U.S. concessions. And if Reagan II is at all successful in restarting arms control talks and in otherwise improving U.S.-Soviet relations, the Democrats will have very little to gain from the issue. They would either have to come in on the left of the Republicans or else follow a me-too line, both politically highly unattractive. Thus they would have considerable reason to ease the peace issue out of politics, concentrate their 1988 strategy on the economy, and earn at least some of the credit that would derive from bipartisanship.

The Democrats would have to disown the quasi-isolationist and quasi-pacifist positions of many liberals (which Walter Mondale did only partly toward the end of the campaign). Similarly, Reagan would have to continue distancing himself from the far right. As the preceding pages suggest, there is a lot of room for him to do that without in any real sense "going soft." He can argue with reason that he is now able to negotiate from strength. A tough but realistic position on arms control may well win bipartisan approval. (A formally constituted, bipartisan body to deal with Soviet policy, which has been

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proposed, sounds excessively bureaucratic, but if it is necessary to get Congress involved, it should be tried.)

Agreement might be harder on issues like Central America and the military budget. But among the things Reagan could safely concede would be some further reductions in the defense budget combined with overall reform of the armed forces. Defense expenditures growing at a somewhat slower but sustainable rate backed by bipartisan consensus would be far more impressive to the Soviets than higher defense expenditures, which are probably not sustainable and at the mercy of congressional or partisan politics. One of the greatest boons to the Soviets over the years has been American inconsistency and the chance of playing Democrats off against Republicans. To avoid this and to achieve at least partial consensus would be worth a great deal.

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*Kenneth L. Adelman*

# ARMS CONTROL WITH AND WITHOUT AGREEMENTS

Of all the emotions arising from strategic arms control today, the most profound is disappointment. In this, as in little else in the vast realm of arms control, conservatives and liberals concur—conservatives for the failure of arms control to diminish the ever more ominous Soviet strategic buildup, liberals for its failure to diminish the ever more wasteful strategic "arms race."[1]

Few fields of human endeavor display as great a gap between what is hoped for and what has been realized as strategic arms control. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said it best: "Measured against these glittering possibilities, the achievements of arms negotiations to date have been modest indeed, as are their immediate prospects. . . . In all, not much to show for 35 years of negotiations and 20 years of treaties."[2]

People of all ideological stripes bemoan this state of affairs. They long for a breath of fresh air in this all too stagnant endeavor. "Arms control theory is now at a dead end," Henry Kissinger recently observed. "The stalemate in negotiations reflects an impasse in thought."[3] We should not have an impasse in thought. With a half-generation of experience, we should now have enough data to judge what in strategic arms control works and what does not. We ought to be able to glean what new approaches might offer. We should, for instance, complement traditional arms control with a new or refurbished approach: arms control without agreements. But first, four

[1] The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's November 1979 report on SALT II was quite perceptive in this regard: ". . .while giving due weight to these modest though useful steps, the Committee is disappointed that more could not be achieved from the arms control point of view. The permitted aggregates are very large. . .but the most important reason for the Committee's sense of disappointment is the large increase in warheads expected on both sides, despite the modest reduction in the numbers of permitted launchers. Thus, paradoxically, a vast increase in the quantity and destructiveness of each side's strategic power will occur during the period of a treaty that seeks to limit strategic offensive arms." *The SALT II Treaty*, Senate Executive Report 96-14, November 19, 1979, pp. 316–317.

[2] Harold Brown, *Thinking about National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World*, Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1983, p. 185.

[3] Henry A. Kissinger, "Should We Try to Defend Against Russia's Missiles?," *The Washington Post*, September 23, 1984, p. C8.

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basic questions: What is the problem? What did we expect? What should we expect? How do we get there?

II

At first glance, the problem seems clear: we have ratified no nuclear arms control agreement for more than a decade, and Moscow has furnished scant evidence that we can do so anytime soon.

But is this really the problem? Thinking it is stresses the *existence* of an arms agreement rather than its effect, a misplaced emphasis. For the objective is not an agreement for its own sake; were it so, an agreement could be readily obtained (most easily by signing up to the Soviet proposal). Any nation can conclude an agreement with another if it yields to terms sufficiently favorable to that other state.

Arms control agreements are neither good nor bad in the abstract. Their value depends upon their terms, and even more, on their effects. If an agreement reduces the risks of war, strengthens sound international norms, and contributes to world stability, as has the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, then it is worthy. But if an agreement inflates expectations without much, if any, concrete benefit, as did the interwar arms pacts and especially the Kellogg-Briand Pact, then it is not of much value and can even have adverse effects.

While the logic here is irrefutable, the passion for "an agreement" is barely resistible. American society is result-oriented. To be without any agreement is to invite serious criticism—witness the cry against Ronald Reagan during the recent campaign. To achieve an agreement, even one that leaves the strategic plans of both sides relatively unaffected, is to earn acclaim. Such a standard invariably proves counterproductive. As Dean Acheson said, we can never get a good arms control agreement unless we are fully prepared to live without one.

III

What are the problems with getting a good agreement? Some are on our side, many on the Soviet side.

Alexis de Tocqueville was on key 150 years ago when he wrote in *Democracy in America* that our system "can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its executions in

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spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience."[4] Persevering in a fixed design is much more difficult in our democratic, free-enterprise system—which rewards risk-taking, thrives on innovation, and equates success with action—than in the Soviets' totalitarian, centralized system—which rewards risk-aversion and thrives on predictable control.

Surely the Soviets watch the dizzying pace of changes in U.S. arms control proposals—the 1983 "build-down" concept constituting at least the fourth U.S. strategic arms approach in seven years—with wonder and with pleasure. While critics of the Administration in 1983 derided what they saw as a lack of U.S. flexibility in the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) and intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) negotiations, the Soviets may have wondered about the half-dozen or more significant modifications in our START and INF proposals which we made in fairly rapid order. In any case, the Soviets can take pleasure in the expectation that if they stand pat, we will meanwhile negotiate with ourselves and probably change our position as a result.

To lurch from one objective, or fresh approach, to another—buffeted by the pressures of impatient groups seeking a prompt agreement—is to be playful with arms control. It is not to be serious about arms control. Indeed, the surest method to assure that we never conclude a significant agreement with the Soviets would be for us to propose each new notion that moves some American faction—a nuclear freeze one day, a MIRVed ICBM test ban a second day, build-down or a cruise missile deployment moratorium the next, and so on.

We must curb some of our instinctive impatience. Arms control lends itself to speedy results no more so than do negotiations on other complicated political or economic matters. The Austrian State Treaty of 1955 took more than ten years of hard negotiations. Impatience there could well have doomed Austria to less than the complete removal of Soviet occupation troops and less than the establishment of a fully democratic, neutral state in the heart of Europe. The Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963) came after eight years of effort, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) took more than three years, the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreement (1972) two-and-a-half years, and SALT II (1979) almost seven years.

[4] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Vol. I, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946, p. 235.

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As endemic as impatience is our inability to keep a secret, for long anyway. Leaks about arms control preparations and negotiations sabotage their chances for success. The likely prospect that any new offering will be leaked spurs any President to announce it himself. Such, sadly, has become standard fare. While admittedly adding dramatic flare, this is precisely what arms control does *not* need. Public fanfare invariably leads to dashed hopes and deepening suspicions that the endeavor is being transformed from one primarily of strategic significance to one primarily of public relations.

The problem here is colossal. A glaring deficiency in our system is the unavoidable urge, nay necessity, to exaggerate in order to make an impact. Flamboyant rhetoric and stark conclusions are used where subtlety and ambiguity should be. Even before President Kennedy called the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 a key step in "man's effort to escape from the darkening prospects of more destruction," agreements have been adorned with rich superlatives. In the arms control realm, the Hawthorne effect holds in spades, namely, that that which is observed changes by the very act of observation. It is not so much the *fact* of being observed that so alters arms control as it is the overwhelming *amount* of observation it attracts. Should arms control ever approach the public inattentiveness with which trade negotiations or civil aviation talks have been met, it would yield richer results. But this, certainly, is not to be.

Our flamboyance and openness contrast with Soviet stodginess and secrecy. Looking at us, the Soviets face a cacophony of voices, of facts and views, a veritable information overload. Looking at the Soviets, we face an unsettling paucity of inside knowledge and hard data. Hence verification is a problem primarily for the United States.

The question "How much is enough?" must be posed concerning the terms of verification, as it must be asked of defense spending. That no significant arms control treaty is perfectly verifiable has become better known of late. An acceptable degree of verifiability depends upon the judgment of the President and the Congress, which must take into account (*a*) the precision of treaty language and the technical capabilities for monitoring treaty compliance with an adversary who may try to cheat clandestinely; (*b*) the military risks of undetected violations or ones that are detected in a late stage; (*c*) the adversary's record of past compliance; and (*d*) the overall benefits that will accrue from the treaty in security or political

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terms. This standard is as demanding as the judges make it, though it should be stringent.

Meanwhile, tough choices must be made between high-confidence verifiability and strategic significance. Elements easiest to verify, such as fixed launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) platforms in SALT I and II, are not necessarily the most important or useful measures of strategic strength. Indeed, their limitation may even be detrimental to strategic stability: limiting launchers without limiting warheads encourages MIRVing (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) which increases the value of each launcher to an attacker and, in essence, raises pressures to strike first in a crisis. Those elements having the most strategic significance—such as warheads, throw-weight, and non-deployed missiles, all included in our START proposal—are much harder to verify.

Moreover, new systems coming along, such as cruise missiles and mobile ICBMs, are both more stabilizing and less verifiable. The very traits that make them less vulnerable, and hence which discourage pressures for a first strike, are precisely those which thwart verification.

Even more troublesome is verification's twin, compliance. Verification involves the means to detect an opponent's adherence, and compliance involves the adherence itself, whether detected or not. Both are critical. Arms control is empty without compliance, and compliance is impossible to know in a closed society like the U.S.S.R. without verification. Distrust of Soviet adherence to agreements runs consistently high among Americans, with polls indicating that some 70 percent of the public believe the Soviets are cheating on existing agreements and *would* cheat on future agreements.[5]

In January 1984, responding to a congressional mandate, President Reagan documented seven cases of Soviet violations and probable violations of arms control undertakings. The most important are the high degree of Soviet encryption (scrambling) of its telemetry (radio signals from missile tests) and the construction of a radar near Krasnoyarsk. These two foreshadow ominous developments: encryption of missile telemetry portends the increasing concealment and deception of all U.S.S.R. strategic programs, and the new radar bespeaks a possibly significant step toward a nationwide anti-ballistic mis-

[5] Poll for the Committee on the Present Danger, conducted by Penn and Schoen, April 1984.

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sile (ABM) capability. Both indicate brazen Soviet disregard for arms control commitments. For the Soviets certainly knew we would detect such a massive structure as the new radar, several football fields large, whose existence could not reasonably be reconciled with the ABM Treaty. Even more disturbing is that the construction must have been planned in the 1970s—the very heyday of détente and of high and rising expectations for arms control.

What to do about Soviet violations remains most confounding of all. The usual deliberations in the Standing Consultative Committee and higher level diplomatic protests are necessary but not sufficient. Military countermeasures may be appropriate, but unless begun as a "safeguard," and incorporated in a treaty's ratification process, they may be too little, too late.

What might be labeled the "massive retaliation" theory of verification formerly prevailed, namely that the domestic and international reactions stemming from a Soviet violation would deter or at least end it. But the muffled public and world response to President Reagan's January report belies this "massive retaliation" theory of compliance.

Cancellation of our obligations in treaties that the Soviets violate is one legal recourse, but one politically painful and at times even unwise. It does not seem wise for the United States to respond to Soviet, Vietnamese or Iraqi use of chemical weapons, in stark violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, by abrogating these treaties. We have no intention of ever initiating the use of chemical weapons, and our abrogation would diminish the accords' salience for the violating state and for scores of other states adhering to them.

Nonetheless, some effective response must be found if Soviet violations are not corrected. Otherwise arms control is doomed. For a treaty prohibition adhered to by open societies and violated by closed societies is no prohibition at all. Rather, it is unintended unilateral disarmament in the guise of bilateral or multilateral arms control.

Another major problem in strategic arms control, one of the most complicated, stems from the different force structures and approaches of the United States and U.S.S.R. The U.S. strategic force and doctrine evolved from the Air Force and its strategic bombing concepts of World War II. We stressed high technology and placed a premium on strategic bombers and later, ballistic missile submarines. From the earliest period

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in the nuclear era, we emphasized a deterrence doctrine and a retaliatory strategy.

The Soviet strategic force and doctrine arose from its army, its artillery actually, and stressed size and sheer firepower. In evolving their strategic systems, the Soviets compensated for their lack of technological sophistication with a brute-force design, which now furnishes them with tremendous growth potential as they have become more technologically sophisticated. Their strong, almost paranoid urge for greater and greater military power, lack of air and naval traditions, and keen intent upon the strictest command and control restrictions—all these pushed them into a far greater reliance on air defense and civil defense and land-based missiles. Although the Soviet Union is deploying a dynamic triad of its own, the two sides' approaches and forces are not the same in major respects. Thus, even with good faith and Herculean efforts on both sides, it will be difficult to bridge the wide disparities—to balance systems that are comparable and to make trade-offs between systems that are not. This difference exacerbates substantial differences between U.S. and Soviet goals in arms control.

Last is the problem of frequent leadership changes. This debilitates arms control. It breaks continuity and makes it difficult to make tough decisions essential for a balanced agreement. Usually these changes arise on the American side. In the initial decade and a half of strategic arms discussions, five different U.S. Presidents faced the same General Secretary heading the Soviet Union (Leonid Brezhnev). This proved most disruptive in the past three presidential elections, when challengers opposed the incumbents' arms control approach. And new administrations inevitably feel an obligation to reinvent the wheel of arms control.

Of late there has been a reversal of roles: President Reagan faced three different Soviet leaders in his first three years in office (Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko). The problem here is not so much newcomers opposing their predecessors as it is stagnation in Soviet policy. This is not surprising, given the health of the Soviet leaders. Besides, in the Soviet system a new leader needs considerable time to consolidate his hold (witness Josef Stalin from approximately 1924 to 1934 and Nikita Khrushchev from around 1953 to 1957). The President's meetings with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in September 1984 will, we hope, lead to a reinvi-

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goration of our dialogue with the Soviets; but we have yet to see whether or when the Soviet leadership will be both willing and able to bargain on tough issues.

IV

These obstacles we know now, far better than we did at the dawn of strategic arms control. Still, it is worth asking: What did we expect? And, has it come about? In a nutshell we expected an end, or at least a tempering, of both the strategic buildup and of Soviet aggressive actions around the world. Neither has come about.

Even though both sides have now signed three strategic arms agreements, both have increased their strategic offensive capabilities, the Soviets far more than we; the number of U.S. missile warheads has doubled and that of the Soviet Union has quadrupled. Since the strategic arms talks began in 1969, the Soviets have introduced four new classes of land-based missiles, upgraded them seven times, and launched at least five new or improved classes of ballistic missile submarines. They are currently flight testing yet another new type of ICBM, contrary to the terms of SALT II. Since the first strategic arms accord was signed, the Soviets have added more than 6,000 nuclear warheads; just from the time the second was signed (1979), they have added 3,850. The existence of the massive Soviet strategic buildup has become a matter of fact, not debate. Current controversy instead revolves around its durability and its consequences.

While the Soviet Union marched ahead in its strategic capabilities, the United States dawdled. Our defense spending, by the mid-1970s, had for seven years been in real decline. When Ronald Reagan assumed office in 1981, the United States had an open production line in only one leg (i.e., sea-based) of the strategic triad, whereas the Soviet Union had open and active production lines in all three.

Arms control has impeded the Soviet buildup little, if at all. No one can reasonably argue that the strategic balance is more stable or more favorable to the United States today than it was when the strategic arms talks began. For it palpably is not. Those who most fervently championed SALT I and II for the accords' reputed ability to help stop the strategic arms race are those who now most fervently decry the staggering growth in strategic weapons within the terms of those very treaties. We may have created our own illusions—and the folly here has

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been bipartisan—but the Soviets never misled us in this regard. Given a choice between constraining U.S. strategic forces or protecting their own strategic buildup, they have consistently chosen the latter. They continue to do so in their proposals offered in START.

Second, we expected arms control negotiations at least to temper Soviet misbehavior in regional crises. Again, the outcome has been different. Between 1970 and 1976—the time of arms control "breakthroughs" and intensive U.S.-Soviet dialogue, including *five* summits—the Soviets (*a*) furnished considerable arms and ammunition to back North Vietnam's war against South Vietnam, which subverted and finally destroyed the peace accords; (*b*) threatened to intervene militarily in the Yom Kippur War, which caused the United States to go on strategic alert, despite a recently signed U.S.-Soviet agreement to warn each other about just such instances; and (*c*) expanded involvement in sundry African countries by dispatching significant arms, Cuban soldiers, and Soviet officers.

During these very years, five countries became Marxist—South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Mozambique and Angola—nearly all with substantial help from the Soviet Union. Two more—Ethiopia and Afghanistan—went communist during 1977 and 1978, again with considerable Soviet assistance. And these were the same two years in which the SALT II negotiations intensified, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks continued, and *four* new arms control channels were opened up.[6] In 1979, after Secretary of State Cyrus Vance met Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin more than 20 times and after the Carter-Brezhnev Summit to sign SALT II, Soviet propaganda still blared out false statements designed to further inflame Iranians during the hostage crisis and, even worse, the Soviets began their massive invasion of Afghanistan.

In marked contrast, over the past four years, Soviet global behavior has been most inhibited while arms control and high-level diplomatic negotiations have unfortunately been most stalemated. Of the three major wars in this era—those in Lebanon, the Falklands, and Iran/Iraq—none was at its core an East-West conflict. Since leaving the arms negotiations in late 1983, Soviet words have become harsher but their actions have remained tepid.

Given such a clear historical record, should we give up the

[6] These included negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, Indian Ocean naval demilitarization, banning anti-satellite weapons, and conventional arms transfers.

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goal that arms control negotiations should at least temper Soviet expansionism in regional crises? The answer, in a word, is yes.

To assign arms talks responsibility for eliminating or even diminishing geostrategic competition is to burden them with much more than they can conceivably carry. To laden arms control with such unrealistic expectations is inevitably to cause it to break down. Arms control can best be considered one single element in a full panoply of political, economic and defense efforts. But, frankly, such modesty has been lost since arms control has been thrust forward as the barometer by which superpower relations (indeed, global tranquility) are gauged.

## V

What *should* we expect from arms control?

We should expect an arms control accord to increase strategic stability and thereby reduce the risk of war (the most vital goal of all), to reduce nuclear weapons to equal and substantially lower levels, and to be effectively verifiable. These goals, while simple to state, are of course exceedingly difficult to attain.

Critics of the Reagan Administration who argue that we are much too ambitious correctly grasp the difficulties of achieving deep reductions, particularly in the most destabilizing strategic weapons. These critics advocate more modest goals, with more significant limits on arms coming somewhere down the road. Such was the promissory nature of SALT I and II, agreements advanced not so much for what they themselves delivered as for what they promised future agreements would deliver.

If we should eventually have to settle for something less than the level of deep reductions we now propose, it should only be after a most valiant try and only with extreme reluctance. This does not mean that we should *ask* for less. Unless we seek arms control with a real military bite—an agreement that reduces destabilizing weapons and increases strategic stability—we relinquish any chance of ever achieving these goals. Moreover, proposing an arms control approach that does not even attempt to slow down, much less halt, strategic competition may so undercut public support as to bankrupt the entire process.[7]

[7] Again the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report in November 1979 on SALT II was on key: ". . .to be worthwhile, and to preserve the base of support in the U.S. for the arms control process, SALT III must achieve much greater progress in reductions and qualitative limits." Senate Executive Report, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

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Herein lies the core set of questions: whether the Soviet Union will *ever* accept an arms control regime that significantly reduces its strategic forces; whether our strategic concepts will *ever* become so compatible as to agree on how to distinguish stabilizing from destabilizing weapons; and whether the Soviets will *ever* accept true equality between strategic forces. Will they instead continue to mask their demand for strategic superiority in the guise of "equal security"? We do not know.

But we do know that we cannot find out unless we try. If, after enough time and with enough incentives, the answers to these core questions are no, then we will have learned something rather important: that arms control cannot be justified on military/security grounds. If the answers turn out to be yes, we will have taken, together with the Soviets, a big step forward in making the world a much better place.

We will not have the answer unless we negotiate with most modest publicity and most vigorous diligence, all the while providing for an adequate defense. Doing so is much trickier than it sounds. For the arms control process has become handicapped by constant carping from both ends of the political spectrum.

To many conservatives, the very act of arms negotiations inevitably saps the will of the West and erodes support for essential defense programs. This concern predates the onset of strategic talks. While the point may have been especially valid in the 1970s, it is less so now. Americans have come to realize that talking does not make it so, that no amount of arms talks can substitute for defense programs. Only an effective treaty that is adhered to can help our security. The converse of earlier fears may be truer today, namely that a president unfortunately must depend upon ongoing arms control talks to build the necessary congressional support for controversial defense programs.

To many liberals, defense programs are frequently seen to be so provocative to the Soviets as to squander chances for successful arms control. Time after time the cry goes forth for us unilaterally to halt tests or deployments of systems—be they the B-1, the MX, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), the Pershing II, or anti-satellite interceptors—quite irrespective of what the Soviets do, so as to "give arms control a chance."

Sadly, this is not the way the world works. No labor union would ever scrap its strike fund, pledge never to have its workers walk off the job, and then one-by-one relinquish de-

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mands to management in order to set a climate conducive to successful negotiations. Nor should we. The Soviets never would; they are no different in this respect from other tough negotiators, only tougher than most. If they can realize their goals without giving up anything in return, they will. If we hand them strategic superiority by neglecting to modernize our forces, we cannot hope to attain strategic stability or parity through arms control. But if we pursue programs that redress the imbalances that have arisen from the unparalleled Soviet military buildup, the Soviets will have a strong incentive to negotiate genuine arms reductions.

VI

How do we get there? How do we move toward our goals, particularly that of furthering strategic stability?

Given the staggering obstacles set forth above, the temptation is strong in some quarters to step aside from nuclear arms control, at least until more favorable conditions materialize. The Soviets have of late sought to do something on this order, for their own reasons. But there is no walking away from the nuclear dilemma. Nor should there be. People in the United States and around the world expect Washington and Moscow to address and redress the nuclear buildup.

Recently, the Soviets have sought to switch the spotlight from nuclear arms talks to those on "preventing the militarization of space," as they first publicized in June and as President Chernenko reinforced in mid-October. While they no doubt wish to play down their walkout from the nuclear arms talks, surely their prime purpose here is to help abort research for the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or "Star Wars" in the vernacular.

The Soviets, posing the issue in this way in public, neatly slide over the fact that both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have long relied on using space for such important military functions as communications, early warning of attack, navigational assistance, and monitoring of the others' forces. Furthermore, space systems are essential for verifying strategic arms accords. The Soviets also slide over their possession of an operational, dedicated anti-satellite (ASAT) interceptor, while ours is in the early phase of testing. Finally, the Soviet formulation lumps together two programs with quite distinct goals: ASAT, a near-term development program for us, designed to destroy orbiting satellites and to redress a specific military

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imbalance; and SDI, a long-term research program designed to explore the potential for defense against ballistic missiles.

A Soviet-American discourse on such matters is long overdue. The ABM Treaty explicitly recognizes a continuing and intrinsic relationship between offensive and defensive strategic forces. Opening a dialogue on this relationship would bring both of us "back to basics" on matters critical to future arms control, matters last pursued seriously a decade and a half ago. Such a dialogue could be conducted within the "umbrella talks" the President proposed in his U.N. speech of September 1984. Besides enabling spin-offs of actual negotiations—for example, on nuclear arms and on space—umbrella talks could continue for jointly exploring overall security/arms control matters and discussing the host of ongoing multilateral arms talks (MBFR, Committee on Disarmament, and Conference on Disarmament in Europe).

U.S.-Soviet discussions on offense-defense would revive the conceptual approach underlying the ABM Treaty. Research on defensive systems, as embodied in SDI, is not only permitted under the ABM Treaty but was actively advocated by the Nixon Administration when the treaty stood before the Senate. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird advocated that we "vigorously pursue a comprehensive ABM technology program."[8] The research itself may eventually furnish possibilities for deterrence to be based more upon defense against missiles that could strike either the United States or our allies, rather than relying solely upon the threat of annihilation. The results of SDI are years away, and naturally we do not know what they will be. Estimates vary wildly. We can surmise now, however, that even a less than perfect or less than comprehensive defense could markedly increase the uncertainty of success to a potential attacker. And this, after all, is the quintessence of deterrence. Should the technology prove attainable and affordable, defensive systems would clearly be most effective and stabilizing in a world of markedly reduced offensive forces on both sides. We must, meanwhile, scrupulously guard against the vicious circle of defensive efforts spurring the other side to add yet more offensive weapons, in order to saturate the prospective defen-

[8] Testimony by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, June 6, 1972. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms*, Hearing 92:2, p. 5.

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ses. Again, this could best be done in frank discourse with the Soviets.

There is much to learn in the research on SDI; yet it is valuable on its own merits and as a prudent hedge against the Soviets' active defense programs and research. For they have not only constructed the permitted ABM defensive system around Moscow but also taken some steps toward fashioning a nationwide ABM capacity. They are also engaged in vigorous research in such SDI areas as lasers and neutral particle beams. Surely the worst outcome of all would be one in which our hands were somehow tied on defensive systems while the Soviets gained substantial further advantages in this realm. Admittedly, SDI and the offense-defense relationship need the most careful deliberations within our government, with the allies, and with the Soviets. The first two are under way; the last lamentably is not.

We do have a firmer historical and technological base on the offensive part of this equation. Indeed, we can learn from experience which previous offensive arms control approaches have been successful and which have not. For one, designing ways to stop modernization of weapons has been consistently unsuccessful even though it has become more popular. Long a theme in arms control, the ban on modernization has been played out in the prohibition on flight-testing or deploying more than one new type of ICBM, as provided in SALT II; the nuclear freeze movement; and in testing bans and moratoria conceived for ASATs, nuclear explosions, testing or producing MIRVed ICBMs, and so forth.

This approach has proven rather futile, as could have been anticipated. Types of progress can no more be stemmed in weapons development than in industry, sports, or any other human endeavor. Nor should it be. Through modernization of weapons, we keep deterrence strong today with one-fourth fewer nuclear weapons than in 1967 and a startling 75 percent less megatonnage than in 1960. Moreover, modernization has of late concentrated on making nuclear weapons smaller, safer, more reliable, and more survivable—in stark contrast to research in the late 1940s on hydrogen bombs which strived to create ever more enormous blasts.

By and large, the newer strategic systems (the SS-25 ICBM on the Soviet side, the Midgetman ICBM on ours, SLCMs on both) increase the survivability of forces and thereby reduce the pressure to "use or lose" them. The dispersion of firepower

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makes each weapon a less inviting target, thus less likely to be fired upon or to be fired early in a crisis. Marked improvements in command, control, communications, intelligence ($C^3I$)—the top strategic priority of the Reagan Administration—make the chances of accidental war yet less likely and the President's grip on our nuclear forces yet more firm. This, too, is all to the good.

Moreover, defining what constitutes modernization for effective arms limitations can be nigh unto impossible. It is no easier to set criteria to determine (as in SALT II) when a missile becomes a "new" one with new components or a renovation than it is for an automobile or an appliance. By concocting a phalanx of cumbersome definitional difficulties which in the end are of scant utility, provisions to retard or rule out modernization open the door to endless doubts over Soviet compliance (witness the SS-25 as a second "new type" missile in SALT II terms). This only harms U.S.-Soviet relations rather than improving them.

Another approach which grows in popularity as it declines in utility is that of tying the deployment of individual weapons systems to the vicissitudes of arms negotiations. This approach has grown remarkably popular in Congress, but it sprang forth in NATO's INF dual track decision of 1979, which linked the deployment of missiles in Europe explicitly to negotiations with the Soviet Union. This NATO plan arose in part from European fears that the United States would give away too much in strategic arms control.

However successful the final result—and it was successful, thwarting the Soviets' number-one foreign policy goal of splitting the Alliance by stopping the deployments—the dual-track formulation itself created far more problems than solutions. That formulation practically invited the Soviet Union into NATO's councils, bestowing upon Moscow power over the Alliance's ability to redress an imbalance the Soviets had created in the first place. It also stirred European public opposition to their governments, which the Soviets could and did handily exacerbate. Nonetheless, political parties which supported the NATO decision were favored by voters in the key European countries quite consistently during the four years between the NATO decision and the initial deployments.

Despite NATO's recent tumultuous experience with the dual-track formulation, the concept is being more widely advocated, and even bastardized at that. An extreme extension of this

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approach was embodied in a House amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill in May 1984. It provided the Soviet Union an opportunity in effect to kill a strategic system, the MX missile, that four presidents and a distinguished bipartisan panel (the Scowcroft Commission) deemed critical to our national defense. All Moscow would have to do is to send a delegation to Geneva to resume a negotiation which it had no business to interrupt. The MX would then almost certainly be killed, not as part of a trade-off encompassing concessions on their part, but merely by Soviet diplomats showing up where they should have been all the while.

Congressional politics is marked by a member differentiating himself or herself from the party or administration, particularly on such a high-profile matter as arms control. A president must negotiate with congressional leaders, as well as with the Soviets, on sundry strategic programs. But, as is often quipped, we need to stop spending so much time negotiating with ourselves and start spending more time negotiating with the Soviets.

Pressure has developed for a given amount of arms negotiations at any one time. This new "zero sum theory of arms control" goes: if negotiations are proceeding with the Soviets (as in 1982 and 1983 on both INF and START), then the need for vigorous negotiations with the Congress recedes; if negotiations stall with the Soviets (as in 1984), however, then they are replaced by more extensive and intensive negotiations with Congressmen and Senators in order to retain controversial weapons systems needed for our security and for incentives in ensuing arms talks.

But there is a price paid for this state of affairs. Presidential control over both arms control and strategic planning slowly, yet detectably, ebbs. Both are thus deprived of needed coherence and continuity, characteristics which are not notable hallmarks of the legislative process.

No arms control negotiation can be successful without central management; no negotiation of any kind can. The same holds for strategic planning. This has been recognized and practiced. In the postwar era, Congress has never deprived a president of a strategic program he deemed necessary (though it has funded a few which presidents have considered unnecessary). Hence the MX affair takes on a grander dimension and may set a more ominous precedent. Canceling the MX could damage prospects for arms control and strategic coherence. If the President fails to gain congressional approval of basic strategic programs

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involved in arms control negotiation, the Soviets are encouraged to be obstinate even longer. Hence the crying need for more bipartisanship in these matters, a subject about which so much has been written and so much more needs to be done.

Congress, of course, has a critical role to play in these matters, and a great service to perform. Members of Congress provide essential continuity between administrations. As such, they are the trustees of the long-term national interest; clearly this was the Founding Fathers' intention. But Congress best performs this role not by haggling over minor matters but by taking the wider and longer perspective. In particular, it should scrap the notion of a "dual track" approach altogether. Defense programs, whether the Pershing II, MX or ASAT, should be designed to meet U.S. security needs and should be funded or discarded solely on that basis. Should arms control accords be concluded and implemented that actually alter those security needs, the relevant defense programs can then be altered accordingly.

Above all else, Congress and the public must grasp that arms control demands patience. President Eisenhower was right when he stated (on January 25, 1956, at a press conference) that "as everybody has always known, any move for disarmament is going to be slow, tortuous, and certainly gradual, even at the best." No American exhortation or unilateral concessions, such as sinking the MX or holding up SLCM deployments, are likely to get the Soviets back to the table and into serious negotiations. That is a decision only Moscow can make, for its own internal and other reasons.

It is well to remember that the Soviets left the arms talks not because of the Reagan Administration's overall handling of the relationship, not because of past rhetoric, and not because of the "deep cuts" we proposed on strategic arms. They left, quite simply, because NATO carried through the 1979 decision to redress the European imbalance arising from the Soviets' extensive SS-20 deployments, averaging one a week. It is hard to imagine any president proceeding differently on INF deployments in response to the Soviet insistence on its "half-zero" option—hundreds of INF warheads on their side and zero on ours. And it is equally hard to imagine any Senator or Representative favoring such a lopsided arrangement as the Soviets proposed.

Congress is to be applauded for its rejection of "bargaining chips" as justifications of weapons systems. Again, each system

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should rise or fall on its own merits; none should be constructed solely in order to be discarded. They seldom are so discarded. Meanwhile, defense dollars have been wasted and, even more important, precious defense credibility has been squandered.

VII

What specifically should our approach to arms control look like?

We can and must be ready for tough bargaining and equally tough trade-offs once the Soviets seriously reengage. Even under the best of circumstances, a relatively comprehensive START agreement will require extensive hammering out given the two sides' different doctrines, force postures, goals, etc. noted earlier. This preparation has, in fact, been under way in the Reagan Administration for some time. When the President said his team was ready any time, he meant it substantively, not just logistically.

Such preparations, however critical, constitute just the first of several elements that furnish greater hope for progress in strategic arms control beginning in 1985:

—The absence of such a momentous event as NATO redressing the balance in Europe with the initial Euromissile deployments sets a better stage for success. It was, after all, the Soviet fixation on INF which provided such an ominous setting for arms control these past four years.

—One can safely presume that no matter how long the stagnation in Moscow persists, the Soviets will at least not change leadership as often as they did over the past four years. Again, this was debilitating since arms control inevitably involves tough trade-offs within each government as well as between them. Seldom over the past years was there much evidence that trade-offs were taking place behind those thick Kremlin walls.

—The strategic modernization program begun in 1981, based on a much stronger U.S. economy, offers the Soviets considerably more incentives to come to terms than previously existed. SDI adds measurably in this regard.

—Last is the simple fact of continuity of the Reagan Administration, with the expertise it has accumulated and the lessons it has learned about arms control in particular and dealing with the Soviet Union in general.

While we are ready and willing to achieve a broad agreement

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on nuclear weapons, the suggestion is sometimes made that we should limit the scope of strategic arms control to a few critical elements, e.g., warheads and launchers on ICBMs and SLBMs, and heavy bombers. Certainly, prospects of success in negotiation can rise as the number of items under negotiation falls—this approach has been advanced as a "quick fix"—and some of the toughest verification problems fade away as well.

This notion is novel only in degree, not in kind. For despite the label of "comprehensive" strategic arms accords, past agreements have not even attempted to limit all key measures of strategic power. Such critical measures as accuracy, reliability, and $C^3I$ simply cannot be controlled directly. But further trimming down the number of elements to be limited poses two difficulties. Deciding what to include and what to exclude becomes a nexus of disagreement between the two sides, each seeking to limit areas of the other's relative strength. Even graver a problem is the limited effectiveness of such an accord. In arms control—as in wage-price controls, pollution controls, or any type of controls—to limit only a few select elements is to let other elements run free. This can thwart, if not nullify, the whole enterprise. As with a balloon, when parts are pressed down, other areas bulge out.

Yet another approach to bring speedier, easier results is to limit an arms control agreement to broad principles rather than specific weapons systems or their characteristics. This approach contains all the strengths and deficiencies of the 1974 Vladivostok understanding. It can be more readily negotiated, with disagreements put aside or elevated to a common level of abstraction. Such accords, however, may be so abstract as to leave the two sides squabbling over just what the principles mean, and how they are to be applied. The United States and Soviet Union disagreed, *after* Vladivostok was signed, over whether the Backfire bombers and cruise missiles were or were not included. This is most unfortunate as, at the bare minimum, arms control is meant to reduce tensions between the United States and U.S.S.R., not to exacerbate them.

Focusing on arms control through agreements-in-principle could detract attention and energy from the need for real reductions of weapons. Moreover, a long line of broad "principles agreements" involving the United States and U.S.S.R. already exists, including the U.N. Charter, the 1972 Basic Principles Agreement, the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention

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of Nuclear War, and the 1975 Helsinki Accords, as well as the Vladivostok Accord. The most charitable thing that can be said about this panoply of signed documents is that strategic stability has not palpably improved because of them. George Marshall once said: "Don't ask me to agree in principle; that just means that we haven't agreed yet."

Another approach, and to me the most promising of innovative thoughts, is arms control through individual but (where possible) parallel policies: i.e., arms control without agreements (treaties, in particular). In simple terms, each side would take measures which enhance strategic stability and reduce nuclear weapons in consultation with each other—but not necessarily in a formalized, signed agreement. Those measures could be enunciated as national policies and could be confirmed in exchanges, ideally after some understandings or at least discussions with the Soviets. Not all aspects of arms control could or should be so fashioned. But some areas may benefit from less emphasis on the formal process—whether negotiations are on or off, whether one side puts forward a new proposal or another—and far more on the results—whether there is greater stability and fewer nuclear weapons on either or both sides. If the Soviets are willing, we can attain these results together in evolving parallel policies.

Adopting this approach of individual, parallel restraint could help avoid endless problems over what programs to exclude, which to include, and how to verify them. The focus should be on areas or strategic systems of greatest military importance. Arms control without agreements could be easier to discuss with the Soviets and quicker to yield concrete results. Being less formal, such arrangements could be more easily modified if circumstances change than could legally binding treaties.

While appearing novel, this approach of arms control without agreements is by no means new. Winston Churchill, in a March 1933 speech before Parliament, contrasted what he deemed the glaring deficiencies of formalized disarmament negotiations with the oft-hidden benefits of "private interchanges" in normal diplomatic discourse, such as: "'If you will not do this, we shall not have to do that,' 'If your program did not start so early ours would begin even later,' and so on." Churchill believed "a greater advance and progress towards a diminution of expenditure on armaments might have been achieved by

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these methods than by the conferences and schemes of disarmament which have been put forward at Geneva."[9]

At the dawn of strategic arms talks, others advocated a similar approach.[10] And, in a way, it has been practiced ever since. Today we have a policy of not undercutting SALT I and SALT II, as long as the Soviets show equal restraint, and a policy of reaffirming adherence to the obligations of the unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. The Soviets state similar policies. At times, a treaty has followed a period of unilateral restraint, as the 1962 unilateral U.S. renunciation of nuclear weapons in space helped lead five years later to the Outer Space Treaty, and as the 1969 unilateral U.S. renunciation of biological and toxin weapons helped lead three years later to the Biological Weapons Convention.

But such practices need not lead to full-blown treaties. The United States and U.S.S.R. hold discussions on nonproliferation—instituted on a regular, twice-yearly basis during the Reagan Administration—which are helpful to both sides and to world stability. The two countries talk, not about what they might talk about or when or where, but about the *real* difficulties of preventing problem countries from acquiring the bomb. Receiving less publicity enables them to work more productively, and continuously. When the Soviets suspended START, INF and MBFR at the close of 1983, they informed us that the nonproliferation dialogue would continue on schedule.

Strategic stability can be enhanced by making our forces less inviting to a Soviet first strike and less threatening in terms of a dangerous first strike potential. We need to communicate with the Soviets—explicitly through discussion, but if they refuse, then implicitly through example—on how to lower the incentives to launch nuclear weapons preemptively. We need to talk about how some systems are inherently more destabilizing in this regard, such as ICBMs, which provide scant warning time, are highly accurate, concentrated in firepower, and difficult to defend against. Other systems, such as strategic

[9] Winston S. Churchill, *While England Slept*, New York: G.P. Putnam, 1938, p. 48. Churchill went so far as to deem the Geneva disarmament process harmful, in the same speech to the Parliament: "The elaborate process of measuring swords around the table at Geneva. . .stirs all the deepest suspicions and anxieties of the various powers, and forces all the statesmen to consider many hypothetical contingencies which but for this prolonged process perhaps would not have crossed their minds."

[10] Thomas C. Schelling and Morton Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control*, New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961, p. 5; for full discussion see Chapter 8, pp. 77–90.

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bombers, are inherently more stabilizing because they are slower, can be recalled before they release their nuclear weapons, and are easier to defend against.

Finally, a fruitful dialogue could evolve into U.S.-Soviet discussions—without expectations of a legal document or even full agreement as a result—on crisis prevention, crisis management, increasing openness, and sharing more and accurate information. This could be done through discussions between U.S. cabinet officers and Soviet counterparts, or U.S. and Soviet regional experts or, best of all, under the arms control umbrella—all proposed by the President at the United Nations in September 1984. One can also envision a similar but wider dialogue between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which might profitably evolve from or even within the MBFR forum.

The second prime goal, reduction of nuclear weapons, can likewise be pursued by way of individual, or, better yet, reciprocal restraint. The United States has unilaterally reduced its own nuclear arsenal quite markedly over the past two decades, and many of these reductions took place before the beginning of the SALT process. At times, the arms control process itself has contributed to keeping obsolete and even dangerous nuclear weapons in the arsenal in order to bolster bargaining leverage for ongoing or prospective negotiations. NATO also unilaterally decided over the past half-decade to withdraw 2,400 nuclear weapons from its total arsenal. Both sets of reductions have been quite beneficial; having the effect of raising stability and lowering reliance on nuclear weapons, they constitute moves toward arms control without agreements. One can safely postulate that neither would have happened had it depended upon an arms control treaty.

While the trend in nuclear weaponry generally is toward smaller and safer devices, the trend in military strategy generally is to move away from our present heavy reliance upon nuclear weapons. SDI research, if productive, may eventually favor a non-nuclear defense over a nuclear offense, leading to a stable balance at much lower levels of nuclear weapons. Far closer to being realized are dramatic improvements in conventional weapons which could help us to raise the nuclear threshold; these weapons could reduce the chances of conventional wars which could then become nuclear, and they could assume military roles which, until now, could be filled only by nuclear weapons. With more accurate guidance systems and more effective conventional munitions ("smart weapons"), for ex-

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ample, conventional arms could be deployed to attack hardened point targets such as bunkers, bridge pylons and other targets behind enemy lines. New sub-munitions could delay and defeat massed Soviet armor with the effectiveness of nuclear weapons.

We need to swim with this technological tide. President Reagan is personally committed to working toward radically reducing the numbers and degree of reliance upon nuclear weapons. This goal can best be furthered by planning, along with our NATO allies, to build up our conventional forces in order to raise overall deterrence and to eliminate the need to use nuclear weapons early in response to a massive Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe.

All such steps must be carefully managed. We need to work closely with our allies and communicate precisely with the Soviets so that there would be no misunderstanding about our continuing deep commitment to NATO and its doctrine of flexible response. In particular, we in no way wish to make Western Europe "safe" for a conventional attack. The Alliance has depended upon nuclear deterrence to compensate for the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority since 1949, and will continue to do so in the future.

Our nuclear forces must serve the additional role—beyond deterring a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States—of "extended deterrence," helping to protect our friends and allies abroad against any type of armed attack from the Soviet bloc. In this endeavor we have reaped sweeping success; Europe is approaching a modern-day record, 40 years without war. No mean accomplishment.

Despite the possibilities of this approach—arms control without agreements—it could encounter stiff resistance here at home. Some conservatives could justifiably fear more unilateral than reciprocal or parallel restraint from this approach. But if that happened, if this approach created great pressures for harmful unilateral concessions, then it would and should readily lose support; it would soon be rendered ineffective. Moreover, conservative opponents could claim that the objective of arms control is to control Soviet forces, not ours. But arms control is not one-sided. It is not a zero-sum game. Both sides can gain by taking the right strategic steps on their own and in collaboration with each other, even while realizing that their strategic doctrines and tasks for strategic forces diverge substantially.

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Some liberals may be even more bothered, detecting here a devious way to kill arms control as practiced over the past half-generation. As stated, however, this approach would supplement, not supplant, the traditional track. Besides, they should see that, if successful, this manner of proceeding could result in fewer nuclear weapons and greater global stability, issues which should be of deepest concern to them. In addition, this approach could be applicable across many areas of arms control to supplement the traditional track.

In its greatest asset lies its greatest liability: blandness. Useful measures of restraint, even if reciprocal, constitute scant material for a media event, furnish no soaring political lift. Such moves are far more likely to further strategic stability and reduce nuclear weapons than they are to fill peoples' deep longing for an arms control treaty (sometimes used in the media interchangeably with "a peace treaty").

Certainly a primary role filled by the arms control process is to reassure the public that somehow, some way, its government is grappling with The Nuclear Issue. Pope John Paul II wrote the United Nations in June 1982 that the world should not be condemned to be "always susceptible to the real danger of explosion." It is painfully depressing to face up to the fact that the world is so poised, and may be condemned to remain so.

Throughout human history, hope has been as powerful and deep an emotion as fear, lust, aggression and love. Free people have rightly asked their governments to contend with the greatest of all human dilemmas involving the most awesome of all human weapons. Governments have a solemn obligation to do their very best. Arms control should not be allowed to degenerate. Rather, it should be molded into the most effective instrument we know how to fashion. Then the sweeping hopes long associated with arms control can be justified.

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*McGeorge Bundy*
*George F. Kennan*
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# THE PRESIDENT'S CHOICE: STAR WARS OR ARMS CONTROL

The reelection of Ronald Reagan makes the future of his Strategic Defense Initiative the most important question of nuclear arms competition and arms control on the national agenda since 1972. The President is strongly committed to this program, and senior officials, including Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, have made it clear that he plans to intensify this effort in his second term. Sharing the gravest reservations about this undertaking, and believing that unless it is radically constrained during the next four years it will bring vast new costs and dangers to our country and to mankind, we think it urgent to offer an assessment of the nature and hazards of this initiative, to call for the closest vigilance by Congress and the public, and even to invite the victorious President to reconsider. While we write only after obtaining the best technical advice we could find, our central concerns are political. We believe the President's initiative to be a classic case of good intentions that will have bad results because they do not respect reality.

This new initiative was launched by the President on March 23, 1983, in a surprising and quite personal passage at the end

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of a speech in praise of his other military programs. In that passage he called on our scientists to find means of rendering nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." In the briefings that surrounded the speech, Administration spokesmen made it clear that the primary objective was the development of ways and means of destroying hostile missiles—meaning in the main Soviet missiles—by a series of attacks all along their flight path, from their boost phase after launch to their entry into the atmosphere above the United States. Because of the central position the Administration itself gave to this objective, the program promptly acquired the name Star Wars, and the President's Science Advisor, George Keyworth, has admitted that this name is now indelible. We find it more accurately descriptive than the official "Strategic Defense Initiative."[1]

II

What is centrally and fundamentally wrong with the President's objective is that it cannot be achieved. The overwhelming consensus of the nation's technical community is that in fact there is no prospect whatever that science and technology can, at any time in the next several decades, make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." The program developed over the last 18 months, ambitious as it is, offers no prospect for a leak-proof defense against strategic ballistic missiles alone, and it entirely excludes from its range any effort to limit the effectiveness of other systems—bomber aircraft, cruise missiles, and smuggled warheads.

The President's hopes are entirely understandable. There must be very few Americans who have never shared them. All four of us, like Mr. Reagan, grew up in a world without nuclear weapons, and we believe with passion that the world would be a much safer place without them. Americans should be constantly on the alert for any possibilities that can help to reduce

[1] There has been an outpouring of technical comment on this subject, and even in a year and a half the arguments have evolved considerably. Two recent independent analyses on which we have drawn with confidence are *The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: A Technical, Political, and Arms Control Assessment*, by Sidney D. Drell, Philip J. Farley and David Holloway, A Special Report of the Center for International Security and Arms Control, July 1984, Stanford: Stanford University, 1984; and *The Fallacy of Star Wars* (based on studies conducted by the Union of Concerned Scientists and co-chaired by Richard L. Garwin, Kurt Gottfried, and Henry W. Kendall), John Tirman, ed., New York: Vintage, 1984.

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the nuclear peril in which we all live, and it is entirely natural that a hope of safety like the one the President held out should stir a warmly affirmative first response. But false hope, however strong and understandable, is a bad guide to action.

The notion that nuclear weapons, or even ballistic missiles alone, can be rendered impotent by science and technology is an illusion. It reflects not only technological hubris in the face of the very nature of nuclear weapons, but also a complete misreading of the relation between threat and response in the nuclear decisions of the superpowers.

The first and greatest obstacle is quite simply that these weapons are destructive to a degree that makes them entirely different from any other weapon in history. The President frequently observes that over the centuries every new weapon has produced some countervailing weapon, and up to Hiroshima he is right. But conventional weapons can be neutralized by a relatively low rate of kill, provided that the rate is sustained over time. The classic modern example is defense against nonnuclear bombing. If you lose one bomber in every ten sorties, your force will soon be destroyed. A pilot assigned to fly 30 missions will face a 95-percent prospect of being shot down. A ten-percent rate of kill is highly effective.

With nuclear weapons the calculation is totally different. Both Mr. Reagan's dream and his historical argument completely neglect the decisive fact that a very few nuclear weapons, exploding on or near population centers, would be hideously too many. At today's levels of superpower deployment—about 10,000 strategic warheads on each side—even a 95-percent kill rate would be insufficient to save either society from disintegration in the event of general nuclear war. Not one of Mr. Reagan's technical advisers claims that any such level of protection is attainable. They know better. In the words of the officer in charge of the program, Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, "a perfect defense is not a realistic thing." In response to searching questions from Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, the senior technical official of the Defense Department, Under Secretary Richard DeLauer, made it plain that he could not foresee any level of defense that would make our own offensive systems unnecessary.

Among all the dozens of spokesmen for the Administration, there is not one with any significant technical qualifications who has been willing to question Dr. DeLauer's explicit statement that "There's no way an enemy can't overwhelm your

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defenses if he wants to badly enough." The only senior official who continues to share the President's dream and assert his belief that it can come true is Caspar Weinberger, whose zealous professions of confidence are not accompanied by technical support.

The terrible power of nuclear weapons has a second meaning that decisively undermines the possibility of an effective Star Wars defense of populations. Not only is their destructive power so great that only a kill rate closely approaching 100 percent can give protection, but precisely because the weapons are so terrible neither of the two superpowers can tolerate the notion of "impotence" in the face of the arsenal of the opponent. Thus any prospect of a significantly improved American defense is absolutely certain to stimulate the most energetic Soviet efforts to ensure the continued ability of Soviet warheads to get through. Ever since Hiroshima it has been a cardinal principle of Soviet policy that the Soviet Union must have a match for any American nuclear capability. It is fanciful in the extreme to suppose that the prospect of any new American deployment which could undermine the effectiveness of Soviet missile forces will not be met by a most determined and sustained response.

This inevitable Soviet reaction is studiously neglected by Secretary Weinberger when he argues in defense of Star Wars that today's skeptics are as wrong as those who said we could never get to the moon. The effort to get to the moon was not complicated by the presence of an adversary. A platoon of hostile moon-men with axes could have made it a disaster. No one should understand the irrelevance of his analogy better than Mr. Weinberger himself. As secretary of defense he is bound to be familiar with the intensity of our own American efforts to ensure that our own nuclear weapons, whether on missiles or aircraft, will always be able to get through to Soviet targets in adequate numbers.

The technical analyses so far available are necessarily incomplete, primarily because of the very large distance between the President's proposal and any clearly defined system of defense. There is some truth in Mr. Weinberger's repeated assertion that one cannot fully refute a proposal that as yet has no real content. But already important and enduring obstacles have been identified. Two are systemic and ineradicable. First, a Star Wars defense must work perfectly the very first time, since it can never be tested in advance as a full system. Second, it

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must be triggered almost instantly, because the crucial boost phase of Soviet missiles lasts less than five minutes from the moment of launch. In that five minutes (which new launch technology can probably reduce to about 60 seconds), there must be detection, decision, aim, attack and kill. It is hard to imagine a scheme further removed from the kind of tested reliability and clear presidential control that we have hitherto required of systems involving nuclear danger.

There are other more general difficulties with the President's dream. Any remotely leak-proof defense against strategic missiles will require extensive deployments of many parts of the system in space, both for detection of any Soviet launch and, in most schemes, for transmission of the attack on the missile in its boost phase. Yet no one has been able to offer any hope that it will ever be easier and cheaper to deploy and defend large systems in space than for someone else to destroy them. The balance of technical judgment is that the advantage in any unconstrained contest in space will be with the side that aims to attack the other side's satellites. In and of itself this advantage constitutes a compelling argument against space-based defense.

Finally, as we have already noted, the President's program offers no promise of effective defense against anything but ballistic missiles. Even if we assume, against all the evidence, that a leak-proof defense could be achieved against these particular weapons, there would remain the difficulty of defense against cruise missiles, against bomber aircraft, and against the clandestine introduction of warheads. It is important to remember here that very small risks of these catastrophic events will be enough to force upon us the continuing need for our own deterrent weapons. We think it is interesting that among the strong supporters of the Star Wars scheme are some of the same people who were concerned about the danger of the strategic threat of the Soviet Backfire bomber only a few years ago. Is it likely that in the light of these other threats they will find even the best possible defense against missiles a reason for declaring our own nuclear weapons obsolete?

Inadvertent but persuasive proof of this failing has been given by the President's science adviser. Last February, in a speech in Washington, Mr. Keyworth recognized that the Soviet response to a truly successful Star Wars program would be to "shift their strategic resources to other weapons systems," and he made no effort to suggest that such a shift could be

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prevented or countered, saying: "*Let* the Soviets move to alternate weapons systems, to submarines, cruise missiles, advanced technology aircraft. Even the critics of the President's defense initiative agree that *those* weapons systems are far more stable deterrents than are ICBMs [land-based missiles]." Mr. Keyworth, in short, is willing to accept all these other means of warhead delivery, and he appears to be entirely unaware that by this acceptance he is conceding that even if Star Wars should succeed far beyond what any present technical consensus can allow us to believe, it would fail by the President's own standard.

The inescapable reality is that there is literally no hope that Star Wars can make nuclear weapons obsolete. Perhaps the first and most important political task for those who wish to save the country from the expensive and dangerous pursuit of a mirage is to make this basic proposition clear. As long as the American people believe that Star Wars offers real hope of reaching the President's asserted goal, it will have a level of political support unrelated to reality. The American people, properly and sensibly, would like nothing better than to make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete," but the last thing they want or need is to pay an astronomic bill for a vastly intensified nuclear competition sold to them under a false label. Yet that is what Star Wars will bring us, as a closer look will show.

## III

The second line of defense for the Star Wars program, and the one which represents the real hopes and convictions of both military men and civilians at the levels below the optimistic President and his enthusiastic secretary of defense, is not that it will ever be able to defend *all our people*, but rather that it will allow us to defend *some of our weapons and other military assets*, and so, somehow, restrain the arms race.

This objective is very different from the one the President has held out to the country, but it is equally unattainable. The Star Wars program is bound to exacerbate the competition between the superpowers in three major ways. It will destroy the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, our most important arms control agreement; it will directly stimulate both offensive and defensive systems on the Soviet side; and as long as it continues it will darken the prospect for significant improvement in the currently frigid relations between Moscow and

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Washington. It will thus sharpen the very anxieties the President wants to reduce.

As presented to Congress last March, the Star Wars program calls for a five-year effort of research and development at a total cost of $26 billion. The Administration insists that no decision has been made to develop or deploy any component of the potential system, but a number of hardware demonstrations are planned, and it is hoped that there can be an affirmative decision on full-scale system development in the early 1990s. By its very nature, then, the program is both enormous and very slow. This first $26 billion, only for research and development, is not much less than the full procurement cost of the new B-1 bomber force, and the timetable is such that Mr. Reagan's second term will end long before any deployment decision is made. Both the size and the slowness of the undertaking reinforce the certainty that it will stimulate the strongest possible Soviet response. Its size makes it look highly threatening, while its slowness gives plenty of time for countermeasures.

Meanwhile, extensive American production of offensive nuclear weapons will continue. The Administration has been at pains to insist that the Star Wars program in no way reduces the need for six new offensive systems. There are now two new land-based missiles, two new strategic bombers, and two different submarine systems under various stages of development. The Soviets regularly list several other planned American deployments as strategic because the weapons can reach the Soviet homeland. Mr. Reagan recognized at the very outset that "if paired with offensive systems," any defensive systems "can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that." But that is exactly how his new program, with its proclaimed emphasis on both offense and defense, is understood in Moscow.

We have been left in no doubt as to the Soviet opinion of Star Wars. Only four days after the President's speech, Yuri Andropov gave the Soviet reply:

> On the face of it, laymen may find it even attractive as the President speaks about what seem to be defensive measures. But this may seem to be so only on the face of it and only to those who are not conversant with these matters. In fact the strategic offensive forces of the United States will continue to be developed and upgraded at full tilt and along quite a definite line at that, namely that of acquiring a first nuclear strike capability. Under these conditions the intention to secure itself the possibility of destroying with the help of the ABM defenses the corresponding strategic systems of

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the other side, that is of rendering it unable of dealing a retaliatory strike, is a bid to disarm the Soviet Union in the face of the U.S. nuclear threat.[2]

The only remarkable elements in this response are its clarity and rapidity. Andropov's assessment is precisely what we should expect. Our government, of course, does not intend a first strike, but we are building systems which do have what is called in our own jargon a prompt hard-target kill capability, and the primary purpose of these systems is to put Soviet missiles at risk of quick destruction. Soviet leaders are bound to see such weapons as a first-strike threat. This is precisely the view that our own planners take of Soviet missiles with a similar capability. When the President launches a defensive program openly aimed at making Soviet missiles "impotent," while at the same time our own hard-target killers multiply, we cannot be surprised that a man like Andropov saw a threat "to disarm the Soviet Union."[3] Given Andropov's assessment, the Soviet response to Star Wars is certain to be an intensification of both its offensive and defensive strategic efforts.

Perhaps the easiest way to understand this political reality is to consider our own reaction to any similar Soviet announcement of intent. The very thought that the Soviet Union might plan to deploy effective strategic defenses would certainly produce a most energetic American response, and the first and most important element of that response would be a determination to ensure that a sufficient number of our own missiles would always get through.

Administration spokesmen continue to talk as if somehow the prospect of American defensive systems will in and of itself lead the Soviet government to move away from strategic missiles. This is a vain hope. Such a result might indeed be conceivable if Mr. Reagan's original dream were real—if we could somehow ever deploy a *perfect* defense. But in the real world no system will ever be leak-proof; no new system of any sort is in prospect for a decade and only a fragmentary capability for years thereafter; numerous powerful countermeasures are readily available in the meantime, and what is at stake

[2] Cited in Sidney Drell *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p.105.

[3] Richard Nixon has analyzed the possible impact of new defensive systems in even more striking terms: "Such systems would be destabilizing if they provided a shield so that you could use the sword." *Los Angeles Times*, July 1, 1984.

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from the Russian standpoint is the deterrent value of their largest and strongest offensive forces.

In this real world it is preposterous to suppose that Star Wars can produce anything but the most determined Soviet effort to make it fruitless. Dr. James Fletcher, chairman of an Administration panel that reviewed the technical prospects after the President's speech, has testified that "the ultimate utility . . . of this system will depend not only on the technology itself, but on the extent to which the Soviet Union agrees to mutual defense arrangements and offense limitations." The plain implication is that the Soviet Union can reduce the "utility" of Star Wars by refusing just such concessions. That is what we would do, and that is what they will do.

Some apologists for Star Wars, although not the President, now defend it on the still more limited ground that it can deny the Soviets a first-strike capability. That is conceivable, in that the indefinite proliferation of systems and countersystems would certainly create fearful uncertainties of all sorts on both sides. But as the Scowcroft Commission correctly concluded, the Soviets have no first-strike capability today, given our survivable forces and the ample existing uncertainties in any surprise attack. We believe there are much better ways than strategic defense to ensure that this situation is maintained. Even a tightly limited and partially effective local defense of missile fields—itself something vastly different from Star Wars—would require radical amendment or repudiation of the ABM Treaty and would create such interacting fears of expanding defenses that we strongly believe it should be avoided.

The President seems aware of the difficulty of making the Soviet Union accept his vision, and he has repeatedly proposed a solution that combines surface plausibility and intrinsic absurdity in a way that tells a lot about what is wrong with Star Wars itself. Mr. Reagan says we should give the Russians the secret of defense, once we find it, in return for their agreement to get rid of nuclear weapons. But the only kind of secret that could be used this way is one that exists only in Mr. Reagan's mind: a single magic formula that would make each side durably invulnerable. In the real world any defensive system will be an imperfect complex of technological and operational capabilities, full understanding of which would at once enable any adversary to improve his own methods of penetration. To share this kind of secret is to destroy its own effectiveness. Mr.

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Reagan's solution is as unreal as his original dream, and it rests on the same failure of understanding.

There is simply no escape from the reality that Star Wars offers not the promise of greater safety, but the certainty of a large-scale expansion of both offensive and defensive systems on both sides. We are not here examining the dismayed reaction of our allies in Europe, but it is precisely this prospect that they foresee, in addition to the special worries created by their recognition that the Star Wars program as it stands has nothing in it for them. Star Wars, in sum, is a prescription not for ending or limiting the threat of nuclear weapons, but for a competition unlimited in expense, duration and danger.

We have come this way before, following false hopes and finding our danger greater in the upshot. We did it when our government responded to the first Soviet atomic test by a decision to get hydrogen bombs if we could, never stopping to consider in any serious way whether both sides would be better off not to test such a weapon. We did it again, this time in the face of strong and sustained warning, when we were the first to deploy the multiple warheads (MIRVs) that now face us in such excessive numbers on Soviet missiles. Today, 15 years too late, we have a consensus that MIRVs are bad for us, but we are still deploying them, and so are the Russians.

IV

So far we have been addressing the question of new efforts for strategic defense with only marginal attention to their intimate connection with the future of the most important single arms control agreement that we and the Soviet Union share, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. The President's program, because of the inevitable Soviet reaction to it, has already had a heavily damaging impact on prospects for any early progress in strategic arms control. It has thrown a wild card into a game already impacted by mutual suspicion and by a search on both sides for unattainable unilateral advantage. It will soon threaten the very existence of the ABM Treaty.

That treaty outlaws any Star Wars defense. Research is permitted, but the development of space-based systems cannot go beyond the laboratory stage without breaking the Treaty. That would be a most fateful step. We strongly agree with the finding of the Scowcroft Commission, in its final report of March 1984, that "the strategic implications of ballistic missile defense and the criticality of the ABM Treaty to further arms

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control agreements dictate extreme caution in proceeding to engineering development in this sensitive area."

The ABM Treaty stands at the very center of the effort to limit the strategic arms race by international agreements. It became possible when the two sides recognized that the pursuit of defensive systems would inevitably lead to an expanded competition and to greater insecurity for both. In its underlying meaning, the Treaty is a safeguard less against defense as such than against unbridled competition. The continuing and excessive competition that still exists in offensive weapons would have been even worse without the ABM Treaty, which removed from the calculations of both sides any fear of an early and destabilizing defensive deployment. The consequence over the following decade was profoundly constructive. Neither side attempted a defensive deployment that predictably would have given much more fear to the adversary than comfort to the possessor. The ABM Treaty, in short, reflected a common understanding of exactly the kinds of danger with which Star Wars now confronts the world. To lose the Treaty in pursuit of the Star Wars mirage would be an act of folly.

The defense of the ABM Treaty is thus a first requirement for all who wish to limit the damage done by the Star Wars program. Fortunately the Treaty has wide public support, and the Administration has stated that it plans to do nothing in its five-year program that violates any Treaty clause. Yet by its very existence the Star Wars effort is a threat to the future of the ABM Treaty, and some parts of the announced five-year program raise questions of Treaty compliance. The current program envisions a series of hardware demonstrations, and one of them is described as "an advanced boost-phase detection and tracking system." But the ABM Treaty specifically forbids both the development and the testing of any "spaced-based" components of an anti-ballistic missile system. We find it hard to see how a boost-phase detection system could be anything but space-based, and we are not impressed by the Administration's claim that such a system is not sufficiently significant to be called "a component."

We make this point not so much to dispute the detailed shape of the current program as to emphasize the strong need for close attention in Congress to the protection of the ABM Treaty. The Treaty has few defenders in the Administration—the President thought it wrong in 1972, and Mr. Weinberger thinks so still. The managers of the program are under more

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pressure for quick results than for proposals respectful of the Treaty. In this situation a heavy responsibility falls on Congress, which has already shown this year that it has serious reservations about the President's dream. Interested members of Congress are well placed to ensure that funds are not provided for activities that would violate the Treaty. In meeting this responsibility, and indeed in monitoring the Star Wars program as a whole, Congress can readily get the help of advisers drawn from among the many outstanding experts whose judgment has not been silenced or muted by co-option. Such use of independent counselors is one means of repairing the damage done by the President's unfortunate decision to launch his initiative without the benefit of any serious and unprejudiced scientific assessment.

The Congress should also encourage the Administration toward a new and more vigorous effort to insist on respect for the ABM Treaty by the Soviet government as well. Sweeping charges of Soviet cheating on arms control agreements are clearly overdone. It is deeply unimpressive, for example, to catalogue asserted violations of agreements which we ourselves have refused to ratify. But there is one quite clear instance of large-scale construction that does not appear to be consistent with the ABM Treaty—a large radar in central Siberia near the city of Krasnoyarsk. This radar is not yet in operation, but the weight of technical judgment is that it is designed for the detection of incoming missiles, and the ABM Treaty, in order to forestall effective missile defense systems, forbade the erection of such early warning radars except along the borders of each nation. A single highly vulnerable radar installation is of only marginal importance in relation to any large-scale breakout from the ABM Treaty, but it does raise exactly the kinds of questions of intentional violation which are highly destructive in this country to public confidence in arms control.

On the basis of informed technical advice, we think the most likely purpose of the Krasnoyarsk radar is to give early warning of any attack by submarine-based U.S. missiles on Soviet missile fields. Soviet military men, like some of their counterparts in our own country, appear to believe that the right answer to the threat of surprise attack on missiles is a policy of launch-under-attack, and in that context the Krasnoyarsk radar, which fills an important gap in Soviet warning systems, becomes understandable. Such understanding does not make the radar anything else but a violation of the express language of the

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Treaty, but it does make it a matter which can be discussed and resolved without any paralyzing fear that it is a clear first signal of massive violations yet to come. Such direct and serious discussion with the Soviets might even allow the two sides to consider together the intrinsic perils in a common policy of launch-under-attack. But no such sensitive discussions will be possible while Star Wars remains a non-negotiable centerpiece of American strategic policy.

Equal in importance to defending the ABM Treaty is preventing hasty overcommitment of financial and scientific resources to totally unproven schemes overflowing with unknowns. The President's men seem determined to encourage an atmosphere of crisis commitment to just such a manner of work, and repeated comparisons to the Manhattan Project of 1942–45, small in size and crystal-clear in purpose by comparison, are not comforting. On the shared basis of conviction that the President's dream is unreal, members of Congress can and should devote themselves with energy to the prevention of the kind of vested interest in very large-scale ongoing expenditures which has so often kept alive other programs that were truly impotent, in terms of their own announced objectives. We believe that there is not much chance that deployments remotely like those currently sketched in the Star Wars program will ever in fact occur. The mere prospect of them will surely provoke the Russians to action, but it is much less likely that paying for them will in the end make sense to the American people. The larger likelihood is that on their way to oblivion these schemes will simply cost us tens and even hundreds of billions of wasted dollars.[4]

In watching over the Star Wars budget the Congress may find it helpful to remember the summary judgment that Senator Arthur Vandenberg used to offer on programs he found wanting: "The end is unattainable, the means hare-brained, and the cost staggering." But at the same time we believe strongly in the continuation of the long-standing policy of maintaining a prudent level of research on the scientific possibilities for defense. Research at a level ample for insurance

[4] The Russians have their own program, of course. But they are not about to turn our technological flank in the technologies crucial for ABM systems. "According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the United States has a lead in computers, optics, automated control, electro-optical sensors, propulsion, radar, software, telecommunications, and guidance systems." Drell *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

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against some Soviet surprise can be continued at a fraction of the cost of the present Star Wars program. Such a change of course would have the great advantage of preventing what would otherwise be a grave distortion of priorities not only in defense research but in the whole national scientific effort.

V

This has not been a cheerful analysis, or one that we find pleasant to present. If the President makes no major change of course in his second term, we see no alternative to a long, hard, damage-limiting effort by Congress. But we choose to end on a quite different note. We believe that any American president who has won reelection in this nuclear age is bound to ask himself with the greatest seriousness just what he wants to accomplish in his second term. We have no doubt of the deep sincerity of President Reagan's desire for good arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, and we believe his election night assertion that what he wants most in foreign affairs is to reach just such agreements. We are also convinced that if he asks serious and independent advisers what changes in current American policy will help most to make such agreements possible in the next four years, he will learn that it is possible to reach good agreements, or possible to insist on the Star Wars program as it stands, but wholly impossible to do both. At exactly that point, we believe, Mr. Reagan could, should, and possibly would encourage the serious analysis of his negotiating options that did not occur in his first term.

We do not here explore these possibilities in detail. They would certainly include a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty, and an effort to improve it by broadening its coverage and tightening some of its language. There should also be a further exploration of the possibility of an agreement that would safeguard the peaceful uses of space, uses that have much greater value to us than to the Soviets. We still need and lack a reliable cap on strategic warheads, and while Mr. Reagan has asked too much for too little in the past, he is right to want reductions. He currently has some advisers who fear all forms of arms control, but advisers can be changed. We are not suggesting that the President will change his course lightly. We simply believe that he does truly want real progress on arms control in his second term, and that if he ever comes to understand that he must choose between the two, he will choose the pursuit of agreement over the demands of Star Wars.

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We have one final deep and strong belief. We think that if there is to be a real step away from nuclear danger in the next four years, it will have to begin at the level of high politics, with a kind of communication between Moscow and Washington that we have not seen for more than a decade. One of the most unfortunate aspects of the Star Wars initiative is that it was launched without any attempt to discuss it seriously, in advance, with the Soviet government. It represented an explicit expression of the President's belief that we should abandon the shared view of nuclear defense that underlies not only the ABM Treaty but all our later negotiations on strategic weapons. To make a public announcement of a change of this magnitude without any effort to discuss it with the Soviets was to ensure increased Soviet suspicion. This error, too, we have made in earlier decades. If we are now to have renewed hope of arms control, we must sharply elevate our attention to the whole process of communication with Moscow.

Such newly serious communication should begin with frank and explicit recognition by both sides that the problem of nuclear danger is in its basic reality a *common* problem, not just for the two of us, but for all the world—and one that we shall never resolve if we cannot transcend negotiating procedures that give a veto to those in each country who insist on the relentlessly competitive maintenance and enlargement of what are already, on both sides, exorbitantly excessive forces.

If it can ever be understood and accepted, as a starting point for negotiation, that our community of interest in the problem of nuclear danger is greater than all our various competitive concerns put together, there can truly be a renewal of hope, and a new prospect of a shared decision to change course together. Alone among the presidents of the last 12 years, Ronald Reagan has the political strength to lead our country in this new direction if he so decides. The renewal of hope cannot be left to await another president without an appeal to the President and his more sober advisers to take a fresh hard look at Star Wars, and then to seek arms control instead.

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*Zbigniew Brzezinski*

# THE FUTURE OF YALTA

Yalta is unfinished business. It has a longer past and it may have a more ominous future than is generally recognized. Forty years after the fateful Crimean meeting of February 4–11, 1945, between the Allied Big Three of World War II, much of our current preoccupation with Yalta focuses on its myth rather than on its continuing historical significance.

The myth is that at Yalta the West accepted the division of Europe. The fact is that Eastern Europe had been conceded de facto to Josef Stalin by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill as early as the Teheran Conference (in November–December 1943), and at Yalta the British and American leaders had some halfhearted second thoughts about that concession. They then made a last-ditch but ineffective effort to fashion some arrangements to assure at least a modicum of freedom for Eastern Europe, in keeping with Anglo-American hopes for democracy on the European continent as a whole. The Western statesmen failed, however, to face up to the ruthlessness of the emerging postwar Soviet might, and in the ensuing clash between Stalinist power and Western naïvete, power prevailed.

Yalta's continuing significance lies in what it reveals about Russia's enduring ambitions toward Europe as a whole. Yalta was the last gasp of carefully calibrated Soviet diplomacy designed to obtain Anglo-American acquiescence to a preponderant Soviet role in all of Europe. At Yalta, in addition to timidly reopening the issue of Eastern Europe, the West also deflected, but again in a vague and timorous fashion, Soviet aspirations for a dominant position in the western extremity of the Eurasian land mass.

Yalta thus remains of great geopolitical significance because it symbolizes the unfinished struggle for the future of Europe. Forty years after Yalta that struggle still involves America and Russia, but by now it should be clear that the issue is unlikely

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to be resolved in a historically constructive manner until a more active role is assumed by the very object of the contest, Europe itself.

II

The setting for Yalta was prostrated Europe. That once globally dominant civilization had committed historical suicide in the course of two devastating wars fought within the span of a mere quarter-century. When the two leaders of the British and American democracies met with the Georgian tyrant of the Great Russian Empire to resolve the future of Europe, continental Europe was absent from the deliberations. In the meantime, much of Europe's future was being decided on the ground, by the great extra-European armies pushing from the east and the west into Germany, the heart of Europe.

Until Yalta, the key issue perplexing the wartime alliance was Poland, the key to control of Eastern Europe. Thereafter, the issue has increasingly been Germany, the key to control over Western Europe. Poland represented to Moscow the gate to the West, and thus the Kremlin in its wartime diplomacy adopted an attitude of utter intransigence on the question of Poland's future. Though in his memoirs Churchill later described the Polish issue as "the first of the great causes which led to the breakdown of the Grand Alliance," neither he nor his Atlantic partner, President Roosevelt, seemed to grasp the central strategic importance of the Polish issue; nor was either of them inclined to exploit Russia's initial weakness to obtain a satisfactory resolution of the Polish-Soviet dispute, initiated by the Soviet seizure of almost half of Poland in 1939 as a result of the Stalin-Ribbentrop agreement.

Stalin correctly saw in the territorial dispute the opportunity to transform Polish independence into dependence on Moscow. So did the Poles. Prior to the Teheran meeting, the Polish prime minister desperately warned Churchill (as recorded by Sir William Strang on September 9, 1943) that "what was at stake between Poland and Russia was not merely a question of frontiers but a question of general relations and indeed the question of the survival of Poland as an independent state. . . ."[1] A month later, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden reported to the British War Cabinet that the Polish prime

[1] This, and the other documents cited, are contained in the very useful collection edited by A. Polonsky, *The Great Powers and the Polish Question*, London: L.S.E., 1976. See also V. Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1979.

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minister had told him on October 6, "The general attitude of Stalin towards Poland, towards Germany and the Free German movement and towards questions touching other occupied countries, as well as his record and his whole mentality, implied more extensive ambitions than ambitions only in the eastern provinces of Poland which were strategically important to Poland but in no sense vital to Russia." Finally, on the eve of the Teheran meeting, Eden briefed the War Cabinet on November 22 that the Poles feared "that Russia's long-term aim is to set up a puppet government in Warsaw and turn Poland into a Soviet republic. . . ."

The British took a more benign view of Stalin's goals. Eden assured the Poles "that British experience suggested that Stalin was much less intransigent . . .," and his internal memorandum on preparations for the forthcoming Teheran Conference makes it clear that the United Kingdom was prepared to satisfy Stalin's territorial goals in the hope that this would produce acceptable political arrangements. If anything, the Americans were even more inclined to gratify Stalin. In keeping with the foregoing, at Teheran in late November and early December 1943, both Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to changes in the Polish frontiers, without any further consultation with the Poles, and more generally conceded to Moscow a preponderant role in the Balkans.

To make matters worse, while pressing the Poles to make territorial concessions to Moscow in the hope of assuaging Russian desires, the British and Americans were unwilling to offer the Poles any assurances regarding compensation in the West. Adopting the position that changes in Germany's frontiers must await the end of the war, London and Washington made the Polish plight more desperate. As a result, most Poles simply refused any compromise on the grounds that a truncated Poland could not survive as an independent entity, while others, shocked and embittered, increasingly saw in Moscow the only sponsor of major Polish territorial acquisition of German territory as a compensation for what was to be absorbed by Russia. The price, however, was the inevitable emergence of Polish dependence on Russia, and through it Soviet domination over Eastern Europe.

By the time of Yalta, not only was Poland occupied by the Red Army, but a new government, sponsored by Stalin, had been installed in Warsaw. At Yalta, the West exacted Soviet promises that the Soviet-installed government would be en-

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larged and would hold free elections, following which the West would recognize it, but Western leaders agreed not to have any binding obligations regarding the elections inserted into the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Yalta Conference. As a result, how free elections were to be organized remained an exclusive Soviet prerogative, with the outcome thereby predetermined. (Indeed, the Western powers recognized the Warsaw government in mid-1945, even though—contrary to the Yalta agreement—no elections had been held.)

III

By finally foreclosing the issue of Poland in Russia's favor, Yalta opened the battle for the future of Germany. Eastern Poland had been incorporated into the Soviet Union, but the West continued to oppose major Polish expansion at Germany's expense. The Russians at first hesitated in deciding how extensively they ought to support Polish claims. But at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, following Germany's final collapse, Stalin apparently concluded that with his armies firmly implanted in the middle of Germany he could afford to satisfy Polish needs (thereby permanently cementing Polish dependence on Russia), while continuing to wage his struggle for a preeminent Soviet role in Western Europe.

For Stalin, that struggle was the vital substance of his wartime alliance with the West. Late in 1943, on the eve of the Teheran Conference, Stalin, whose armies were then still fighting on Soviet soil, had succeeded in obtaining Western accord for a major Soviet role in both postwar Germany and Italy, and Western acquiescence to the scuttling of the Polish-Czechoslovak plans for a Central European confederation which might have presented an obstacle to Soviet domination over the region.

The Teheran Conference further nurtured Stalins's grandiose hopes that the British would be unable and the Americans unwilling to oppose his larger designs, which he revealed cautiously, while continuously probing the intentions and the will of his British and American interlocutors. Throughout, Stalin and his associates skillfully played on the anti-imperialist sentiments of the Americans to weaken the British role in any postwar arrangements and on the British rivalry with France to make certain that no center of effective power would emerge in postwar Western Europe. In the Soviet interpretation,

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Roosevelt's penchant for speaking of the world's "four policemen" could have had only one geopolitical meaning: America's central concern would be the Western Hemisphere, a weak China would be preoccupied with its own problems, and a bankrupt Britain would be enmeshed in its imperial dilemmas, leaving most of Eurasia to the care of the fourth policeman.

In testing Western reactions to his design, Stalin used as bait two somewhat varying schemes for Europe. Though one will never know to what extent these plans were alternative scenarios or competing concepts, both plans provided for a major Soviet role in all of Europe. The two options were succinctly summed up in a conversation on August 31, 1943, between British Foreign Minister Eden and the Soviet ambassador to London, Ivan Maisky, as reported by Eden:

> . . . Maisky continued that there were two possible ways of trying to organize Europe after the war. Either we could agree each to have a sphere of interest, the Russians in the East and ourselves and the Americans in the West. He did not himself think this was a good plan, but if it were adopted we should be at liberty to exclude the Russians from French Affairs, the Mediterranean and so forth, and the Russians would claim similar freedom in the East. If, on the other hand, we would both, and the United States also, agree that all Europe was one, as his Government would greatly prefer, then we must each admit the right of the other to an interest in all parts of Europe. If we were concerned with Czechoslovakia and Poland, and the United States with the Baltic States, then we must understand Russian concern in respect of France and the Mediterranean. . . .[2]

The latter variant was apparently advocated at least until Yalta by Maxim Litvinov, the former Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs and former ambassador to Washington. Postulated on the unstated assumption that America would disengage militarily from Europe but that at least a semblance of congeniality between the Soviet Union and its principal wartime allies would continue even after the war, and bound to appeal to the idealistic American dislike of spheres of influence, the plan envisaged not only a Soviet role in all of occupied Germany but in effect a thinly camouflaged arrangement for a Europe dominated indirectly by the Soviet Union, the only effective power in the region. British influence was to be confined to several narrow maritime enclaves, France was to play a negligible role, while continued Soviet-American accommodation would be tacitly premised on American noninvolve-

[2] Polonsky, *op. cit.*

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ment in European affairs. There can be little doubt that the Soviets took seriously Roosevelt's repeated hints both at Teheran and even later at Yalta that the United States would not maintain a postwar military presence in Europe. Given their ideological cast, they must also have been reassured by Roosevelt's tendency to speak privately to Stalin in most negative terms both of the British and of the French, seeing in that confirmation of their theory of "inherent capitalist contradictions."

The alternative to this strategy of domination through Western acquiescence was associated with Litvinov's principal rival and successor at the helm for foreign affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov. It took more for granted that an American-Soviet collision would eventually occur, presumably after the expected U.S. disengagement from Europe and probably in the context of sharpened intercapitalist conflicts. Molotov's alternative strategy of exclusive control by fait accompli put more emphasis, therefore, on directly subordinating eastern Europe and as much of central Europe as possible, while vigorously asserting Soviet claims to a major role in the West and to a coequal veto-wielding status in relations with the United States. In more specific discussions regarding postwar arrangements for Germany, Stalin was careful to keep his options open. At times he seemed to be favoring a central German government, at other times he would opt for the fragmentation of Germany into several constituent states. In either case, he was always insistent that the Soviet Union have a major say in all of Germany, while making certain that no major West European power was reconstituted.

As the Soviet armies marched westward, Stalin's claims became more explicit both territorially and politically. In addition to retaining everything seized during the collaboration with Hitler, by late 1944 and early 1945 the Soviet Union made territorial demands on Norway (Bear Island and the Spitzbergen) and regarding the Far East (southern Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, and a preponderant role in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia). Stalin also sought a share in controlling Tangier and a slice of the Italian colonies on the Mediterranean, in addition to proposals for joint action against Franco's Spain and increased political pressure on neutral Switzerland and Sweden. This was followed later by demands for territorial concessions by Turkey. Moreover, the Soviets consistently

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spoke of France as totally demoralized and worthless, underlining the proposition that Europe was a political vacuum.

Anglo-American surprise and protracted failure to come to grips with the scope of these Soviet ambitions is all the more remarkable when one considers the extent to which Stalin's aspirations mirrored traditional Russian goals. Indeed, they so closely replicated Tsarist objectives in World War I that one may suspect that old Russian planning papers were disinterred for Stalin's and Molotov's use. Some 30 years earlier, in late 1914, the Russian Council of Ministers had also considered the related problems of Poland and of Russian postwar objectives. The majority report focused on the restoration of a Polish kingdom, but under Imperial Russian sway, as Russia's major postwar objective. However, the minority report prepared by the more reactionary members went beyond that priority and defined Russian war objectives much more ambitiously.

Russia's general aims were stated as involving the "strengthening of Russia herself, in an ethnic, economic and strategic way"; in addition to "the possible weakening of Germanism as the chief enemy of Slavdom and Russia at the present time"; and to "the possible liberation of other Slavic peoples from the authority of Germany and Austria-Hungary (insofar as such liberation does not conflict with the direct interests of Russia)." To accomplish the above, Russia was to attain the following specific goals in order of importance:

> (1) Completion of the historic task of uniting all sections of the Russian people by reuniting eastern Galicia, northern Bukovina and Carpathian Rus' with Russia.
>
> (2) Realization of the historic tasks of Russia in the Black Sea by the annexation of Tsar'grad (Constantinople) and the Turkish Straits.
>
> (3) Rectification of the borders of the Russian state at the expense of East Prussia and also in Asiatic Turkey.
>
> (4) The weakening of Germany internally in every possible way by means of her complete territorial reconstruction on a new basis, with a possible decrease in Prussian territory to the advantage of France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark and the smaller German states as well, and, perhaps, the restoration of the Kingdom of Hanover, Hesse-Nassau, etc.
>
> (5) Unification and liberation of Poland within the widest possible boundaries, but, in any case, within limits which are ethnographic rather than historic (which would be contrary to the basic interest and entire history of Russia).
>
> (6) Liberation of the remaining Austrian Slavs.[3]

[3] Gifford D. Malone, quoting *Russko-pol'skie otnosheniia v period mirovoi voiny* (Moscow, 1926), in *Russian Diplomacy and Eastern Europe, 1914–1917*, New York: King's Crown, 1963, pp. 20–21, 139–40.

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What is striking about these war aims, drafted by the more nationalistic and reactionary members of the Council, is their identity with Soviet post-World War II objectives defined by Stalin and Molotov. Every one of the objectives became Stalin's: the incorporation of parts of Polish Galicia never previously held by Russia and of Czechoslovak Sub-Carpathia were identical with the first 1914 goal; the second objective was denied to the Soviets, but they did press for it in their conversations with the Western allies (presumably recalling that in the spring of 1915 France and Britain had conceded as much to Tsarist Russia); the third objective was obtained in East Prussia (again a surprise to Westerners), and the Soviets in 1945 pressed for territorial concessions from Turkey but without success; the fourth was achieved in a different form in Germany; the fifth pushed Poland further west than was thought possible in 1914 but with functionally the same result—the creation of a Poland highly dependent on Russia for its territorial integrity.

One can thus classify Soviet wartime objectives as falling into three categories: first, recovery of the territorial status quo ante as of June 1941; second, securing politically acquiescent regimes in east-central Europe; third, gaining a preponderant voice regarding the political organization of the rest of Europe. The Soviets were totally unyielding and quite open about the first objective; they were prepared, however, to camouflage the second objective if it served to promote the attainment of the third goal. It is easy to forget how uncertain at the time was America's postwar role in Europe, while American unwillingness during wartime to focus concretely on postwar issues fortified the expectation that it would again turn inward. As Soviet forces moved westward, their pursuit of the second objective became more brazen, and it assumed brutal manifestations when it dawned upon the Soviets that there might not be an American acquiescence to the attainment of the third objective. That realization dawned on Stalin and his colleagues with increasing intensity after Yalta.

## IV

Yalta can therefore be said to have initiated the postwar struggle for Europe. Yet it was hailed in the West as an unmitigated diplomatic triumph, foreshadowing a period of prolonged East-West accommodation. Forty years later this very same Yalta continues to evoke equally simplistic—though opposite—emotions. It is now the synonym for betrayal. At

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the time its decisions were said (according to a *New York Times* editorial of February 13, 1945) to "justify and surpass most of the hopes placed on this fateful meeting . . . they show the way to an early victory in Europe, to a secure peace and to a brighter world."

Sumner Wells might be accused of some partiality when he announced (in *The Washington Post* on February 28, 1945) that ". . . the Declaration of Yalta, whatever the future may bring forth, will always stand out as a gigantic step forward toward the ultimate establishment of a peaceful and orderly world." But even such an experienced observer as Walter Lippmann was not to be outdone. Writing in *The New York Herald Tribune* on February 15, 1945, Lippmann informed his readers that Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt "have checked and reversed the normal tendency of a victorious coalition to dissolve as the war, which called it into being, approaches its end. . . . The military alliance is proving itself to be no transitory thing, good only in the presence of a common enemy, but in truth the nucleus and core of a new international order."

Skeptical voices were few and far between. *The Wall Street Journal* warned on February 16, 1945, that the Yalta deal on central Europe "can only lead to increasingly unsatisfactory relations between the United States and Russia"; while a perceptive Frenchman, Andre Visson, (writing in *The Washington Post* on February 18, 1945, in an article entitled "Big Powers and Small Nations") noted that the United States was finally becoming committed to the future of Europe and was showing signs of a willingness even to contest the Soviet domination over Eastern Europe—unlike at Teheran, where it seemed uninterested in postwar arrangements and willing to settle for "the division of Europe into two zones of influence."

In fact, Yalta was the last effort by the wartime partners to construct the postwar world jointly. Unlike Teheran, where Churchill was still clearly Roosevelt's equal, at Yalta the lead was taken by the Americans, foreshadowing the bipolar world that was in fact emerging. The real collision at Yalta was between Roosevelt's well-meaning vagueness about arrangements for Europe's postwar future and Stalin's studied vagueness about the extent of Russia's desire to dominate that future. The former desperately wanted to believe in postwar cooperation while the latter deliberately exploited that faith to create facts on the ground while pressing for Western acceptance of

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Soviet claims in both the west and the far east of the Eurasian continent.

As a result, the Yalta declarations were manifestly escapist in character. The provisions regarding free elections in Poland were at best a transparent fig leaf for outright Soviet domination, while the rhetoric concerning future peace simply obscured the emerging and very basic differences between the major powers. However, that rhetoric did serve to further delude Western public opinion regarding Russia's true intentions, thereby making it more difficult for the Western democracies to cope effectively with the emerging East-West confrontation.

By failing to construct an agreed-upon world, while in effect sanctioning the concessions made earlier at Teheran, Yalta became subsequently the symbol of Europe's partition. The follow-on meeting at Potsdam was merely a contentious session to carve the spoils. It was at Yalta that the Westerners belatedly had their first inklings that the concession of Eastern Europe to Soviet domination might be the beginning of the contest for central and Western Europe, while to Stalin Western reticence regarding satisfaction of the wider Soviet goals foreshadowed a more difficult political struggle than apparently anticipated earlier. Henceforth, the increasingly overt preoccupation of Soviet policy became one of driving the United States out of Eurasia.

V

That preoccupation has endured for the 40 subsequent years—and today it is still the central motif of Soviet foreign policy. Its concomitant is the determination to prevent the emergence of a genuine Europe motivated by shared political will. The last four decades, however, also reveal an important strategic lesson: what has come to be seen as the legacy of Yalta—namely the partitioned Europe—can only be undone either in Soviet favor through Litvinov's more subtle design of domination through acquiescence, or to Europe's historical advantage by the emergence of a truly European Europe capable both of attracting Eastern Europe and of diluting Soviet control over the region. America does not have the power or the will to change basically the situation in Eastern Europe, while crude and heavy-handed Soviet efforts to intimidate West Europe merely consolidate the Atlantic connection.

Of the two principal sides, it has been the Soviet that has

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sought much more persistently than the American to achieve a geopolitical breakthrough, settling the fate of Eurasia. Yalta had stimulated Soviet anxieties that America might not in fact disengage totally from Europe; Potsdam reinforced them, while the subsequent announcement of the Marshall Plan confirmed Moscow's worst fears: America, contrary to Stalin's hopes and expectations, was becoming implanted on the continent, de facto checking the expansion of Soviet power.

Subsequent history has been punctuated by more overt and direct Soviet efforts to challenge that reality head-on—above and beyond the relentless attempts to undermine it. The political campaign against the Marshall Plan, and Stalin's open decision to keep both Czechoslovakia and Poland out of it, were undertaken in the context of the strategic conclusion that not only would America remain engaged in European affairs but that a protracted political conflict was now inevitable. The subsequent Berlin crisis was thus an important test of will, designed to challenge America's suddenly improvised determination to play a major role in the truncated Germany.

It is important to be clear about it: neither Stalin's blockade of Berlin, nor Khrushchev's Berlin crisis of a decade later, was about Berlin itself. In both cases, the stake was the American security connection with Western Europe. This is why both Stalin and Khrushchev were willing to risk even a period of very high tension—dangerously high tension—with America, something which Berlin itself did not merit. Had the Soviets prevailed, Germany would have been panicked, and the vaunted American commitment to the defense of Europe would have been rendered impotent. The geopolitical effect of a Soviet success in Berlin would have been to establish Soviet paramountcy over Western Europe.

Though the two Berlin crises were the most overt indicators of the enduring Soviet determination to sever the Atlantic security connection, Soviet diplomacy throughout the postwar era has pursued also the cardinal objective of ensuring that a geopolitically vital Europe does not surface as a competitor or even as a neighbor. Soviet foreign policy—using all its diplomatic leverage as well as such overt and hidden tools as the West European Communist parties and the myriad of fellow travelers—has been active in opposing such schemes as the European Defense Community, and it has above all persistently tried to place obstacles in the way of the Common Market's evolution toward a political personality. Even if Western Eu-

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rope cannot be severed from America, it must at least be kept divided and weak.

The commitment to the goal of expelling America from Europe is not just lingering in the Kremlin. It animates the current Soviet leadership, a leadership more Stalinist in substance than any since 1953. Attempting to exploit the West European "peace movements" and unease regarding the anti-Soviet rhetoric of the Reagan Administration, the current Soviet leadership decided to elevate the INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) issue into a new test of will, again making the Atlantic security connection the ultimate stake. The Soviet decision to refuse to negotiate with the United States on arms control issues unless the United States dismantles and removes its Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles is tantamount to an attempt to impose on America a public humiliation with wide-ranging strategic consequences. It is the functional equivalent to the earlier Berlin crises.

But the Soviet leadership has again overreached itself. Its heavy-handed tactics contributed to the defeat of the neutralist Social Democratic Party in Germany, to the discrediting of the unilateral disarmers in the Labour Party in Britain, and to the strong show of solidarity with America displayed by Europe on this issue. (Parenthetically, one may add that almost simultaneously the present Soviet leadership has stimulated in Japan the highest degree of anti-Sovietism since World War II.) It did so because it overestimated the depth of the neutralist sentiments and the extent of the West European, even the German, stake in the East-West détente. It may also have overestimated the impact on West European public opinion of the greatly increased Soviet strategic power, especially in comparison to the Berlin crises of the late 1940s and the late 1950s. The Soviet leaders may have calculated that the combination of a specifically West European interest in détente with the growing fear of Soviet military power (especially with the massive deployment of the SS-20s targeted on Western Europe) might stampede the West Europeans—even if not the Americans—into a unilateral accommodation. They thus relied too much on simple political intimidation.

Nonetheless, in addition to noting Soviet persistence in seeking to achieve the subordination of Western Europe, it is important not to be overly reassured by the Soviet failure. For that failure is due more to the crudeness of the Soviet tactics than to the resilience of Western Europe. The fact is that

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Western Europe as such has not emerged politically. In that respect the Soviet Union can be said to have achieved at least a part of what it has been seeking since Yalta. In the meantime, the continued division of Europe breeds growing resentment not only of the direct Soviet domination over Eastern Europe but also of the American role in Europe, a situation which more skillfull Soviet diplomacy could at some point more intelligently exploit.

The political reality is that America cannot undo Europe's partition, but the existence of that partition intensifies the American-Soviet rivalry which in turn perpetuates the partition. Though America has at times sought to loosen the bonds that both tie and subordinate Eastern Europe to Moscow, at the truly critical junctures America has chosen not to contest Soviet domination directly. American policy has aimed at carefully encouraging the peaceful evolution of a somewhat more pluralistic Eastern Europe, a process that is bound to take time and which can periodically be reversed by force, as through martial law in Poland in 1981. However, when the East German regime collapsed in 1953, when Hungary arose in 1956, when Czechoslovakia peacefully emancipated itself in 1968 only to be invaded by Soviet armed forces, the United States adopted a passive posture masked by anti-Soviet rhetoric. Whether more could have been done is debatable, but that not much *was* done is undeniable.

## VI

American prudence is one reason why the Europeans sense that America cannot undo the division of Europe. The other reason is even more basic. America cannot undo the partition of Europe without in effect defeating Russia. And that the Russians must and will resist firmly—just as the direct expulsion of America from Western Europe would be resisted by America as an intolerable defeat. At the same time, the partition of Germany in the context of the partition of Europe makes both partitions a live issue. It ensures a continuing political struggle for the future of Germany and thus for the future of Europe. It locks America and Russia into a strategically central conflict, but with the stakes so high that neither can countenance a direct defeat. With divided Germany thus serving as the permanent catalyst for change, the issue of the future of Europe remains a live issue, despite the stalemate of the last 40 years.

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The situation might have been altogether different if the division of Europe had not entailed simultaneously the division of Germany. If instead of the Elbe the geopolitical American-Soviet frontier had been fixed on the Rhine or on the Oder-Neisse line, the division of Europe into two spheres of influence would have been neater and politically easier to maintain. With the Rhine as the dividing line, the West European rump would have felt so threatened by the Soviet presence, backed by a Sovietized Germany, that henceforth its enduring preoccupation would have been to insure the closest possible ties with America, forgetting altogether about the fate of the Soviet-dominated central and eastern Europe. If, on the other hand, Soviet sway had been extended only to the Oder-Neisse line, the Poles and the Czechs would have been so fearful that an American-backed Germany might resume its traditional *Drang nach Osten* that the partition of Europe would have been of very secondary concern.

As it happens, the existing stalemate is increasingly resented by all Europeans. The Germans—no longer dominated by feelings of war guilt, less mesmerized by the American ideal, distressed by the failure of Europe to become an alternative to divisive nationalisms—are naturally drawn to a growing preoccupation with the fate of their brethren living under an alien system. The notion that the destiny of a united Germany depends on a close relationship with Russia is not a new one in German political tradition. Frustration with the nation's division is giving it a new lease on life.

Moreover, for Germany especially but also for Western Europe as a whole, the East holds a special economic attraction. It has been the traditional market for West European industrial goods. As Western Europe discovers that in its fragmented condition it is becoming less competitive with the high-tech economies of America and Japan, the notion of a special economic relationship with the East becomes particularly appealing. The fear that America may be turning from the Atlantic to the Pacific has in this connection a self-fulfilling and a self-validating function: it justifies a wider economic, and potentially even a political, accommodation between an industrially obsolescent Western Europe and the even more backward Soviet bloc, a logical consumer for what Western Europe can produce.

More than most Europeans, the East Europeans, no longer expecting American liberation, long for a genuine Europe,

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which would free them from the Soviet yoke. That longing explains the extraordinary standing to this day in Eastern Europe of de Gaulle—simply because he raised the standard of "Europe to the Urals." It explains also the special appeal of the Pope, whose vision of Europe's spiritual unity has obvious political implications. But the East Europeans will settle for half a loaf if they cannot have the whole. Faced with the choice of exclusive Soviet domination, only occasionally contested by American policy, or of at least growing ties with even a politically weak Western Europe, the East Europeans clearly prefer the latter.

To register all of this is not to say that Europe will simply drift into a separate accommodation with the Soviet Union, fulfilling long-standing Soviet ambitions. It is to note, however, the potential and growing West European susceptibility to a Soviet policy based more on Litvinov's prescriptions than on Stalinist practices. A Soviet policy designed to exploit more subtly the continued absence of a united Europe, the mounting American frustration with the low level of the European defense effort, and the inevitable appeal of escapist notions regarding disarmament, nuclear freezes, and the like could have a significant impact on both American and European public opinion. Indeed, under certain circumstances, one can even envisage a spontaneous American inclination to disengage from Europe, with conservatives advocating it out of irritation with European unwillingness to do more for common defense, and with liberals propounding it because of their current tendency to deal with difficult security matters by evasion. The U.S. deficit will, in any case, drive Congress toward a more critical look at the cost of the U.S. NATO commitment.

In Europe itself, such a more subtle Litvinov-type Soviet policy would aim not at the dismantling of NATO as such but at depriving it of any political or military substance. Exploiting the duality of German feelings and the growing ties between Bonn and East Berlin, it would seek to transform Germany into a quasi-neutral member of NATO, thereby alarming and further fragmenting Western Europe. Instead of concentrating on trying to inflict on America a visible and direct political defeat in Europe, it would play on European unwillingness to associate itself with America in the wider global and ideological rivalry with Russia, in order to achieve European acquiescence to a subordinate relationship with Moscow.

It is not self-fulfilling pessimism to note that a Europe de-

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pendent militarily, fragmented politically, and anachronistic economically remains a Europe more vulnerable to such blandishments. In brief, a sustained Soviet peace offensive poses the greater danger that Moscow finally might succeed in splitting Europe from America and thus, taking advantage of Europe's continued historical fatigue, attain finally a Yaltanized Europe.

VII

As President Mitterrand put it some two years ago, "*tout ce qui permettera de sortir de Yalta sera bon. . . .*" But how to escape from Yalta? Forty years later, there must be a better option for both Europe and America than either a partitioned and prostrated Europe that perpetuates the American-Soviet collision, or a disunited Europe divorced from America acquiescing piecemeal to Soviet domination over Eurasia. And there is such a third option: the emergence of a politically more vital Europe less dependent militarily on the United States, encouraged in that direction by an America guided by a timely historic vision, and leading eventually to a fundamentally altered relationship with Eastern Europe and with Russia.

This third option requires a long-term strategy of the kind that the West simply has not devised in dealing with the enduring post-Yalta European dilemma. The point of departure for such a long-term strategy has to be joint recognition of the important conclusion which the experience of the last several decades teaches: *the historic balance in Europe will be changed gradually in the West's favor only if Russia comes to be faced west of the Elbe rather less by America and rather more by Europe.*

Thoughtful Europeans realize, moreover, that the future of Europe is intertwined with the future of Germany and of Poland. Without spanning, in some non-threatening fashion, the division of Germany, there will not be a genuine Europe; but continuing Russian domination of Poland makes Russian control over East Germany geopolitically possible. Thus the relationship between Russia on the one hand and Germany and Poland on the other must be peacefully transformed if a larger Europe is ever to emerge.

Both Americans and Europeans must also face up to the implications of the fact that the division of Europe is not only the unnatural consequence of the destruction of Europe in the course of two world wars; in the long run it is also an inherently

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unstable and potentially dangerous situation. It is likely to produce new explosions in Eastern Europe and it could also generate a basic and destabilizing reorientation in Western Europe, especially since for many Europeans the existence of the two alliances across the dividing line in the middle of Europe is seen as an extension of superpower efforts to perpetuate the status quo.

Accordingly, concentration on the purely military dimension of the East-West problem, or trying to get the West Europeans to hew to the U.S. line in the Middle East or in Central America, is not going to preserve Western unity. America has to identify itself with a cause which has deeply felt emotional significance to most Europeans. Undoing the division of Europe, which is so essential to its spiritual and moral recovery, is a goal worthy of the Western democracies and one capable of galvanizing a shared sense of historic purpose.

But that objective, so essential to Europe's restoration, cannot be accomplished as an American victory over Russia. Nor will it be achieved by an explicit Russian acceptance, through a negotiated agreement, of Eastern Europe's emancipation from Russian vassalage. Moscow will not yield voluntarily. A wider Europe can only emerge as a consequence of a deliberately but subtly induced process of change, by historical stealth so to speak, which can neither be quickly detected nor easily resisted.

The West must shape that process and give it historical direction. As the point of departure for seeking the common goal, one can envisage a strategy combining five broad political, economic and military dimensions. Some involve relatively simple acts and can be summarized succinctly; some require more complicated processes of change, are bound to be more controversial, and thus require a fuller justification.

*First*, on the symbolic plane, it would be appropriate for the heads of the democratic West as a whole, perhaps on February 4, 1985, to clarify jointly, through a solemn declaration, the West's attitude toward the historic legacy of Yalta. In publicly repudiating that bequest—the partition of Europe—the West should underline its commitment to a restored Europe, free of extra-European control. It should stress its belief that there now exists a genuine European political identity, the heir to Europe's civilization, which is entitled to unfettered expression. It should affirm the right of every European nation to choose its sociopolitical system in keeping with its history and tradition.

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It should explicitly reject and condemn Moscow's imposition on so many Europeans of a system that is culturally and politically so alien to them. Finally, by drawing attention to the positive experience of neutral Austria and Finland, it should pledge that a more authentic Europe would not entail the extension of the American sphere of influence to the European state frontiers of the Soviet Union.

*Second*, and in direct connection with the renunciation of Yalta's burden, the West should simultaneously reconfirm its commitment to the Helsinki Final Act. This is absolutely essential, for otherwise the repudiation of Yalta could give the Soviets the convenient argument that the territorial integrity of Poland and of Czechoslovakia is thereby again endangered. The Helsinki agreements confirmed the durability of the existing frontiers in central and eastern Europe, and the eastern nations must be reassured on this score. At the same time, the Helsinki agreements legalized and institutionalized the notion that the West has a right to comment on the internal practices of East European governments and that respect of human rights is a general international obligation. Accordingly, the repudiation of Yalta's historic legacy should be accompanied by the reaffirmation of the West's commitment to peaceful East-West relations, to the maintenance of the existing territorial status quo, and to the indivisibility of the concepts of freedom and human rights.

Moreover, reaffirmation of the continued Western commitment to the Helsinki Final Act could help to resolve the potentially fatal European ambivalence regarding Germany. The fact is that, while the Europeans resent their historic partition, they fear almost as much a reunited Germany. Therefore, the renunciation of Yalta's legacy—the division of Europe—should be accompanied by an explicit pledge, through the reaffirmation of Helsinki's continued relevance, that the purpose of healing the East-West rift in Europe is not to dismantle any existing state but to give every European people the opportunity to participate fully in wider all-European cooperation. In that context, the division of Germany need not be undone through formal reunification but by the gradual emergence of a much less threatening loose confederation of the existing two states.

*Third*, much in keeping with the spirit of these symbolic acts, Western Europe should strive to create the maximum number of opportunities for East European participation in various all-

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European bodies. There is today a proliferation of such institutions, both private and public. East Europeans should be encouraged quietly but systematically to increase their participation—even if initially only as observers—in such bodies as the European Parliament, as well as the myriad of more specialized technical agencies. The fostering in Eastern Europe of the European spirit, and of greater East European recognition that there is more to Europe today than meets the eye, is clearly in the interest of all Europe. But a new burst of energy in this regard is much needed.

It would also be appropriate for the major West European nations, as well as for America, to sponsor during the Yalta year of 1985—on either a private or public basis—a series of seminars and conferences on the future of post-Yalta Europe. A special effort should be made to invite East Europeans to participate, on whatever basis is possible, in deliberations designed to forge during that year a wider consensus on how best to undo peacefully Yalta's legacy.

In addition, Western Europe should reactivate efforts previously initiated but lately dormant designed to encourage closer contacts and eventually even some form of collaboration between the Common Market and Eastern Europe. In different ways, both East Germany and Yugoslavia today have practical relationships with that important West European entity. Precisely because the present Soviet leadership has stepped up its efforts to integrate Eastern Europe into COMECON and thus to bind it to the Soviet economy, additional initiative on the part of the Common Market is now badly needed. Even if the East Europeans, under Soviet pressure, were to rebuff such Western efforts at closer contacts, exchange of information and some cooperative projects, the Western initiative would still have a positive effect. The recent East German willingness to risk Soviet displeasure at growing inter-German ties reflects the widespread desire as well as economic need of Eastern Europe for closer links with the rest of Europe. The continued economic stagnation of the Soviet-type economies makes the timing for greater Western activism in this regard particularly propitious.

*Fourth*, and in no way in conflict with the preceding, Europe should intensify its aid to those East Europeans who are struggling actively for the political emancipation of Eastern Europe. That struggle is the necessary concomitant and at least partially also the cause of evolutionary change in Eastern Europe. Only

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too often do West European well-wishers of a more independent Eastern Europe look askance at those in the East who undertake more direct forms of struggle. While cultivation of East European officials enjoys a certain fashionable prestige in Western circles, tangible assistance to those resisting totalitarianism is viewed only too frequently as somehow "in the spirit of the cold war."

Yet a division of labor between America and Europe in which the former is seen as alone in supporting dissident "subversion" while the latter engages exclusively in official courtship would be self-defeating. West Europeans should undertake to provide support for some of the activities that America has quite generously, for Europe's sake as well as for its own, sustained for more than three decades. The French recently have done so for the Polish Solidarity movement, and so have some other Europeans. Radio Paris has been gaining more East European listeners. But much more needs to be done. Germany, for example, after Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in effect endorsed Wojciech Jaruzelski's martial law in Poland, confined itself to truly humanitarian private philanthropy; it has not been as active as it could be in sustaining various forms of East European political activity designed to induce the existing regimes to transform themselves.

In subtle but sustained fashion West Europe could aid the East Europeans in such efforts, because in the age of transistors and mass communications totalitarian control can be pierced, with positive political effect. Western Europe should, after all, be a direct partner in the struggle for Europe's future, and a well-funded Franco-British-German-Italian consortium (a Foundation for a Post-Yalta Europe) to aid East European efforts to emancipate peacefully the eastern portion of Europe would be an appropriate and long overdue contribution.

*Fifth*, the time has come for a more fundamental rethinking of the relationship between Western security and political change in Europe as a whole. The West can make the needed adjustment, and America—since it plays the central military role—should take the lead to that end. America is needed in Europe to deter Russia not only from military aggression but from political intimidation. That is obvious and it justifies NATO and the American military presence on the continent. But an American military presence that reduces the incentive for the Europeans to unite politically, yet simultaneously increases the incentive for the Soviets to stay put militarily in central and

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eastern Europe, is a military presence not guided by a subtle political-historical calculus. A more sensitive calibration of the political-military equation is needed in order to safeguard Western Europe while promoting change in the East-West relationship.

If Europe is to emerge politically, it must assume a more direct role in its own defense. A Europe that plays a larger defense role will require a lesser, or at least a redefined, American military presence. A Europe that can defend itself more on its own is a Europe that is also politically more vital, while less challenging to the Soviet Union from a purely military point of view, than a Europe with a large American military presence in its very center. Such a Europe would then be better able to satisfy the East European yearning for closer association without such association being tantamount to an American defeat of Russia.

But Europe must be prodded to move in that direction. Left as it is, Europe's cultural hedonism and political complacence will ensure that not much is done. Even the modest 1978 NATO commitment to a three percent per annum increase in defense expenditures was not honored by most European states. America should, therefore, initiate a longer-term process to alter the nature of its military presence in Europe gradually, while making it clear to the Europeans that the change is not an act of anger or a threat (à la the Mansfield resolution) but rather the product of a deliberate strategy designed to promote Europe's unity and its historic restoration.

Ultimately, the United States in NATO should be responsible primarily for offsetting Soviet strategic power, thus deterring both a Soviet attack or nuclear blackmail. But on the ground, the defense of Europe over the next decade should become an even more predominantly European responsibility. The needed process of replacing gradually but not totally (and certainly not in Berlin) the U.S. ground combat forces could perhaps be accelerated if, through the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks or otherwise, the Soviet Union were willing to reciprocate by comparable withdrawals of its own ground forces. But, in any case, it should be accompanied by appropriate European efforts to assume greater responsibility for the defense of Europe not only on a purely national basis but through enhanced European defense coordination.

The United States should particularly encourage efforts at increased Franco-German military cooperation and eventual

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integration. France has a historic awareness of a European identity while Germany chafes under Europe's partition. A Franco-German army would have the manpower, the resources, and the fighting potential to pick up the slack created by a gradual decrease in the American combat presence on the ground. The eventual fusion of these two national forces into a joint combat force would represent a giant step toward a politically more vital Europe, yet a Europe which would be less conflictual with the Soviet Union than a Europe hosting a large U.S. army and less threatening to Eastern Europe than a Europe with a powerful separate German army. A gradually reduced U.S. ground presence would in turn create pressure from even the existing East European regimes for a commensurate Soviet redeployment, thereby gradually creating a more flexible political situation.

To move Europe in this direction, the United States will have to take the first steps, even perhaps unilaterally through a ten-year program of annual cuts in the level of the U.S. ground forces in Europe. But these steps should be taken in the context of an articulated strategy that has a constructive political as well as military rationale. Its political purpose should be openly proclaimed: to create the setting for Europe's restoration and, through it, also for a more stable East-West relationship. It would also have to be made clear that some American combat forces would remain in Europe, as they do in Korea, thereby ensuring immediate American engagement in the event of hostilities. Moreover, continued American strategic protection of Europe should not remain confined only to the possible employment of nuclear weaponry. It should over time, with technological advance, be enhanced to include also some strategic defense. As strategic defense for America becomes more viable, it should be a major American goal to extend some of its protection to Europe as well.

A division of labor in NATO along the foregoing lines would make it much easier to consider by Yalta's fiftieth anniversary also those East-West security and political arrangements which at the moment seem premature, unrealistic, or excessively threatening to America or to Russia. These could include demilitarized or nuclear-free zones or extension of the Austrian-type neutrality to other areas, including later even to a loosely confederated Germany. It would encourage a process of change permitting the latent or frustrated West and East European impulses for the restoration of Europe gradually to

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surface. Eventually, it would permit Europe to emerge, and to play a major role on the Eurasian continent, along with the Soviet Union, India and China, while helping to ensure through its links with America that no single power dominates that geopolitically vital continent.

VIII

The fiftieth anniversary of Yalta is only ten years away. It should be our shared goal to fashion by then political-military arrangements which, instead of perpetuating the division of Europe—and perhaps even prompting West Europe's political decay, create the preconditions for peacefully undoing Yalta. A Western Europe essentially self-reliant in regional defense, while covered by the U.S. system of nuclear deterrence and also eventually by U.S. strategic defense, would be a Western Europe more capable of pursuing a positive policy toward the East without fear of domination by Moscow. In the final analysis, only Europeans can restore Europe; it cannot be done for them by others.

To be sure, Moscow will resist the aspirations of the Europeans. No empire dissolves itself voluntarily—at least not until it becomes evident that accommodation to gradual dissolution is preferable to the rising costs of preserving the imperial system. So it will be also with the Soviet empire. Moscow will violently protest any Western disavowal of Yalta's legacy and will accuse the West of worsening East-West relations; that is only to be expected. But such public disavowal is the necessary point of departure for more focused efforts by all the Europeans gradually to undo their continent's division. Once that historic commitment has been made, these efforts, as recommended here, need not be either aggressive or initially even very explicit. As time passes, with the organic growth of a larger Europe gathering momentum, it will become more and more difficult for the Kremlin to resist a process that over time may acquire the hallmarks of historical inevitability. At some point, then, even the Soviets may find it useful to codify some new neutrality arrangements in central Europe and to reduce and eventually to remove their occupation forces.

One should not underestimate in this connection Moscow's adaptability. Despite his ruthlessness, even Stalin accommodated himself to the reality of an independent Catholic Church in Poland; Khrushchev to a Polish peasantry free from collectivization and to a separate Romanian foreign policy; Brezhnev

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to "goulash communism" in Hungary and to army rule in Poland. Why then should not the next generation of Soviet leaders be pressed also to come to terms with the fact that even the interests of the Soviet people would be better served by a less frustrated and oppressed east-central Europe, partaking more directly of the benefits of all-European cooperation?

As divided Europe enters the fifth decade after Yalta, it is important to reiterate that undoing Yalta cannot involve a precise blueprint or a single dramatic initiative. The shape of the future cannot be reduced to a neat plan, with specific phases and detailed agreements. Rather, it requires an explicit commitment and a sense of strategic direction for a process of change that is bound to have also its own dynamic. In any case, for America the emergence of a more vital Europe would be a positive outcome, for ultimately a pluralistic world is in America's true interest. Moreover, such a development would avert the major danger that if Yalta's legacy is not deliberately—though peacefully—undone in the East, it will eventually become the reality in the West. In other words, Yalta must be consigned to Europe's past if it is not to become Europe's future.

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*Richard Lowenthal*

# THE GERMAN QUESTION TRANSFORMED

"We are the allies of the United States, not their vassals." These words were spoken in late September 1984 by the Minister of the Interior of the West German state of Hesse, a Social Democrat. He was responding to an American corps commander who had called German demonstrators at an American military training area "anarchists and criminals," and demanded their full prosecution under German law. According to the U.S. officer, the demonstrators had "damaged military vehicles, sprayed paint and thrown rocks at soldiers." German police arrested 188 demonstrators, charged them with disturbing the peace, trespassing and damaging property, and then released them.

Reading about this incident in the American press during a prolonged absence from the Federal Republic of Germany, I have no means to judge whether the corps commander overdramatized a certainly illegal, but otherwise peaceful demonstration, or whether the police and the minister ignored the rocks thrown at American soldiers. What concerns me is the tone of the minister's sentence. It expresses a mood which is, I believe, typical of large numbers of West Germans today.

With a slight variation, it could be typical of many East German leaders as well. The East German party chief, Erich Honecker, and many of the men around him would no doubt like to say that they are "the allies of the Soviet Union, not its vassals." Only they cannot afford to say it—that is the little difference.

The mood of many people in responsible positions is comparable in both German states today. Each is determined to stick to its alliance—the West Germans because the Atlantic Alliance is the ultimate protection of their political freedom against Soviet blackmail, the East German leaders because the Warsaw Pact is the ultimate guarantee of their own rule. But both have a more conscious sense of their national identity, not

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to say of their national dignity than, say, 15 years ago—and it is a common national identity.

This is the new form the German Question has gradually assumed in the course of those 15 years—the period of the success of Ostpolitik within the framework of superpower détente and of the effort to preserve the fruits of Ostpolitik after the collapse of that framework. This new form does *not* turn, as people outside Germany often still believe, on the idea of German reunification in a single national state. The immense majority of Germans have long realized that such reunification could only happen if all Europe were reunited by the release of the East European nations from Soviet control. While the East German leaders and their Communist followers are not even permitted to wish for that, the West Germans and the non-Communist majority of East Germans see no foreseeable prospect of it, nor any realistic course of action for bringing it about.

While the sense of common history and culture has grown among Germans in East and West since human contact and mutual knowledge were made easier with the Basic Treaty of 1972, there is also greater awareness even in the East that not all the differences of institutions and customs have been imposed from above and outside. Large numbers of East Germans, for instance, would prefer to keep their system of public education rather than adopt the West German system, if the elements of political indoctrination and political preference could be eliminated. Generally speaking, the longing for a return to a German national state, so natural to the generation that experienced the partition of Germany, has gradually faded, first in the West and more recently in the East. At the same time, the awareness of being drawn together by a common history, including both common cultural achievements and common horrors and sufferings, has revived, particularly in the West where the early postwar generation had tended to turn away from it.

It is the purpose of this article to suggest how changes in the political situation during the rise and decline of détente have contributed to the change in German attitudes. In doing so, I shall deal in greater detail with West Germany, where I live, than with East Germany, of which my knowledge is necessarily much more limited.

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II

The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic was begun at a time when the Western powers, with the United States and France in the vanguard, felt that an improvement of relations with their Soviet antagonists was both possible and necessary. President Lyndon Johnson was convinced that the Soviet Union had become a satisfied power, and that serious danger to peace came only from Communist China, which he believed had started the war in Vietnam as the first stage of a major offensive in Southeast Asia. President Charles de Gaulle, while taking a different view of China and Vietnam, hoped that improved relations between France and the Soviet Union could open the way to the revival of a traditional European balance and thus reduce the dependence of postwar Western Europe on the United States.

The NATO Council, without generally sharing the illusions of either Johnson or de Gaulle, had adopted the thesis of the 1967 Harmel Report that only defense and détente together could ensure lasting peace on the divided continent. As American and French policies competed to belittle the importance of the Soviet-led intervention of the Warsaw Pact armies in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet leaders were confirmed in perceiving their chance to isolate the German Federal Republic as the only Western country refusing to recognize the territorial outcome of Hitler's war.

To avoid such isolation, the Grand Coalition formed by Christian Democrats and Social Democrats in Bonn in 1966 sought both diplomatic relations with East European states, which previous governments had avoided, and an agreement with Russia on the renunciation of force. But the Soviets, after a brief initial hesitation, insisted on formal recognition of the territorial status quo, including both the German partition and the Oder-Neisse frontier with Poland.

The Christian Democrats, the stronger party in that coalition, saw no way to negotiate the hurdle—due both to a rigid interpretation of the West German constitutional obstacles and to the presumed continuing importance of the votes of expellees from the former German territories in east-central Europe and refugees from the German Democratic Republic. When Moscow published documents of the stagnant negotiations, and thereby broke them off in the middle of the Czechoslovak

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crisis, the Social Democrats, with Willy Brandt as Foreign Minister, were confirmed in their view that the Federal Republic's inclusion in the normalization of East-West relations could be achieved, and its isolation avoided, only if a legal form could be negotiated for de facto acceptance of the territorial status quo.

Such was the stake in the West German elections of 1969, which led to the end of 20 years of Christian Democratic rule and the formation of a Social Democratic and Free Democratic—"social-liberal"—government headed by Willy Brandt. The issue of an Eastern policy had figured in the campaign, but had by no means been fully understood by the voters. The difficult negotiations that Brandt began had to reconcile de facto recognition of the status quo with the Federal Republic's constitutional commitment to the goal of reunification. They had also to assure the status of and access to West Berlin before opening the way for any international recognition of the German Democratic Republic, and to establish a degree of normality between the two German states and an assured form of contact between their peoples. The Berlin negotiations could only be conducted between the four powers responsible for the former German capital under the wartime and postwar agreements. At the same time, both these and the "inter-German" negotiations would require the East German leaders to take risks they had carefully avoided for many years. As a result, the complex international negotiations which were to assure a new stability in the heart of Europe could finally succeed only after serious internal opposition had been overcome in both German states.

In the Federal Republic, the draft treaties negotiated with the U.S.S.R. and Poland in 1970 were attacked by most of the Christian Democratic opposition and a large part of the press as a betrayal of the constitution. By the middle of 1972, Brandt no longer had a working parliamentary majority and arranged for new elections. His most effective campaign argument was that 20 years of nonrecognition of the East German state had not only failed to bring reunification a single step nearer, but allowed the G.D.R. to raise ever higher the barriers between the Germans in East and West—of which the Berlin Wall was the most abhorrent symbol. The new Eastern treaties and the Berlin Agreement would at last begin to lower those barriers. That argument won a safe majority for the social-liberal coalition and made Brandt's Social Democrats the strongest party

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in the Federal Republic for the first time. The voters made a clear decision: from the point of view of their national feelings, the resumption of a measure of human contact with their East German kin had become more important than the dream of political reunification.

III

The leaders of the G.D.R., headed since Stalin's time by Walter Ulbricht, saw the popular uprising of June 1953 as proof of the danger inherent in any contact between their subjects and the West Germans. They raised the Berlin Wall in August 1961 as a vital protection against that danger. Physical barriers and deathtraps along the borders were supplemented by the ideological doctrine that one single German nation no longer existed, but rather two, one capitalist, the other socialist. While the physical barriers were effective, the ideological doctrine was not; the separation of eastern Germany from the larger western part was stubbornly resented by the large majority of its inhabitants as having been imposed by Soviet force. Consequently, Ulbricht opposed all negotiations with the Federal Republic from Bonn's first overtures in 1966. When the negotiations became serious after the formation of the Brandt government, he was not so much pleased by the prospect of international recognition for the G.D.R. as he was worried by the danger of new guarantees for the status of West Berlin and of increased contact between the Germans on both sides of the border.

It became clear that success of the whole package of negotiations depended on the outcome of the Four-Power talks on Berlin. As the latter began to make progress in the spring of 1971, Ulbricht seems to have tried to mobilize some of his personal friends in the Soviet leadership against the policy pursued by Leonid Brezhnev. He failed—and was pensioned off in the summer.

His successor, Erich Honecker, was naturally no less concerned to preserve a Communist-controlled East Germany than were Ulbricht and, indeed, the Soviet leaders. But like the Soviets, Honecker was more eager to win international recognition for the G.D.R., and with it for the borders along which Europe had been partitioned a quarter-century earlier, than he was worried about the price—guarantees for the status of West Berlin and for Western access to it, and permission for West Germans and West Berliners to visit the G.D.R. for a

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limited time—or even the effect of West German media with correspondents in East Berlin broadcasting across the border. Thus, after the Moscow and Warsaw treaties and the Four-Power agreement on Berlin had been signed and ratified, the Basic Treaty between the two German states went through. Both nations simultaneously entered the United Nations and took their seats at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki.

Honecker's calculation proved correct from the viewpoints of both the international status and the internal security of the East German state. The millions of West German visitors who would now enter the G.D.R. year after year, and the West German radio and television programs to which East Germans came to listen quite legally as a matter of course, caused no unrest among their hosts or their audience. On the other hand, the new worldwide recognition made it easier for the citizens of the G.D.R. to develop some pride in their state, even if they were critical of many of its features. But there were subtle changes as the atmosphere of irreconcilable mutual hostility could no longer be maintained. The long-developed language of hatred had to be damped down in the East German press, and where it was kept up, as in military education, it must have lost in effectiveness even among the young. Many East German listeners and viewers took a critical view of much that they heard and saw in Western programs, but the official line of two separate states had gradually to be toned down as human contacts did their work. The official G.D.R. picture of German history, built up to treat all "progressive" movements as forerunners of the G.D.R. and all "reactionary" rulers as ancestors of Hitler *and* the Federal Republic, was quietly revised.

The cultural contact between writers and artists on both sides and the increasing publication of censored East German works in the Federal Republic made the waves of expulsion of East German writers for ideological reasons appear all the more absurd. In addition, the revival of contact between the Protestant churches, most impressive in the prominent West German participation in the East German Luther Year, made a special contribution to the sense of a common German nationhood.

Meanwhile, in the Federal Republic, most Christian Democrats, including a number of outstanding leaders, gradually came to accept the results of the Ostpolitik treaties in general, and of the Basic Treaty with the G.D.R. in particular, as not

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only binding in law, but as an important step forward in inter-German relations. National consciousness and national history, neglected by two generations of postwar youth, both revived in the new climate—but not in the spirit of the nationalism of Imperial or Hitlerite Germany. Rather, the phraseology of "reunification" faded in the West as that of "two German nations" faded in the East. They gave way to a common acceptance of both the achievements and the recognized horrors of a common past and, finally, to a growing pride in a common contribution to détente and peace—expressed in the phrase, used equally on both sides of the border, that "no war must ever arise again from German soil."

## IV

This slogan was, in fact, developed after the crisis of détente had already begun. But to understand the impact of that crisis on the two Germanys, we must first take a look at the time lag between its real beginning and its general perception in Europe.

The crisis became manifest to all at the end of 1979, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and NATO's double-track decision on intermediate-range missiles. Its real beginning dates from 1975, when the Soviet leadership started its series of proxy advances in the Third World by organizing Cuban intervention in Angola, and also prepared new pressures on Western Europe by beginning production of the SS-20 missiles to be used primarily, though not exclusively, in Europe. Under Brezhnev's leadership, the Soviets had gained an unprecedented, peaceful foreign policy success when the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement of 1972 recognized the principle of an approximate nuclear balance between the superpowers as the basis of détente. Moscow now demonstrated that it accepted such a balance only in direct relations with the United States, not with America's European allies or even with nonaligned nations.

There was no danger that might have justified such an attempt to expand Soviet power in several directions at once—only the apparent opportunity offered by the weakened capacity of American presidents for either negotiation or action in the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate. The opportunity also seems to have coincided with the beginning of the decline of Brezhnev's effective control of Soviet policy; at any rate, at the 1976 Party Congress, the aging leader cheerfully and

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publicly welcomed the Angolan "success," which was the first blow against the détente he had helped to bring about.

The importance of the new intermediate-range SS-20 missiles, though no less significant than the new Soviet expansionism in the Third World, was less quickly recognized by international opinion and even by the U.S. Administration. In Europe, the Soviet deployment caused little immediate concern to the second-rank nuclear powers, though it was at once seen as a potential threat to exposed and non-nuclear West Germany. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt reacted first with confidential representations to the Soviets and an equally private suggestion to the Carter Administration that it include the problem of intermediate-range missiles in its resumed negotiations for the second SALT agreement. Only after both moves failed to bear fruit did Schmidt raise the matter publicly in his 1977 London speech, which alerted American and West European opinion and eventually resulted in NATO's double-track decision.

When Schmidt took that initiative, he saw détente as threatened, but by no means lost: neither the acceptance of Soviet nuclear superiority in the European theater nor an arms race in intermediate-range missiles would save it; only a negotiated balance could help. To achieve that, the production of the American "Euromissiles" had to be started alongside the negotiation. But this view, based on the remarkable success of détente in Europe, and of Ostpolitik and inter-German relations in particular, was no longer shared by the leadership of the Soviet Union or by the leadership and public opinion in the United States. America had been profoundly shocked by the Soviet-organized military actions in Africa and the Near East, and many regarded the very concept of détente as a fraudulent Soviet trick. President Reagan's call for a prolonged effort to increase and modernize the U.S. weapons arsenal to restore American security won widespread support even before his election to the presidency.

The Soviets, whose brutal and shortsighted exploitation of a passing period of American indecision had provoked that reaction, now began to fear the consequences—an arms race against an economically and technologically superior opponent in general, and the deployment in the heart of Europe of modern American intermediate-range missiles targeted on their country in particular. They wished to maintain and even increase their SS-20s and hoped to prevent the deployment of

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new American Euromissiles—not by negotiation, but by frightening the West Europeans and particularly the West Germans. Meanwhile, the military experts in the Reagan Administration saw the deployment of new missiles in Europe not as a bargaining asset in negotiations, but as an important addition to their overall strength.

During his Moscow visit in 1980, Helmut Schmidt succeeded with great effort in getting his Soviet hosts to agree in principle to take part in what became the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). He and other European allies finally convinced President Reagan, after a long delay for preparations, to appoint negotiators for Geneva. To most West German observers today it seems clear that while Schmidt succeeded in bringing those horses to the water, he could not make them drink. As they see it, the Soviets made no substantial concessions at all during the negotiations, while the Americans adopted the "zero option" proposed by Bonn for new intermediate-range missiles as a starting position that they could be sure the Soviets would not accept. But the Americans showed little interest in further negotiating moves. In particular, they did *not* suggest merging the INF and START negotiations, which might have offered a way to discuss the French and British missiles, regarded by the Soviets as "strategic" weapons, without making them direct objects of superpower negotiation. The one serious effort to advance toward a compromise was the famous "walk-in-the-woods" proposal, in which Paul Nitze had a major role; but not only were the European allies of the United States, including the Federal Republic, not consulted about the proposal, they learned of it only months after it had been rejected by both Washington and Moscow.

It was this impression of the course of the negotiations, skillfully exploited by both Soviet and pacifist propaganda, which for a time gave the West German peace movement its extraordinary strength. The bulk of the demonstrators, whose numbers reached into the millions on the eve of the Bundestag vote on deployment, were in no way pro-Soviet, and in their great majority not neutralist either. Most among them were moved by an acute fear of nuclear war, fed as much by loose talk from important American officials as by Soviet threats. Many of them came from the ranks of church activists, many more from the Social Democratic Party, which was no longer part of the federal government and now overwhelmingly rejected the deployment part of the double-track decision (which

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Helmut Schmidt had accepted and to which he stuck). Yet at the same time, Willy Brandt confirmed the Social Democrats' allegiance to the Atlantic Alliance and their rejection of neutralism, and this decision was endorsed again without substantial opposition at the party's next regular congress in May 1984. In the meantime, the federal elections of March 1983 had approved the policy of the new federal government under the Christian Democratic leadership of Helmut Kohl, and the strength of the peace movement had seriously declined—even though not only had the deployment of American missiles proceeded on West German soil, but new Soviet missiles directed at West German targets had been deployed in East Germany and the U.S.S.R.

While the movement to prevent deployment has failed and the fear of imminent catastrophe faded, the sense that the replacement of détente by confrontation between the superpowers spelled permanent danger for the Europeans in West and East, and for the Germans in particular, has remained and, indeed, become generalized. If I am not mistaken, it is shared to a considerable extent by the current West German government, which has been steadily, if quietly, urging its American allies to work for a normalization of relations with the Soviets and for a resumption of arms control negotiations.

Most remarkably, there has been a parallel development in the G.D.R. Its leaders had accompanied their campaign to prevent the deployment of American missiles in West Germany not with threats, as did the Soviets, but with increasingly emphatic appeals to the common interests of all Germans. It was in this period that the Luther Year was deliberately used to attract a maximum number of Western visitors, and that the earlier doctrine of two German nations with two different histories was visibly disavowed. But even when Soviet threats and East German appeals to common interests alike had proved unable to prevent Bonn's decision for deployment, the East German leaders were not willing to abandon their new "national" approach. While criticizing the West German decision, they announced at the same time a policy of "limiting the damage" to inter-German relations; while dutifully accepting the deployment of Soviet countermissiles on their soil, they did so without any sign of enthusiasm.

The Kohl government in Bonn, in turn, has eagerly welcomed the idea that the damage to inter-German relations should be limited, and stressed the common special responsi-

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bility of the West and East Germans for the preservation of peace. It has shown its readiness to make such a policy economically worthwhile for its East German partners.

As a result, what appeared to Moscow and Warsaw, and to some extent also to Paris and Rome, as a dangerous flirtation between the two Germanys—in the middle of the confrontation between the leading powers of the alliances to which they belonged—nevertheless continued until mid-September 1984.

It would be entirely mistaken to see this move toward rapprochement in the context of past hopes for reunification in a national state, let alone of dreams of pan-Germanism. It is equally wrong to see it as mainly the fruit of West German economic bribes, as the Soviets pretend. Honecker is a Communist, and Communists are not inclined to make political concessions in return for economic favors, gladly though they may accept the latter. Rather, what has created the striking sense of a common political interest between two German states of very different political structures and ideologies has been, first, the revival of a sense of common nationhood during the period of détente, and second, the rising sense that they face a common threat as détente has given way to confrontation between the superpowers.

The resulting effort by their governments to "limit the damage" has been highly popular in both the G.D.R. and the Federal Republic—where only a few traditionalists in the Christian Democratic Union thought it was going too far and only a small neutralist party, the Greens, thought it did not go far enough, while the official Social Democratic opposition welcomed it. But the reactions of the two superpowers have been very different.

The U.S. Administration has shown a well-founded trust in the Kohl government's loyalty to the Alliance, and a corresponding degree of understanding for its efforts to preserve some of the fruits of Ostpolitik. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has shown increasing irritation with Erich Honecker's policy during 1984. It has opened a campaign against the alleged revival of "revanchism" in the Federal Republic, against Bonn's role in the deployment of American missiles, and finally against the F.R.G.'s alleged attempts to influence the East European states, including the G.D.R., by economic ties. Moscow attacked even Honecker's formula of "damage limitation" by ascribing it to a West German attempt to hide its own share in causing the damage. As a result, Honecker was

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forced first, after considerable resistance, to call off an imminent visit to the Federal Republic, and then increasingly to justify his retreat by some of the very Soviet reproaches against the Federal Republic that he had at first refused to copy. It remains to be seen whether this reluctant about-turn will be the prelude to Honecker's loss of his position as Party leader.

## V

For all we can know at this stage, the old form of the German Question, a longing for reunification in a single national state, is dead. A future revival is difficult to imagine. But the transformed German Question, which began to emerge with a revived consciousness of a common German nationhood during the period of détente, has given greater self-confidence to the leaders and peoples of both German states within their respective alliances. Under the impact of the competitive deployment of new nuclear weapons in Germany, it has produced common, if separate, pressure by Germans in East and West, including their governments, for ending the confrontation. For with the newly deployed missiles before their eyes, the crucial common factor in the minds of Germans in West and East is the certainty that they, at any rate, will not survive a nuclear war.

For the first time in modern history, then, what appears as the German Question has taken the form of an almost desperate desire for peace by the German people in West and East—a desire strong enough to exert major pressure on the foreign policies of both governments. It is *not* a pressure for leaving their respective alliances, but rather for attempting to influence the superpowers that lead them. But it is a pressure that, due both to the limited power behind it and to the German heritage, is likely to have a constructive effect only if it is presented as an expression not just of unique German interests, but of a common and vital interest of all Europeans.

The chances of European attempts to influence the superpowers succeeding are even more doubtful on the Soviet than on the American side. The reason lies in the different structures of the two alliances, and in the fact that the inner structure of the Warsaw Pact is more vulnerable precisely because it is based on the Soviets' much narrower concept of leadership. The Soviet leaders have started to talk of an alleged revival of German revanchism, not because they believe in it, but because they have found that the desire of East Germans to overcome the present East-West confrontation is shared by the self-willed

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Romanians, the cautious Hungarians and even the Bulgarians. Moscow's attempt during the summer to get all these countries to reduce their economic relations with the West was largely unsuccessful, and reviving the ghost of German revanchism was their best means to get at least the Polish and Czech governments to toe the line. What appears to the Soviets as the insecurity of their control over their own bloc, combined with the image of the instability of their aging leadership, is likely to make it doubly difficult for them to take any initiative to get out of the blind alley of confrontation with the United States which they first entered in 1975—even though they must be aware by now that it *is* a blind alley.

The United States in my view has entered a similar blind alley in the opposite direction, albeit at a later date and in response to Soviet provocation. Washington has greater freedom of movement to escape by taking a new negotiating initiative if it wants to; it is in a stronger position, but unlikely to take the initiative just to please the Germans, whose concerns are little understood in the United States, and actively misunderstood by some West Europeans, notably in France and Italy.

Not only has the German peace movement greatly contributed to those misunderstandings, which vastly overestimate the strength of neutralist or even nationalist tendencies in the Federal Republic; the present West German government too, for all its incontestable loyalty to the Western Alliance, has caused misunderstandings as well by overstressing, in temporary harmony with the East German leaders, the special responsibility of the two German states for the preservation of peace. Of course, in view of the past, such a special responsibility does exist in a moral sense, and its recognition should be welcomed in this context. But, in a political sense and with a view to the present and future, the responsibility should be recognized as common to all those who feel, and are, immediately threatened by a continuation of the nuclear arms race—the Europeans in West and East. The Germans will therefore be well advised not to present their legitimate concern for surviving the superpower confrontation as the new German Question: it is the new European question—and it should be the common responsibility of the West European allies to convince the American leaders of the Alliance of the urgent need for steps to overcome the confrontation.

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*Walther Leisler Kiep*

# THE NEW DEUTSCHLANDPOLITIK

The Ostpolitik of the 1970s has given way to the Deutschlandpolitik of the 1980s. The former, with then Chancellor Willy Brandt as its leading champion, focused predominantly on détente. It coincided with a weakening of the desire for reunification among Germans, and as a consequence there was a tendency in many countries to misunderstand Ostpolitik as being in itself a settlement of the German Question.

Deutschlandpolitik is a reflection of changing West German attitudes. The quest for new ideals and opportunities for personal identification is leading Germans back to their own history and into public discussion of "national awareness," "homeland," "fatherland" and "nation." These "national" tendencies can be observed in the peace movement and elsewhere on the left. Even the neutralist Greens are actively pursuing their own Deutschlandpolitik.

The "ice age" between East and West Germany that was predicted by many critics of the current West German government led by Helmut Kohl has not occurred. On the contrary, a broad range of contacts, meetings and negotiations now exists between the two states in Germany, more than ever in the past. The postponement of the visit to West Germany by East German leader Erich Honecker has not ended these activities.

Indeed, the quest for a "German identity" that has been taken up in West Germany is also emerging to an increasing extent in East Germany. The German Democratic Republic's historical claims are today no longer limited to humanistic traditions and revolutionary forces. This is an astonishing turnaround for the G.D.R. In the 1970s the East German leaders went to considerable trouble trying to persuade their people not only that German political unity was a thing of the past, but that a single German nation no longer existed. Today the East German Communists base their legitimacy on German history, laying claim to that history as a whole, without any limitations regarding historical periods, geography or class.

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Deutschlandpolitik is not being considered solely from the limited perspective of reunification; it is being considered rather in the framework of broader political fields such as peace policy, security policy and European policy. But both at the level of the general public and at the political level, the division of Germany, the unity of Germany and, above all, the self-determination of all Germans is bound to grow into an active issue.

The German Question is unresolved. It will remain on history's list of unfinished business until all Germans have had a chance to freely exercise their right to self-determination. Until then, we in the Federal Republic will maintain our unswerving view that the German Question must be resolved by achieving unity through peaceful means. Keeping the question open, Germany's legal status must not in any way be placed in question or otherwise rationalized away.

The fact that there is currently no recognizable political opportunity to restore German unity peacefully and in freedom must not keep us from seeing that this might well be feasible some day, and, indeed, that a change in the current state of affairs is a historical necessity.

II

The West German government adheres to a contractually defined modus vivendi with the G.D.R., certifying the existence of two independent and sovereign states on German soil. However, the relations between them are special—not those usually found in international law. The current coalition in Bonn is willing to cooperate with the G.D.R. in doing that which is feasible to make the consequences of separation more bearable for the people, while fully preserving West German security and alliance interests. As a result, contacts, meetings and negotiations are taking place with the G.D.R. on a scale hitherto unknown.

—In the first half of 1984, the G.D.R. allowed 31,352 Germans to resettle in West Germany, a much larger number than in an entire year under the Social-Liberal government.

—In September 1983, the minimum daily currency exchange requirement for travelers was totally eliminated for children between the ages of 6 and 14. For pensioners it was reduced in July 1984 from 25 to 15 marks. In the period from January to April 1984, the number of visits

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by West German citizens to the G.D.R. and East Berlin rose to 897,000— an 18.4-percent increase over the same period in 1983. This took the volume of visits back to where it stood when the minimum daily exchange requirement was doubled at the end of 1980.

—The G.D.R. is removing the automatic firing devices along the inter-German border. Thus far, these devices have been taken down along 175.7 kilometers of border. They had been installed along 439.5 kilometers of border in 1983, so 40 percent have been removed.

—There has also been visible movement in the environmental protection sector. In July 1984 the G.D.R. attended the International Environmental Protection Conference in Munich. The two states in Germany could potentially set an example in Europe for fighting air pollution, water pollution and damage to forests.

The fact that meetings and negotiations are taking place in these practical areas exerts a stabilizing influence on inter-German relations. For West Germans, however, the yardstick of the quality of relations with the G.D.R. continues to be the measure of freedom of movement that can be attained for the people in both parts of Germany. As long as Germany continues to be divided, this will be a source of tensions. There is no way around this problem. It will only be possible to reduce these tensions by bringing about a steady improvement within divided Germany. This is the specific contribution the two states in Germany must make in support of the détente and peace process in Europe as a whole. In this matter they bear a common responsibility.

For this reason our policy on Germany is at the same time a European peace policy. The West German government advocates maintaining and lending new impetus to East-West dialogue in the interest of stability and peace in Europe. What has already been attained in the détente process must be preserved, expanded and further implemented. The interdependence between the climate of East-West relations and the potentials and limits of Deutschlandpolitik has never been more visible than today.

However, the revival of the quest for a German identity has led some sections of the West German population to support the idea of taking a separate route between East and West. There are movements afoot in all of Europe today aimed at withdrawing from the blocs and from the confrontation be-

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tween the two superpowers. This trend is visible not only among the Greens and the peace movement, but also among Social Democrats. Under discussion are quite different variants of a "separate German route."

One concept, which might be called the "Europeanization of Europe," has found particular support in the ranks of the Social Democratic Party (SPD). One of the leading proponents of this school of thought—and one of the more independent thinkers—is Peter Bender, who takes the view that Europe today is no longer divided ideologically, but only politically. He feels that in the long run the Europeans in the East and the West should "decouple" themselves and establish a political position somewhere between Moscow and Washington.[1] Some people interpret this concept only to mean that Western Europe is to acquire greater weight in the Western Alliance with respect to the United States. Others see in it an opportunity to establish a "European route" between the Eastern and Western power blocs.

Large parts of the German peace movement and parts of the Greens advocate another variant. They support the idea of a reunified, neutral and nonaligned Germany—"national neutralism." This line of thinking is expressed most clearly by a Berlin version of the Greens, the Alternative List (AL), which advocates, among other things, "nonalignment of the German states, withdrawal of all foreign troops from Western and Eastern Europe, dissolution of the NATO and Warsaw Pact military blocs."[2] Peter Brandt and Herbert Ammon, two spokesmen for this kind of "left-wing nationalism," express their convictions as follows: "In this way the German question will become an instrument of peace for Europe; a withdrawal of the two German states from the military blocs will create a real détente zone and at the same time facilitate closer cooperation between the two German states. . . . A confederation between the two German states would be conceivable as a stage in the process of attaining national unity."[3] The view of the Alternative List becomes particularly important with the pos-

[1] Peter Bender, *Das Ende des ideologischen Zeitalters. Die Europäisierung Europas*, Berlin, 1981.

[2] *Thesen für eine grüne Deutschlandpolitik*, January 1984, in *Reader zum deutschlandpolitischen Kongress der GRÜNEN*, March 1984, p. 131.

[3] P. Brandt and H. Ammon, "Patriotismus von links," in *Die deutsche Einheit kommt bestimmt*, W. Venohr, ed., Bergisch Gladbach, 1982, p. 159f.

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sibility that the SPD and the AL may be planning a coalition in Berlin after the next elections there in the spring of 1985.

Elements of the Greens advocate another variant of a "separate German route." The main proponent of this view is Dirk Schneider, the spokesman for the Green parliamentary party on matters regarding Deutschlandpolitik. This group wants pacifism, neutralism and equidistance between the blocs, but it also demands unilateral withdrawal of West Germany from NATO, recognition of the G.D.R. under international law and removal of the reunification reservation in the preamble of the West German constitution.[4]

Too much importance should not be attributed to the political forces that favor withdrawing from the superpower confrontation and the major power blocs. Every indication is that the vast majority of West Germans continue to support their country's firm orientation toward the West. Nevertheless, the demand for self-determination for all Germans must be a binding principle of action in our foreign policy. We can readily understand the demand for self-determination among the younger nations of the world; this right also provides West Germany with a certain amount of room for maneuver in its foreign policy. Self-determination can lead to reunification. However, it can also lead to something else. If the Germans want to live in a political configuration that is not a German nation-state they must be free to decide so.

The results of self-determination would have to be accepted in any case, even if the decision of the Germans in the G.D.R. were to lead to a free state similar to the "Austrian solution." Self-determination is an indispensable basic right and an integral element of the shared values in the Western family of nations. Unity without self-determination must be rejected; we have no hegemonic claims on the G.D.R. Self-determination without unity, however, is conceivable.

German self-determination will not, of course, affect Germans alone. As our parliament, the Bundestag, acknowledged in a resolution earlier this year, "Our country is divided, but the German nation continues to exist. We Germans will not be able to change this state of affairs on our own. . . . It will only be changed in the framework of a durable peace order in Europe." The division of Germany is also the division of

[4] Cf. a 12-point paper entitled *Knackpunkte zur Deutschlandpolitik*, Plenarprotokoll 10/59, 4182.

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Europe. The European nations that pursue the ideal of European unity know that overcoming the division of Europe will also involve finding a solution to the German Question, since it will only be possible to create long-term stability and peace in this way.

We may properly ask whether reunification will only be possible if and when neighboring European states agree, or whether the Germans can only be reunited in the framework of a united Europe, something that would presuppose integration in a West European federation. Might not complete integration of West Germany in a West European federation make the reunification of our country impossible, or at least endanger it? Are European unification and German reunification mutual conditions, or are they irreconcilable contradictions? Will European unification make German reunification possible or, conversely, will German reunification open up the way for European unification?

The interests of all the countries affected are involved in the answers to these questions. For, as Karl Feldmeyer concluded in an editorial in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, "The German question is not a European question, but rather a question between the world powers."[5]

III

German interest in self-determination has not been limited to West Germans alone. Throughout East Germany there is evidence of a growing shift in attitudes toward inter-German issues.

This shift first emerged in official G.D.R. positions regarding German history. In December 1980 the famous equestrian statue of Frederick II of Prussia was restored to its original location on the Unter den Linden in East Berlin; G.D.R. politicians even went so far as to refer to him as "Frederick the Great." East German leaders have expressed newfound appreciation for the Prussian reformers Stein, Hardenberg and von Clausewitz. Even Bismarck, the Iron Chancellor, is no longer characterized as a "reactionary Prussian Junker." On the contrary, Bismarck is praised as a far-sighted "Realpolitiker" for having negotiated a security pact with Russia.

All-German anniversaries in the past two years have been marked in the East as in the West—the Goethe anniversary in

[5] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 22, 1984.

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Frankfurt and Weimar, the Luther anniversary in Worms and Wittenberg. At a historical conference in East Berlin, Professor Finker, Vice-Rector of Potsdam Teachers' College, praised the efforts of the anti-Hitler conspirators of July 20, 1944, as "a courageous deed of historical and national significance." What the plotters did, he said, was "in the interest of the German people." By contrast, the Soviet Army newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* noted that attempts to raise the conspirators to the "rank of national heroes" could not be separated from the revanchist and nationalist moods of West Germany. Indeed, the Soviet paper said, such adulation was aimed "directly at fomenting chauvinist and great-power ambitions."

A particular circumstance in East Germany reinforces the interest in the all-German heritage. The priority for people in East Germany continues to be personal and political freedom; this they can achieve by officially sanctioned emigration to the West, by escaping, or by measures toward reunification. The first two options are unlikely and dangerous, leaving reunification as the most realistic vehicle for the pursuit of freedom. Despite the revival of the "national question" in the G.D.R., however, it should be kept in mind that Honecker wants reunification, if at all, only under a socialist system.

For East Germany, the incentives for improving inter-German relations are increasingly clear.

—East Germany has failed to bring about any general acceptance of its claim to legitimacy in the German context.

—As a result of the economic crisis in the Eastern bloc countries, the G.D.R. needs trade relations with Western countries and particularly with West Germany.

—Military costs are forcing the G.D.R. to pursue a "peace policy" that urges arms control.

G.D.R. relations with Western countries serve to bring further international recognition and stabilization of the G.D.R.'s position under international law. This also brings with it a growth in importance for the G.D.R. with regard to the other Eastern bloc countries.

The G.D.R.'s new attitudes toward West Germany have evoked mixed reactions among its socialist neighbors—misgivings in Czechoslovakia and Poland, approval from Hungary.

The Czechoslovak Communist Party newspaper *Rude Pravo* in early April 1984 attacked "particularistic" and "separatist tendencies" on the part of "some brother parties" who were attempting to gain unilateral financial advantages in the West

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and "to demonstrate an independent foreign policy course that diverges from the line agreed upon in the community," and who "underestimated their own models." *Rude Pravo* mentioned no names, but the meaning was clear.

The Hungarians responded immediately, and the G.D.R. demonstratively printed the major Hungarian statements. On April 12, 1984, *Neues Deutschland* published an interview with Hungarian Central Committee Secretary Matyas Szürös under the title "Common Aims, National Interests." Szürös cited East Germany's relations with West Germany as being a specific example of how historical ties between individual European countries can benefit the common aims of the socialist countries and, at the same time, serve national interests. He emphasized that the majority of socialist countries lay in Europe, "one of the ancient centers of human civilization. Europe will doubtless continue to initiate and continue détente policy in the future. This is a result of mutual interests and mutual dependencies."[6]

This controversy clearly brings out the disharmonies within the Eastern bloc regarding independent national interests, and expression of these interests in terms of foreign policy. On the other hand, it also becomes clear that Europe exerts a strong attraction on the East European countries, both in terms of common European history and culture as well as in terms of Europe's political future.

## IV

The most serious factor affecting the G.D.R.'s emerging position, of course, is the response of the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders have an interest in seeing that domestic stability is preserved in East Germany. For this reason Moscow grants the G.D.R. some freedom of movement in German-German relations. Still, the question remains whether the G.D.R. is only a recipient of Soviet orders or whether it has genuine room for maneuver.

This question was raised in concrete terms on July 27, 1984, when Moscow expanded its campaign against West Germany with sharp attacks on German-German relations, not only directing new attacks against Bonn, but also addressing disguised warnings to East Berlin.

Only a few days after West Germany agreed on a new loan

[6] Cited by Ilse Spittmann in "Die deutsche Option," *Deutschland-Archiv*, May 1984, p. 453.

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for the G.D.R. and on promises for relaxing travel restrictions, the Soviet newspaper *Pravda* accused the West German government of orienting the development of relations between the two German states toward a "nationalistic conception," directed, in the final analysis, toward "undermining the socialist system in the G.D.R." *Pravda* went on to say that Bonn was forcing "concessions in questions affecting the G.D.R.'s political sovereignty and using both economic levers and political contacts to do so."

With this attack the Soviet Union attempted to intimidate the West German government. And Moscow has made it clear to the G.D.R. that it will not accept German-German relations that are independent of the Soviet Union. Both states in Germany have been put on notice that the national question can only be solved with Moscow, not against it. The postponement of the Honecker visit to West Germany announced at the beginning of September 1984 shows how limited the G.D.R.'s room for maneuver truly is, and also how dependent rapprochement between the two countries is on the climate of East-West relations.

The Soviet Union is attempting to use a revival of the German Question as a means of separating West Germany from its Western allies, above all from the United States. By advising West Germany to "throw ballast overboard," the Soviet Union wants to make it clear to Bonn that a neutralist attitude could be worth its while. The peace movement, the Greens and a large part of the SPD have come in for unreserved praise from the Soviet Union because of their demand for equidistance from the superpowers.

But East Germany seems not to have made this Soviet strategy its own. The East German position was well expressed to Henry Tanner, a correspondent for the *International Herald Tribune*, by an influential member of the East German leadership. Tanner's East German informant defined the German-German relationship as a "security partnership," since neither the Germans in the West nor those in the East would ever be able to live in security as long as this was not guaranteed in the other part of Germany as well. Thus, this East German argued, security partnership would have to replace mutual deterrence. He strongly rejected as "nonsensical" the idea of dissolving the two power blocs. Better relations between the two German states were, on the contrary, only possible if the two governments were fully aware of the fact that they were integrated in

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two different alliance systems with all of the accompanying obligations. "Anything else would be absurd, a dream, a fantasy."[7]

Interesting in these statements is the decisiveness with which East German spokesmen are distancing themselves from the left-wing circles in West Germany, including both the radical elements among the Greens, who would like to eliminate both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and Günther Grass, who called on both German governments to openly contradict the respective superpowers in the question of nuclear arms. According to Heinz Barth, writing in *Die Welt*,[8] the *Herald Tribune* article shows that the new course being steered by the East German leadership is aimed primarily at avoiding any strains that could have a negative effect on the greater latitude sought for the German-German relationship. A visible effort is being made, according to Barth, to create an autonomous field for German-German dialogue inside the overall field of East-West relations, as it were, under the umbrella of the two alliances.

East Germany is thus apparently attempting to acquire more freedom of movement with respect to the Soviet Union not by making the "national question" a focus of policy on Germany, but rather by placing it in the context of its "peace policy." At their meeting during the funeral for Soviet leader Yuri Andropov at the end of February, Honecker and Kohl agreed that the further shaping of relations between the two German states cannot be separated from safeguarding peace.

The East German leaders are attempting to present their state as a "bulwark of peace and socialism in Europe." Remaining a reliable ally of Moscow, East Berlin is systematically pursuing an independent foreign policy that is addressed, above all, to the European middle powers. For East Germany, however, the way to Western Europe still leads through Bonn. Disturbed relations between East and West Germany and good relations between East Germany and West Germany's allies are hardly conceivable. For this reason East Germany has integrated its own Deutschlandpolitik into its "peace policy."

## V

The following areas of agreement have emerged between the West German and East German governments:

[7] *International Herald Tribune*, March 20, 1984, p. 1.
[8] *Die Welt*, March 20, 1984.

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—the desire to keep central Europe as free as possible from tensions and reversion to cold-war tactics;
—rejection of both neutralism and equidistance from the two superpowers; and
—loyalty to their respective alliance partners.

This is a convergence of interests which facilitates the current dialogue between the two states in Germany. How can the four powers who have control over Germany as a whole, and the European neighbors as well, be won over to a Deutschlandpolitik?

The aims and intentions of the Soviet Union as well as its influence on East Germany are of crucial importance for a peaceful solution of the German problem based on overcoming the division of the country.

The Soviet Union's overall diplomatic record is not encouraging. Even Eastern Europe has become a cause of concern to the Soviets. Czechoslovakia, Romania and Poland mark a destabilized area which ties up Soviet resources instead of freeing them. Slowly but surely, special interests are emerging under all-European and nationalist guises. A degree of erosion already attained in the Soviet sphere of influence seems irreversible. There is no glossing over the fact that in the Soviet Union, too, centrifugal forces have grown.

The objective of our negotiating efforts with the Soviet Union must be to bring about a kind of cost-benefit analysis in the U.S.S.R. that responds to the question of whether or not maintaining the current state of division and confrontation in Europe by means of military superiority is still worthwhile in view of the huge material and political costs involved and the questionable benefit.

Many observers consider it possible that a newly formulated Soviet foreign policy could aim at making the German Question a central issue. If the Soviet Union has to admit that it cannot persuade West Germany to leave the Western Alliance, even with the help of East Germany, it will not hesitate to play the "German card"—that is, tempt West Germany by offers of improved inter-German relations—even hinting at reunification. Given the existing power configuration, a move of this kind would be forthcoming from Moscow rather than from East Germany, but we may rest assured that the impetus will come from East Berlin.

We can be equally sure that East Germany will not open the new round of Deutschlandpolitik by proposing either reunifi-

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cation or the withdrawal of the two German states from NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Rather, it would likely come up with an offer of one of many conceivable variants of a "higher quality" in relations between two German states, bringing it into the context of a "common responsibility" and a "normalization of German-German relations." It would indicate that "further steps" would be possible if we accept this "offer" and return to the status quo prior to deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces.

Neither the Soviet Union nor the Western powers would want to let Germany reunite without being certain of the effect it would have on the power balance. Ever since the Germans began attempting to find political identity in a unified nation-state, they have been watched more or less distrustfully by neighboring countries. A Germany "divided in itself" was considered "a factor guaranteeing equilibrium in Europe" after 1815, after 1918, and again after 1945, according to Michael Stürmer. Does François Mauriac's cynical statement, "I love Germany so much that I am happy there are two of them" still apply? Or Alfred Grosser's that "the Western Allies only want reunification as long as it is impossible"? Or Golo Mann's comment that "the secret of Franco-German friendship is the division of Germany"? West German President Richard von Weizsäcker wrote: "Overcoming separation does not yet mean political unification. . . . For the former we will find understanding almost everywhere and for the latter almost nowhere. Most Europeans dislike the Wall about as much as they do the idea of a large German state in Central Europe."

These long-standing attitudes among our allies may be changing. The Reagan Administration, for one, has made it clear that the United States does not view the Yalta Agreement as the West's approval of the division of Europe. Instead, it believes the Yalta Agreement to be an instrument of international law giving it political responsibility for Eastern Europe. If the United States does not recognize a legal division of Europe, then it also rejects the division of Germany.

The French ambasssador in West Germany, Jacques Morizet, emphasized in a speech last March that France had never disputed the right of the German people to self-determination. French opposition leader Jacques Chirac has stated his belief in the need to restore the political unity of the German nation. And French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson has flatly stated his support for "providing the German nation the opportunity

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to achieve its unity on the basis of a free decision and by peaceful means. All Germans are entitled to this right and no one can deprive them of it."

In order to establish how our Western allies assess Germany and the German wish for reunification, we need more than statements by politicians. We also need the views of the "man in the street." Recent polls have produced surprising results. A February 1984 poll conducted for the left-liberal weekly *Le Nouvel Observateur* determined that 57 percent of the French population expressed their sympathy for the Germans, 41 percent felt that the Germans would, if given the choice, decide in favor of reunification, 42 percent felt France should remain neutral toward a reunification plan and 28 percent expressed their support of such a plan. This means that 70 percent were not against reunification. Only 15 percent indicated they were against it. Another poll of international attitudes conducted for the West German weekly *Stern* at the end of April 1984 also showed a positive attitude toward German reunification. Large portions of those polled (in the United States, 54 percent; Britain, 51 percent; France, 43 percent) considered it desirable, since it would serve the cause of peace in the world. According to the same poll, 71 percent in the United States, 42 percent in Britain and 44 percent in France said they like the Germans.

VI

Critics of any form of a Deutschlandpolitik still abound in the Western press, complete with allusions to a new Rapallo. Yet on the whole it can be said that the Western allies take a positive attitude toward the German Question. The task of German policy now is to persuade the various governments of the practical value to them in making German unity a central element of their policies. This will be possible only as long as the Federal Republic of Germany is esteemed as a reliable, friendly and stable partner in the Alliance, both in NATO and in the European Community. Any considerations on the part of the Germans aimed at equidistance, neutrality or independent German initiatives would result in our isolation. This would evoke feelings of mistrust and remove the basis for continuing a realistic Deutschlandpolitik and Ostpolitik.

The freedom of Germany and Western Europe, as well as the prospect of overcoming the division of Europe and Germany, can only be preserved on the basis of firm integration in the Western Alliance. What is involved is a policy that

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convinces the Soviet Union that its previous policy has been unable to dissolve the Alliance and thus translate military strength into political influence in Western Europe. The offer of economic cooperation, which provides the Soviet Union with an opportunity to close domestic gaps, continues to be just as much an instrument of Western policy as negotiations in the political and security areas.

Deutschlandpolitik should be guided by three basic points.

First, the Federal Republic of Germany's decision in favor of the West in 1949 was not a geographical or power-policy decision, but rather a statement of belief in the values shared by the members of the Western family of nations. The right to self-determination is a conviction common to all of the partners in the Western Alliance. For this reason, German-American friendship, our alliance as well as our statement of support for a politically united Europe, continues to be a kind of second unwritten constitution for the Federal Republic of Germany.

Second, the pursuit of the aim of self-determination for all Germans requires that the German Question be kept open. This cannot be done only by arguing our case in the courtrooms of history. What is needed instead is the backing and support of the majority of all Germans. In order to preserve this conviction, we need to intensify encounters, mutual acquaintanceship and mutual knowledge in our divided country.

Third, East-West relations and the possibility of improving relations in divided Germany are mutually dependent. Confrontation and a lack of East-West dialogue reduce the latitude available for progress between East Berlin and Bonn, just as icy inter-German relations would not fail to have an effect on the climate between the two superpowers. A balance of military forces is a necessary condition for successful negotiations. Any attempt by one side to achieve unilateral advantage at the expense of the other side destroys any hope for a balanced give and take.

The priorities defined in the preamble of the West German constitution—freedom, peace and unity, *in that order*—continue to be a guideline for political action in our time.

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*Sir Geoffrey Howe*

# THE EUROPEAN PILLAR

No better image has ever been found for the Atlantic Alliance than the arch supported by two pillars, one planted in North America, the other in Western Europe. The arch is a noble, gravity-defying structure, whose discovery was one of the great landmarks of civilization. It works only because of its design and absolute solidity: every stone in its place, each one supporting the other, with the stress properly distributed overall. As a model for NATO, it symbolizes the West's political strength. Contrast it with the structure of the Warsaw Pact, which often seems more like one of those huge monolithic hero-statues so favored in the East, weighed down by its abnormal musculature, and built on a foundation of broken rubble.

Even so, an arch so large that it spans the ocean between two continents cannot escape occasional stresses and strains. There has hardly been a year since its inception when the Atlantic Alliance has not had to deal with some internal difference or make some painful sacrifice for a common goal. So far we have coped remarkably well. The successful start to the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe last year was a prime example. But the question is bound to arise: are we not handicapping ourselves unnecessarily by organizing our defenses in this way? Is it not contrary to nature to link together a group of states separated by 3,000 miles of ocean, with different histories and fundamentally different geostrategic positions? Is not the arch bound to be dangerously lopsided when one pillar includes a superpower with global responsibilities and the other a plurality of states which, even collectively, do not aspire to "super" status; and when that superpower, geographically the farthest from the greatest military threat, contributes as much as 60 percent of the Alliance's total defense spending and 40 percent of its military personnel? Why, 40 years after the last war, are there still 350,000 American troops on the continent of Europe? Why, indeed, are there 66,000 British servicemen still in Germany? In short, if the arch was not there, would we need and want to invent it?

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My answer to that last question is a resounding yes. I am profoundly convinced that Europe needs America and America needs Europe, for safety and prosperity, and the security and peace of the world as a whole. I shall have a good deal to say to justify that judgment. But I also want to look at the tasks that arise from our mutual need: how, in short, to ensure that the arch stays as strong and effective as it has been up to now. That involves looking at what the Europeans do already; how they can (and are planning to) maximize their efforts in future; and what common goals the whole Atlantic community should be setting itself. In all this I am mindful of the broader community of interest that exists beyond NATO with all states who value political and economic freedom, in the Far East and Southeast Asia, but by no means only there. One of my main concerns is that the Atlantic arch should be compatible with, and firmly built into, a broader worldwide framework of democratic security and that both "pillars" should take their fair share in making it so.

One area which I deliberately exclude from my questioning is that of general Alliance strategy. The more I hear and read of the debate over flexible response, forward defense and the two-track approach of deterrence and dialogue, the more I am convinced that no plausible alternative to these basic strategies has been found or can be found for NATO in the foreseeable future. As for their credibility with the man (or woman) in the street, it is a striking fact that the more governments have done to explain them—in face of the public debates of the pre-INF deployment period—the more public concern has settled down, and the more firmly the quiet majority in favor of Atlantic defense has reasserted itself. One of the great virtues of these strategies, however, is that they are not static ones. Their practical consequences are constantly changing as the threat changes and as new technical possibilities present themselves for countering it. This process of practical adjustment, and how it affects the "European pillar," will be very much a part of my theme.

## II

I return to my first premise: that the mutual dependence of America and Europe still justifies, among other things, the continuing presence of large U.S. forces on our continent. It may be worth thinking this through from first principles. It is common ground that the Soviet Union and its allies pose the

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major threat, both in Europe and worldwide, to the free democratic nations of the West. The great bulk of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military resources—four million out of 5.7 million personnel, 173 out of 244 active divisions, 42,500 out of 60,000 main battle tanks and 7,240 out of 12,000 combat aircraft—is deployed in or immediately facing the European theater. Some two-thirds of the new Soviet SS-20 missile force are also aimed at Europe. The case for Western, including U.S., defense efforts also to concentrate on Europe is therefore clear. And since reinforcements located in the west of the Soviet Union are 650 kilometers from the East-West dividing line, while forces stationed in the United States are 6,000 kilometers away, Europe—and indeed the Alliance as a whole—needs more than just the promise of U.S. assistance in times of crisis. A substantial American presence, conventional and nuclear, is needed in Europe itself to keep in-place forces at the level required for immediate deterrence, and—in face of the East's marked conventional superiority—to signify the allies' readiness, if the need should ever arise, for a graduated nuclear response. If we failed to equalize the pressure by maintaining all-round deterrence in this way, not only would we increase the temptation for the Soviet Union to exploit its superiority by direct military action, but we would expose the West European nations even in peacetime—if you could call it that—to the full onslaught of political blackmail and intimidation.

To Americans—to the rest of the Western world—that might not seem a matter of immediate concern. But Western Europe houses a unique concentration of prosperous and vigorous democratic nations. Of 27 countries in the World Bank's top GNP-per-capita bracket, 15—more than half—are in Europe. The ten members of the European Community account for 31.9 percent of the world's total trade. They provide some 17 percent of U.S. import requirements including over 20 percent of miscellaneous manufactures and 12 percent of U.S. imports of mineral fuel. By anyone's standards, this is too great an asset to be allowed to fall into Soviet hands or even come under Soviet political domination.

But one might say that this argument can and should be turned on its head. A Europe that has attained such economic strength should today take a greater share of the responsibility and cost of its own defense. Henry Kissinger has suggested, for example, that NATO should have a European as Supreme Allied

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Commander, that Europe should negotiate directly with the Russians on shorter-range nuclear missiles, and that there should be only a token U.S. troop presence on the Continent.

I do not deny, indeed I endorse, the notion that the Europeans can and should do more to defend themselves. But Henry Kissinger's prescription is not right. There is no native nuclear superpower in Western Europe. France's and Britain's strategic nuclear forces together make up less than three percent of the superpower arsenal. But all Soviet nuclear systems, not just short-range ones, can be used to threaten Europe, and the risk of their being so used would be far greater if the American nuclear commitment to Europe at all levels were not made credible by the deployment of substantial U.S. conventional as well as nuclear forces. We could perhaps reduce that risk by bringing the two sides' conventional forces in Europe more into balance. But building Europe's forces up to the Soviet level is hardly practical, even if it were desirable. And our leverage for bringing their level down to ours would hardly be strengthened by a signal of waning American interest in Western Europe such as a unilateral troop cut would convey.

For frankness' sake I have to add that the most likely result of withdrawing the American "prop" might well not be to spur the Europeans to stand on their own two feet and multiply their own defense efforts. It could be more likely to make them question whether their own commitments to each other were still worth the sacrifices involved. It would certainly strengthen the platform of those (happily a small minority at present) who have always argued for European neutrality and/or accommodation with the East.

Besides, one of the main premises of some variants of the burden-sharing argument—that Europe's economic strength is now equal or close to America's—needs to be handled with some caution. The European Community has gone a long way toward integration but it is still not a federal structure, let alone a single political and economic entity. Separate states cannot make the internal transfers of resources that are possible within a single powerful nation-state like the United States, and find it difficult (though we do try) to achieve economies of scale greater than the national market will bear. The average defense spending of individual European allies can, in fact, be shown to be fully in proportion to their relative prosperity compared with the United States. The European share of total allied defense spending has risen sharply to its present 40

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percent from only 23 percent in 1969. During the period 1971–82 European defense spending grew by 25 percent in real terms overall, while U.S. defense spending showed a net decrease in real terms of 0.2 percent and ended up barely higher than its level prior to the Vietnam War. Today, of the Alliance's ready forces in Europe and the surrounding seas, the European allies provide 70 percent of the fighting ships, 80 percent of the combat aircraft, 85 percent of the tanks, 95 percent of the artillery and 95 percent of the divisions. Nor is this the end of the story.

The contributions of NATO partners are in part material and quantifiable, as in the direct allocation of human and budgetary resources to the common defense; but they are also often intangible or political, as when governments persevere in policies serving overall security interests in the face of competing domestic and international pressures. Allied governments have remained steadfast behind both tracks of NATO's INF modernization/arms control decision of 1979. This action has represented, especially for the basing countries, a profound commitment to the unity and credibility of the Alliance. Besides, many allies make additional hidden economic contributions to the common defense that are not reflected in their official defense expenditures. Overall, the non-U.S. NATO allies do appear to be shouldering roughly their fair share. (This paragraph will not, I hope, be taken as European special pleading. Every sentence in it is taken from Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's report to Congress of March 1984 about the balance of allied contributions.)

My contention, therefore, is that there is nothing too badly out of proportion in the share of defense burdens borne by the European pillar of the arch. But the loads it has to bear are constantly changing, and neither pillar is exempt from the effects.

There is no standstill even in the traditional arena of confrontation. Warsaw Pact forces continue to grow quantitatively, to improve qualitatively and to exploit technical advances. NATO itself has new technological and tactical options, not least in the field of conventional warfare. Making the right choices while preserving the sophisticated balance of our existing strategy, while respecting existing defense planning commitments, and while grappling with manifold constraints on resources, will be no easy task. It demands from us all a clear sense of perspective and priorities, an eye for what has not changed as

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well as what is changing, and a determination to give even the least glamorous topics—stocks, reserves, infrastructure—their due.

Outside Europe and the North Atlantic, the worldwide threat posed by the Soviet Union, its allies and clients has become clearer than ever. So has the complexity of the sources of instability, the variety of local factors involved and the difficulty of calculating the best Western response in each instance. All civilized nations are having to contend with renewed threats to their security, both internal and external: notably the worldwide phenomenon of terrorism, which—especially when governments are implicated—faces us with a number of policy challenges as well as ethical and legal conundrums. The principles for states' behavior embodied in international law have become more important, but their enforcement more complex and difficult, than ever before. It is a truism, but true, to say that our world has become multipolar. Japan has become a force to reckon with outside purely economic fields and is developing a distinctive voice on political and security matters. Increasingly, the big issues—democratic values, the security balance, global economic management—need to be examined and tackled in a three-way North American/European/Japanese context: the Atlantic is not the free world's only ocean.

## III

How can the European pillar be made to bear its full weight in coping with these newer, as well as the older but still important, challenges? It is a subject always near to our hearts in Britain. We cannot claim to have found the philosopher's stone. But history and geography have left us uniquely placed to see Europe's problems from the inside, without forgetting how Europe looks from the outside as well. We stand at the heart of the Alliance in Europe, with 66,000 soldiers and airmen permanently in the front line. We have a double commitment both through the Western European Union and NATO to use them—and indeed all our forces, including nuclear—in the defense of any of our allies when attacked. We have one of the strongest and most distinctive voices in the European Community. And with all this, we have not lost our keen understanding of the global nature of security.

In 1945 we ruled an empire two-thirds larger in size than

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the Soviet Union is today. We have now divested ourselves of virtually all of it, but that process has taught us some useful lessons too. Today we still retain responsibility for territories in some key strategic positions; and we not only maintain but have frequently made use of a flexible capacity for military intervention outside the NATO area. British servicemen and women are sent on loan to provide military training, advice and assistance in some 30 countries ranging as widely as Zimbabwe, Kuwait and Brunei, and we give ad hoc military assistance to many more.

IV

I hope, therefore, there will be no risk of my being charged with special pleading as a "little Englander" or "little European" if I offer two home truths about the United States' own contribution to the way ahead. The first concerns the economic dimension of security.

My American friends are, rightly, always among the first to draw attention to the link between military potential and the economic base when it comes to our trade with the Eastern bloc, and to controlling the sale or transfer of defense-related products and technologies. One less often hears it pointed out in the United States that economic resources and the free flow of trade are directly relevant to defense performance on the Western side as well. A defense effort so badly planned and overfinanced that it resulted in economic bankruptcy would be self-defeating. Equally, each time the Western allies take steps which hinder rather than foster each other's economic development, they are making the common security endeavor more difficult.

There is a global aspect to this too. Much of the West's attraction as a model for developing countries rests on its economic principles and economic success. The attraction will quickly wane if we are not prepared to share our success—or if we pursue it by means that do unwarranted damage to others. The less-developed countries already have to grapple with fundamental economic problems of poverty and fast population growth. Their political structures are often imperfect and under strain. It will hardly help if we face them with a series of extra economic hurdles, each one higher than the last, created by our own pattern of interest rates and major currency movements. And it will hardly improve the chances of their

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staying firm—in the face of all other threats and blandishments—in their political allegiance to the free Western world.

A blueprint for meeting the economic challenge is not far to seek. At the Williamsburg and London Economic Summits, Western leaders committed themselves to policies which should not only consolidate recovery in the leading industrialized countries but also help to spread its benefits more widely. The task now is to stick to that course. The American economy has shown extraordinary dynamism in recent years. In the last ten years, 17 million jobs have been created in a workforce that is mobile and highly motivated and trained. Europe has done comparatively badly here. Where we have led the field is in taking the tough decisions needed to reduce the volume of resources consumed by the state, curb deficit financing and thereby create the conditions for successful enterprise.

The wider lessons of our experience cannot just be ignored. I give full credit for the flexibility of the U.S. internal market and the realism and courage that the U.S. labor force has shown in pursuing new opportunities, even at the cost of foregoing real wage increases. I also give credit for the way the buoyancy of U.S. domestic demand has helped all America's trade partners, whether developing or developed. But a good deal has been mortgaged for these immediate rewards. The high interest rates that go with high budget and trade deficits are taking their toll here and now, not least in the friendly Third World countries that I mentioned above. And the scale of the economic mismatch involved in such deficits threatens us all, sooner or later, with a delayed adjustment that could be painful and disruptive in the extreme.

There is no excuse for delay. If we are serious about sustaining economic recovery, increasing its pace and spreading the benefits beyond the industrialized world, we must make a reality out of our joint declarations. We must all work together—America, Europe and Japan—to "build down" interest rates, subsidies, and tariff and non-tariff barriers on all sides. Let us not waste time deciding who throws the first stone.

Agricultural protectionism, for instance, is a vice that flourishes on both sides of the Atlantic. It is high time we all exposed our farmers to a more genuinely open environment, to guide them toward production patterns that are more in line with both domestic and worldwide demand. Let us not forget either that protectionist pressures are not a kind of natural force divorced from our own actions. We run the risk of strengthen-

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ing them by policies that effectively slant the rules of competition in our favor, such as the overvaluing of national currencies. And, finally, let us recognize once and for all that free trade is not part of the problem. It is—and always has been—part of the solution.

V

My next home truth concerns the American attitude toward closer integration and further cooperation in Europe. The United States wants and needs a strong Europe, and one whose strength is manifested in fields beyond the merely regional and the merely economic. That can only mean an increasingly united Europe. Successive administrations have been steadfast and generous in supporting the cause of European integration. More recently there has been a tendency among some North American commentators to write off the European Community—and Europe as a whole—as a weak-willed, declining backwater. Even if not self-fulfilling, such assessments are neither helpful nor accurate at a moment when Europeans themselves are rapidly shaking off—if they ever shared—the frame of mind known as "Euro-pessimism." The European Community, having worked out solutions at last to its domestic housekeeping problems, has recognized and grasped the opportunity to make a new start. And on the defense front there is a flood of new thinking and activity at national, bilateral and multilateral levels.

In short, the Europeans want to do more and are preparing to do just that. They are getting their act together, which means both a better joint analysis of problems and more pooling of effort to find solutions. If our American friends support the ends they must logically support the means. They must be confident and show themselves confident that a more united European front does not mean united against the United States. A European position can be different from an American position without implying treachery or hostility. It is reasonable for the United States to ask that in seeking integration the Europeans should not become exclusive and inward-looking, waste time on rhetoric, or dwell on the most divisive issues. It is equally reasonable for the Europeans to ask Americans to appreciate that there are distinctively European interests and policy requirements involved in the business of "doing more," and that changes in roles and burdens imply changes in policymaking machinery as well as in policy itself.

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## VI

The tasks facing the ten Community members, soon to be 12, and the 14 European members of NATO are as much external as internal. But in both groups, internal coherence is the precondition of external effectiveness. In the Community, for example, Britain regards it as a key objective to make the Common Market genuinely common by bringing down the obstacles to free trade in services and the remaining barriers to free trade in goods. Joint research and the identification of key areas for industrial and technological collaboration is another high priority. This does not mean we envisage a fortress Europe, building up its technological base behind locked doors to compete with the United States and Japan. Of course we want to compete, but we also want to cooperate: the challenges of the new technologies are too great to be met by any state or group of states alone. We need to find a framework, not just for European but for global collaboration between the technically advanced nations. Are the conditions and mechanisms as good as they might be? How do we ensure that barriers to transatlantic and transpacific cooperation are lowered? How do we guard against new ones being created? How do we grapple with the real problems underlying our immediate difficulties with extraterritoriality—problems which the Community has gone a long way toward resolving in Europe, and which stand out all the more clearly for that when they occur across the Atlantic? We need, at the least, an opportunity to talk through these subjects outside as well as inside Europe.

On global economic and political issues, similarly, a more united European voice is needed to ensure that European interests are properly represented and European skills not underemployed in the management of major international problems. Foreign policy cooperation among the ten Community members already has a good track record in this area. It needs to and can develop further, and as it does, the United States will increasingly be able to rely on the presence of another, weighty Western foreign policy actor whose philosophy and aims are complementary to her own. This developing political personality is a crucial prerequisite for any joint European contribution to the defense of Western interests beyond the NATO area. Some European states already have the capacity—and will—for rapid military intervention, whether as a component of international peacekeeping or in response to

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more specific needs and requests. I can cite as examples the European contingents in UNFICYP in Cyprus, French and British action in Vanuatu, Britain's role in monitoring the Zimbabwe elections, our garrison in Belize, the mine-clearing operation in the Red Sea, the Sinai MFO and the Lebanon MNF. Other European states contribute to the objectives of security and stability in key regions through diplomacy and economic assistance. So the potential is there for a coordinated, substantial and constructive European role in "out of area" problems.

VII

On defense, I have already mentioned the challenges facing the Alliance as a whole. I hope that I have also shown that the Europeans, in seeking to improve their contribution, are doing so from a very high starting base. It follows that we must focus on extracting every possible ounce of value from what we have. In Britain, for example, we have been able in recent years to increase significantly the proportion of our budget which goes to defense equipment rather than manpower and operating expenses. Further energies can be released, and economies identified, through bilateral cooperation—a process in which Britain and other European allies are actively engaged. Then there are multinational equipment projects, with varying membership, which not only promote economies of scale but also advance the cause of interoperability. They do much to make the European industries involved stronger competitors and partners for their counterparts in the States.

There are, however, aspects of today's defense challenges which affect all European members of NATO and which all need to discuss together. The Eurogroup and the Independent European Program Group (IEPG) within NATO provide well-established fora, which can and should be developed further, for discussing policy, information and equipment issues. But other bodies have legitimate parts to play. The ten members of the EC, as I have implied above, cannot overlook in their political deliberations the security component of regional problems, or the economic aspects of security.

Last but not least, the Western European Union (WEU) established by the Modified Brussels Treaty—which celebrated its 30th anniversary this year—brings together seven European nations with a strong political and material stake in the solidity of the "European front." Britain's commitment to station large ground and air forces in the Federal Republic of Germany

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goes back in the first instance to this Treaty and gives us a particularly strong stake in WEU as well as in European defense as a whole. With our six fellow members, we resolved at a ministerial meeting this October to give new weight and new directions to our joint activities in WEU, above all at the level of political deliberation on shared threats, problems, objectives and tasks. WEU is not a rival to or a substitute for NATO, with which it has strong constitutional links. And it is not a center of dissent within the Alliance. We see it rather as a means of securing a more distinctive and more effective European input. Above all, it can bolster its members' will to enhance their defense contribution and to accept whatever sacrifices that may involve—though the actual process of enhancement may best be pursued through other channels. The point of using WEU is that the conclusions will have been arrived at by Europeans themselves and on the basis of their own analysis of Europe's best interests. The effect will be to demonstrate more clearly, for our own publics as well, that the Atlantic arch truly does have two pillars and that one of these is truly European.

The aims of European cooperation are constant throughout all these fields of action. The mechanics and procedures are highly diverse. In the field of security alone, bilateral talks, multinational projects, WEU, the Ten, Eurogroup and IEPG all have parts to play. The key issues for Europe at the moment are how far to allow this diversity to develop, and how to ensure that overall coherence is maintained. My own view is that flexibility and coherence are both essential, and should indeed complement each other. It is common sense to accept that not all nations can be or will want to be equally involved in all areas of European collaboration. Specialization and division of labor is a sensible answer. What is vital is that the system should remain genuinely flexible. Any rigid "class structure" among the Europeans would be wrong and unnecessary. Also, governments should maintain an overview, individually and when they come together, to avoid duplication and to spot gaps.

All this European activity is not self-serving and self-sufficient. It is a contribution to the goals of the Atlantic community and the community of democratic nations worldwide. If the Europeans ever let it appear otherwise, they will have failed in their dearest aim. Furthermore, we must make sure that the channels and mechanisms are there to allow the European contribution to be properly harmonized and integrated with

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that of the United States and Japan. Within NATO, the machinery for this already exists in abundance. The role of the NATO foreign and defense ministers and occasional NATO summits is particularly important. The occasions when all 16 ministers get together are too valuable to be used for exchanging set statements or rubber-stamping reports. We must be frank in discussion, flexible in procedure, and ensure that we focus on the genuinely most important issues.

Where the Western policy consensus extends beyond the 16 members of NATO—as it increasingly and gratifyingly does these days—the task is not so much to revitalize existing organizations as to develop new ones. Fora for economic consultation are relatively plentiful: IMF, IBRD, OECD, the "G-5" of finance ministers. The seven-power Economic Summit grouping (Canada, France, the F.R.G., Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) is particularly valuable not just for the authoritative contribution it makes on its primary, economic subject matter, but also because of the informal discussion it allows on political issues of urgent common concern. The Williamsburg Summit declaration of 1983 and this year's declaration on democratic values, with the other statements issued at the London Summit on terrorism, East-West affairs and the Gulf, have illustrated once again the common ground that exists between all summit participants on key political and security topics.

VIII

This leads me to my final point. What are the key issues on the common Western agenda for the next few years, to which the Europeans should direct their contribution? I shall recapitulate them briefly, not in any particular order or priority since I hold them all equally important. On none of them does the need for extra effort apply to Europe alone, and none of them can afford to be viewed in isolation. They are all linked: free trade and protectionism, U.S. economic policies and European defense policies, regional security and Third World debt.

The tasks as I see them are, then:

—to get our own economic policies right. The aim must be to secure sustainable noninflationary growth, which means sticking to all—not just some—of the principles of the Williamsburg and London Summits;

—to develop a realistic approach to the economic problems of the less-developed countries, eschewing the North-

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South rhetoric which bears no practical relation to today's needs. We must pursue our general aim of extending global recovery by tackling, in the right fora, such specific issues as the longer-term handling of debt, structural adjustment, barriers to trade, the fostering of greater private investment and stable long-term finance, the aid needs of the poorer countries, and effective aid delivery;

—to develop an overall approach to global security problems, recognizing both the worldwide nature of issues like the fight against terrorism and the special difficulties of small states, as well as the existence of local peculiarities that will influence in each case the way our policies are implemented.

—to pursue NATO's dual policy of deterrence and defense and of dialogue and arms control with both conviction and hardheadedness. As NATO's Washington declaration of May 1984 so well expressed it, the two aims are fully complementary: "Dialogue can only be fruitful if each party is confident of its security and is prepared to respect the legitimate interests of others; military strength alone cannot guarantee a peaceful future." And here above all, the possibility of separate but coordinated and complementary actions by Europeans and North Americans is an integral part of the Alliance's strength.

Expressed in generalities, such a shopping list may look pretty short and uncontroversial. But as we all know, its practical ramifications and the demands it will create on all of us, in America, Europe and farther afield, are tremendous. I am confident that the Europeans will find the right way—or rather, variety of ways—to take their fair share of the burden. And I am confident that all this can happen without revolutionary change in Western policymaking, or structures and procedures. This assertion does not just reflect the ingrained British preference for conserving what is best, for respecting the wisdom of our forebears and for refusing to let familiarity breed contempt. Rather, I am convinced that the basic structure and balance of the Atlantic Alliance remains right for today's needs, and that if we tamper with it in any significant way we stand to lose a lot more than we gain.

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*Henry Owen*

# THE WORLD ECONOMY: THE DOLLAR AND THE SUMMIT

*The next annual economic summit is scheduled to be held in Bonn in May 1985. What follows is a more or less fanciful account of its proceedings—not a prediction of the eventual reality, but a depiction of where present domestic and international economic trends are leading. Foremost among these trends is the growth of the U.S. trade and budget deficits. Conceivably, by next May, the actors at the Bonn Summit will have seen signs that these deficits are being reduced. More likely they will not, and the Summit will open in full awareness of the dangers that these deficits pose to the global economy.*

*The dramatization that follows aims to portray what might happen in the absence of effective measures to avert these dangers. Any resemblance between the heads of government described herein and those now in office is, as they say, purely coincidental. The scenario is illuminated by the author's experience as a "sherpa" at the summits of 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980.*

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The time is May 1985. The scene is a large building in the federal government compound in the West German capital, which is distinguished from other nearby buildings mainly by its lack of distinction. Its style is 1905 functional. Two sentries from the German armed forces stand at the entry. They present arms as each of eight political leaders—the heads of government of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Great Britain and the United States, and the President of the European Community—enters. The 1985 Bonn Economic Summit of the seven major industrial democracies is about to begin.

This is the ninth in a series of summits which started in 1975, when President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France convened the first meeting at Rambouillet. Since the 1970s, the heads of government have moved away from detailed and specific sum-

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mit agreements. They prefer substantive exchanges that do not require major changes in the participants' policies. That is what they achieved at Ottawa in 1981, Versailles in 1982, Williamsburg in 1983 and London in 1984: useful discussions, rather than agreement on new actions.

The need to do more, however, is in their minds as the gavel of the German Chancellor calls them to order. This need has been underlined by recent events.

When the new U.S. Congress convened in January 1985, it quickly became apparent that neither the executive branch nor the legislative branch of government had any stomach for major changes in U.S. budgetary policy. The Administration introduced a tax reform and simplification proposal, but neither political party showed much desire to use this measure to increase total tax revenues, in the face of opinion polls that showed this to be highly unpopular. There was even less support for major cuts in defense expenditures; arms control negotiations with the Soviets were resuming, but their results were still unclear. As for cuts in domestic expenditures, notably middle-class entitlement programs, these were barely mentioned, except by a few members of Congress who had already indicated that they did not wish to run for reelection.

The economic situation in early 1985, therefore, seemed to be only a continuation of that in 1984. American interest rates remained high as the U.S. Treasury competed with private borrowing for available savings. These high interest rates, the seeming strength of the U.S. economy and consequent profitability of investments in America, plus the stability of the American body politic, continued to attract foreign funds, both long-term investment and short-term overnight money. These funds filled the gap between high domestic U.S. borrowing and investment needs on the one hand, and the relatively low rate of domestic U.S. savings on the other. They balanced the huge U.S. deficit on current account, which was due largely to greatly increased U.S. imports caused by the weakness of foreign currencies vis-à-vis the dollar and by the increased domestic demand attendant on a strong American recovery.

Although the situation seemed stable as 1985 began, several factors were at work to undermine it. Some of these had existed in 1984. All grew more evident in the first months of the new year:

—The large U.S. budget deficit and resulting high U.S.

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interest rates were slowing the U.S. recovery and causing fears of an eventual recession.

—The U.S. trade deficit was generating growing protectionist pressures in the United States, which threatened to abort recovery abroad, especially in countries that relied heavily on exports for their prosperity.

—The large borrowings abroad that financed the budget deficit and offset the trade deficit were converting the United States into a permanent debtor and creating an ever-larger dollar overhang that made the international financial community increasingly uneasy.

—Foreign investors and governments began to lose their previous hopes that the U.S. budgetary and trade deficits, which were at the root of these problems, would soon be brought under control.

—The efforts of foreign countries, which had witnessed the flight of capital to the United States, to make their industrial economies more attractive to investment were beginning to pay off.

For all these reasons, there was growing uncertainty over whether the strength of the dollar and the flow of funds to the United States, which had been such marked features of the economic scene in 1984, would continue in the same degree. Those sending funds to the United States noted these doubts, reflected on these destabilizing factors, and began to worry. There was a sudden brief drop in the value of the dollar in early April; it rebounded, but not as rapidly as it had fallen.

In the wake of these events, U.S. interest rates rose still further, as American public and private borrowers felt compelled to offer even greater inducements to attract the foreign funds needed to finance federal deficits and U.S. private investment. This rise in U.S. rates created special problems for debt-ridden developing countries and exacerbated fears of a general slowdown of growth in the industrial world. Protectionist pressures increased even more rapidly as a result.

To hold back the rise in interest rates, the Administration urged the Federal Reserve to show greater flexibility, but without success. The Chairman of the Fed argued that an increase in the U.S. money supply would generate fears of renewed inflation and thus intensify foreign concerns about the soundness of the U.S. economy, which would only compound the problem.

While the dollar remained strong and foreign funds contin-

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ued to flow into the United States, an alarm bell had been heard in the night. Fears grew of a further and sharper drop in the dollar and of a drastic reduction in the flow of funds to the United States. Public discussion arose over whether the United States would eventually have to ask for loans from foreign central banks, if the flow of private funds to the United States dried up. Some observers speculated as to whether, if this occurred, the banks would insist on a change in U.S. fiscal policy as a precondition to their lending.

Against the background of these growing concerns about the future, the press and television gave the forthcoming Summit increasing attention. It was seen as a potential turning point, for better or worse, in the economic fortunes of the West. Comparisons were made with the last Bonn Summit in July 1978, when a package economic agreement had enabled the United States to make an overdue change in its economic policy. Would the second Bonn Summit again help an American president to take needed domestic measures—this time to reduce the large budget deficit?

The German Chancellor, host and chairman for the meeting, had been urged by his country's press to rise to the occasion and the precedent. The German media also advised him to avoid an open clash with the United States, which might strengthen pressures in Congress for a reduction of American forces in Germany. He was urged, in short, to get an agreement that would dispel economic concerns, but to do so without any confrontation with the United States.

Pre-summit telephone talks with the U.S. President had left him uncertain as to whether this could be done. Bilateral and multilateral discussion among sherpas had not removed that uncertainty, although they had suggested to the Chancellor and some of his advisers the general outlines of a possible agreement.

II

The Chancellor opened the first session, as is usual at summits, by asking each head of government to speak about his economic concerns and the situation in his country. He turned first to the President of the United States.

The President spoke about elements of strength in the U.S. economy: prices were relatively stable; growth was proceeding at a faster rate than in other industrial countries; the executive branch was resisting protectionist pressures; the United States

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was still the main force making for world recovery. But its ability to continue playing this role was hindered by the doubts about U.S. prospects reflected in recent turbulence on foreign exchange markets. The President urged the Summit participants to remove these doubts by expressing their confidence in the U.S. economy and in U.S. economic policy.

The other heads of government responded by indicating, with varying degrees of diffidence, their view that the present situation was not an accident but the inevitable result of U.S. fiscal policies. No summit communiqué could restore confidence unless these policies changed.

The President answered that the United States was not the only country to run a large budgetary deficit, but it was the only country that had staged a large recovery in recent years, the only country that offered investors reasonable profit margins instead of prohibitive wage and social welfare costs, the only country that had successfully encouraged the development of new technologies on a large scale, and the only country that had been able substantially to reduce its unemployment without generating inflation. The sum total of recent U.S. policies, including fiscal policies, had produced this outcome. It was not the United States but the countries which had done less well that needed to change their policies.

Some heads of government pointed out that the budget deficits of other countries (Japan was the best example) were often matched by high rates of savings. It was the combination of large U.S. deficits and a relatively low U.S. savings rate that had intensified concerns about the American economy.

After this exchange, more blunt than customary at summits, silence settled over the room. It was evident that the participants were separated by a chasm which could not be bridged by oratory. The other heads of state then spoke briefly about each of their countries' economic outlook, but the thoughts of all remained focused on the U.S. problem and prospects so vividly illustrated by the President's remarks.

Over lunch, the Chancellor followed the pattern of previous summits in suggesting that the heads of government discuss noneconomic subjects at meals. He encouraged the President to brief them on the current state of U.S.-Soviet arms talks. The President gave a summary, suggesting that there was some prospect for success in achieving an agreement, but that a great deal depended on convincing Soviet leaders that the United States and its allies would meet the challenge of higher defense

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budgets if these talks failed. The European heads of government wished him well, noting the strong nuclear concerns of their publics.

Then came the usual "free time" after lunch. Breaking into groups of twos and threes, the heads of government strolled for a few minutes around the garden. The Chancellor and the President walked together up and down a small gravel path. The Chancellor said that they should talk as practical politicians: the Summit could succeed only if the United States made some contribution. The other heads of government could not go home without some sign that there would be change in the U.S. fiscal policies that they and their publics thought now threatened world recovery.

The President responded that he had the same problem in reverse; he could not return to the United States having been forced by the allies to change his budgetary policies without getting anything in return. No one would respect a president who yielded to this kind of foreign pressure. If eventually there had to be some shift in U.S. fiscal policy, this would not be the way to go about it. The allies would also have to make major contributions to a summit package if it was to be of any help to him.

When the statesmen reconvened they showed some surprise at the chairman's proposal to move on to other topics. They would need, he said, to complete the initial coverage of economic issues that afternoon, and then take up political issues at dinner, so that they could judge tomorrow morning whether enough progress had been made to permit a constructive summit communiqué.

The President of the European Community objected. There could be no successful summit unless the basic issue that they had confronted in the morning was resolved. To this end, he wanted to pose a question: would the other governments consider changes in their present fiscal and economic policies if the U.S. budgetary policy tightened? Without such changes, a tightening of U.S. budgetary policy would only eliminate the one economic engine that was now sustaining growth in the world. To avoid this, other governments would have to adopt policies that were the reverse of the policies they were urging the United States to adopt. They would have to adopt looser budgetary policies to avoid recession, while maintaining reasonably tight monetary policies to avoid inflation. An indication that they would undertake these changes was the least that an

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American president could expect before tightening fiscal policy.

The response was muted. The contingency envisaged seemed too remote, in view of the President's attitude, to warrant spending much time discussing it. The chairman suggested that the heads of government move on to the next topic: trade policy.

III

European heads of government led off. They indicated that the high levels of unemployment which generated growing protectionist pressures in Europe were more the result of structural than cyclical factors: resources did not shift rapidly from old to new industries. Hence some industrial countries were unable to respond as effectively as others to foreign competition. In this circumstance, the astonishing thing was not that there had been increased protectionism, but that the summit countries had come through the most serious recession since World War II without worse damage to world trade. The trade record of 1984, one head of government pointed out, had been one of stalemate rather than drastic deterioration. They would not be doing too badly, he suggested, if they could continue that stalemate.

The U.S. President was less optimistic. He pointed out that 1984 was the first postwar year in which there had not been the annual increase in international trade that had hitherto sustained world economic growth. He stressed that this was a problem not only for the industrial world but also for the developing countries, which had to rely on rising exports to resolve their debt crises. The summit nations would have to lead the world out of the present trade stalemate if both they and the developing countries were to grow.

The Japanese Prime Minister pointed out that Japan's own barriers to manufactured imports had been further reduced in the past year. If exporters in other countries would make the effort required to adapt their products to Japanese tastes, they would be astonished at the opportunities open to them. Even in agriculture, he observed with a wry smile, he could promise that Japan would not lag behind the European Community in dismantling its protectionist policies.

When other heads of government complained of the large Japanese export surplus, the Prime Minister pointed out that this was due largely to two factors beyond his control: the

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strong U.S. dollar and the high Japanese savings rate. When his colleagues suggested that stimulative Japanese domestic measures would absorb the excess production generated by Japanese savings and thus reduce Japan's export surplus, he described the oversized budget deficit that large Japanese government expenditures had already generated, and said that it would be politically impossible for him to propose an even further increase in these expenditures.

He pointed out that Japan's export surplus was offset, as that of nineteenth-century Britain had been, by large exports of capital, which greatly benefitted other countries. The U.S. President agreed on the value of Japan's capital exports, despite the fact that they contributed to a temporary further weakening of the yen, and urged the Prime Minister to accelerate the deregulation of Japanese financial markets that had begun in 1983 and 1984. Other heads of government stressed the need to ensure that Japan's capital exports were of the kinds most needed for a world recovery, i.e., foreign aid and long-term investment rather than short-term speculative capital movements.

The discussion of trade policy then turned to the United States. European criticism centered on America's 1984 actions to limit imports of steel. The President pointed out that if the U.S. economy was viewed as a whole, it would be seen to be more open than that of Europe or Japan; widespread American public perception of this fact lay at the root of current protectionist pressures in the United States. The best way to constrain these pressures was to go forward with a new round of trade negotiations, which would reduce trade barriers, as agreed at the London Summit in 1984.

Responses from European heads of government made clear that they did not share the President's enthusiasm for accelerating these negotiations. They would be quite satisfied if a "standstill" agreement to avoid new protectionist measures could be maintained. If European trade policy was to change, some major new incentive for this change would be needed.

The U.S. trade negotiator, who had been present for this part of the discussion—along with his European and Japanese colleagues—suggested how such an incentive might be found. Europe was falling behind the United States and Japan in industrial applications of new technology; if this trend continued, Europe's already high levels of unemployment were bound to increase. The way out was to push ahead with trade

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negotiations, which would lower barriers to the movement of high technology, as well as of other exports. European heads of government took note, but merely stressed the need for the United States to relax the controls that it had increasingly applied to technology exports. These controls did more harm to U.S. allies than to the Soviet Union; they were a thinly disguised form of protectionism. In response, the President promised that this issue could be reviewed if the new trade negotiations made progress.

IV

The Chancellor's suggestion that the meeting move on to examine the Third World debt problem led to a desultory review of proposals for new institutions to deal with this problem, and to a general agreement that it was more important to make existing institutions work than to start new ones. That set the stage for mild criticism of the United States for not supporting more strongly the two Bretton Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Several heads of government praised the role of the IMF in rescheduling Third World debt. They noted that the World Bank Group's provision of long-term hard and soft loans supported the IMF's short-term approaches to this problem. They asked why the United States did not take the lead, as it used to, in urging a further expansion as needed in these two institutions.

The President pointed out the incongruity of other heads of government urging him to adopt a tougher fiscal policy while pressing him to spend more money for foreign aid. He was then told by some of the Europeans that a large replenishment of the IMF, some years hence, and a World Bank capital increase, would not require large-scale expenditures by the governments of the industrial countries. As for the International Development Association (IDA, the World Bank's soft-loan window), which *did* require large new appropriated funds, there might be more sympathy for the U.S. position if the Administration evidenced its long-term support for this institution, while pleading temporary budgetary difficulties. The President listened, made a note, but did not answer.

In moving on to the next topic, international monetary policy, the chairman referred to proposals that had been made by experts for international agreement on target zones, beyond which foreign exchange fluctuations would be restrained by concerted action of central banks. He did not himself favor

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these proposals, but he thought they should be discussed. None of the heads of government, except the French President, showed much interest. Most felt that currency value changes were symptoms of governments' inability to coordinate their national domestic economic policies with each other. It was necessary for summits to overcome this problem before they could address its symptoms. The morning's discussion had made clear that the industrial countries were a long way from achieving that coordination, which would be needed before a monetary system comparable to the European Monetary System could be made to work on a global scale.

V

On this somber note, the chairman adjourned the meeting so that the heads of government could prepare for dinner. Most used the time to phone their governments at home, to warn that the summit might fail to achieve any evident result and to suggest that preparations be made to minimize the impact on public opinion.

After dinner, the chairman summed up the first day's work by saying that the issues had been well canvassed, but that the differences seemed larger than the areas of agreement. The heads of government should recognize that the meeting might have to adjourn tomorrow without result. In this case the traditional joint press conference by heads of government should perhaps be cancelled, since there would be little to say. For the same reason there might be no communiqué, only a short statement that exchanges of views at the Summit had been frank and useful. Given the possible effect of this outcome on foreign exchange markets, which were expecting something more tangible, precautions might have to be taken.

As the chairman stood up to leave the room, some heads of government, particularly those facing elections soon, protested against this pessimism. Could not something be done to avoid the dismal summit outcome he had predicted?

The chairman appeared to reflect. He saw one possibility: each of the issues that had been discussed, taken by itself, seemed insoluble. But perhaps, if they were viewed as a whole, a different outcome could be envisaged. Would it be useful, he asked, for the sherpas to hold an all-night exploratory session, to see whether the outlines of a package agreement could be even faintly discerned? There would be no point in going this route unless each head of government was willing to make

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concessions. He believed that the United States would eventually have to change its fiscal policy. The question was whether the President would do so now, to prevent trouble, or wait until the trouble was closer at hand. The question for the other heads of government was whether this Summit could help the President make that choice. Sometimes, he continued, actions that are politically infeasible, standing by themselves, can be taken when they are part of a larger package—one that includes evident benefits for all. Could such a package be assembled at this Summit, one that would include not only what other heads of government want from the American President but what he wants from them? This meant that European and Japanese heads of government must be willing to reconsider their positions on the issues that were discussed that afternoon, even as the American President must be willing to reconsider his position on the question that was discussed in the morning. If the heads of government were not ready to do this, there was no point in staying up all night continuing negotiations.

There was a long pause and then general, if unenthusiastic, approval for his proposal for an all-night negotiation.

VI

After the plenary meeting adjourned for the night, events followed something like the procedural pattern of the 1978 Bonn Summit.

First, there were meetings between individual heads of government and their sherpas, to fix national positions on key issues.

Then came a long meeting of the sherpas and of sub-cabinet representatives from the foreign and finance ministries—briefly and pleasantly interrupted, as had happened at previous summits, by a late-night visit from the British Prime Minister, who offered encouragement. This session addressed the task that the Chancellor had defined: exploring whether a package agreement could be put together that would include beneficial changes in U.S., European and Japanese policies.

The sherpas' discussion turned first to broad economic policy, since that was the heart of the matter. The question which had been posed by the President of the European Community seemed relevant: if the United States were to adopt a more restrictive budgetary policy, would the other industrial countries change their present tight fiscal policies? If they did not, some argued, the most likely result would be a world recession.

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The sherpas tentatively agreed that it would make sense for the countries with the strongest economies—Japan, Britain and Germany—to follow more expansionist fiscal policies if the United States tightened its fiscal policy. This expansion should be modest, to avoid reviving inflation. While the U.S. sherpa welcomed this pledge, he made clear that it would not be enough to warrant a U.S. change of policy. It would insulate the world from the adverse effects of such change; it would not bring new benefits to the United States in other areas.

When the sherpas turned to trade policy, the discussion became more difficult. The Europeans were reluctant to promise to push ahead more vigorously in the new round of trade negotiations desired by the United States and Japan. In the end, it became clear that without this concession no package could be put together. As at the 1977 and 1978 summits, the Europeans finally agreed to set deadlines for the achievement of major reductions in trade barriers. To secure these concessions the U.S. sherpa found it necessary to repeat his President's promise that U.S. controls on exports of high technology would be reviewed as part of the new round of trade negotiations.

All agreed that even a further lowering of trade barriers would not end the large Japanese trade surplus, which would have to continue to be balanced by substantial Japanese capital exports. The other sherpas made clear that Japan would have to contribute to this part of the package by pledging a continuing increase in its foreign aid and continuing progress in deregulating its private financial markets, to improve the quality of its capital exports and thus match the trade concessions of other countries.

The U.S. sherpa welcomed these European and Japanese pledges. They were useful building blocks in building an agreement that might meet U.S. needs.

The sherpas then turned to the Third World debt problem and the need to strengthen the Bretton Woods institutions' role in meeting the problem. The bargaining here was not only among the summit countries but also (in some of the sherpas' minds at least) between these countries and developing nations not represented at the Summit. All wanted the Summit to appear at least somewhat responsive to those absent nations' concerns. The outcome was a compromise. The United States agreed to join the other summit countries in supporting a further large IMF replenishment, when this became necessary, and an increase in the capital of the World Bank, which it had

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hitherto opposed. The European countries and Japan agreed to contribute to the replenishment of the IDA's soft loans on the scale that would be required if the goal were the $12 billion that they had proposed for this replenishment; reversing their previous positions, they agreed to do this even though the United States made clear that its contribution would be geared to the $9-billion goal which it favored, until its budgetary problems had been overcome.

The European and Japanese sherpas then turned to their American colleague: was the package of macroeconomic, trade and aid concessions that they had assembled that night sufficient to elicit an indication that the U.S. President would propose measures to reduce the U.S. budget deficit? The meeting adjourned, while the U.S. sherpa sought an answer to this question.

The President objected to the agreement that his sherpa reported to him. It might make substantive sense, but it did not meet his political need. Most of the allied concessions were either of little interest to the American public and the Congress or else they were too vague and general. His sherpa suggested to the President that the whole might be more than the sum of its parts; the overall impact of such a package agreement could be considerable. The President was not convinced; he would not authorize the sherpa to include a pledge to make changes in U.S. fiscal policy unless the package were strengthened.

The sherpa suggested that perhaps there should be some indication in the communiqué that foreign central banks would, if it became necessary, lend money to maintain the flow of capital to the United States. The President doubted that such loans would be required; the flow of private funds to the United States would continue. If not, he expected such central bank loans as a matter of course.

The President asked if something could be included in the package that would help him more directly on U.S. fiscal policy—for example, pledges of increased allied defense efforts that would make it possible to reduce slightly the present rate of increase in U.S. defense expenditures. Even if this did not save enough money to make much difference in the budget deficit, it would help him make a political bargain at home on the deficit.

The President conceded that allied reactions at the meeting

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that day (and even more the events immediately preceding the Summit) suggested a need for some action to reduce the budget deficit. This meant taxes. The only tax increase that he could get through Congress quickly would be a flat tax surcharge. Liberals would object that this proposal was regressive. To overcome their opposition, he would have to give them something. A decline in the rate of increase in defense expenditures might do.

But such a decline could only be justified by some change in the external situation. Since arms control talks had not yet produced results, this meant that there would have to be increased allied defense effort. Although the Japanese were outside of NATO, there was nothing to prevent the six heads of NATO governments present from indicating the positions that they would take at a future NATO meeting. Furthermore, this was primarily a U.S.-German affair; together they contributed over two-thirds of the military strength deployed on NATO's central front. The President decided to telephone the German Chancellor.

So it came about that the U.S. and German sherpas met before dawn to draft language pledging the heads of NATO governments present to join in calling for an early NATO summit, which would renew the now-forgotten London NATO 1977 Summit agreement that each nation's NATO defense expenditures should be increased by at least three percent annually. It would be made clear that this increase was to focus on the improvement of NATO conventional defenses, thus improving the London agreement.

The U.S. sherpa told his German colleague that he was authorized to include a U.S. pledge to join its allies in exploring means of encouraging the diffusion of new conventional defense technologies within the Alliance, encouraging European weapons production based on these technologies, and ensuring that European production received full consideration in procurement of weapons for all NATO countries (what NATO bureaucrats called the "two-way street"). This was the price that the German Chancellor had told the U.S. President would be needed to secure allied acquiescence. These defense pledges were to be included not in the summit communiqué, but in a separate statement that would be issued at the same time by the heads of NATO governments who were attending the Bonn Summit.

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VII

When the heads of government met after breakfast, copies of the draft communiqué and of the separate NATO statement were laid before each chair. None of them, except the German Chancellor, had seen the full text—just as at the 1977 London Summit, the copying machine had broken down. The statesmen stared at the papers before them with a mixture of hope and suspicion. Then they began to speak—each approving some sections of the communiqué and proposing changes in others. As the discussion continued it appeared that a plenary meeting of heads of government of the world's most powerful nations would degenerate into a drafting session.

The German Chancellor realized that his handiwork was in danger. He spoke out to the group. Recent events, he said, indicated that present trends could eventually lead to a financial and economic crisis. It was far from certain that this would occur, but it was possible. The heads of government had met to try to assure that such a crisis did not take place. The package before them involved changes in policy that each would like to avoid or postpone. In that sense, it was politically difficult for each to accept some parts of this package. But it would be much more difficult for all, he continued, if he went out of the room to tell the press that the Summit had failed to produce the results that were widely desired. All would then have to return home to confront the reactions of their publics and deal with the reaction of the exchange markets to their failure. That is why he called now on all of them either to approve or disapprove these papers as they stood. He would accept but a very few amendments.

Some hours later, the seven heads of government and the President of the European Community walked out to line up before the usual audience of 2,000 or so journalists. Their chairman began: "I have to report to you a great success. The heads of government have reached agreements that will help to meet the main threats facing the industrial world. . . ." When he finished, there was a burst of applause, in which the other heads of government joined. Then each of them began to speak, echoing the Chancellor and implicitly claiming some credit for the results.

In the days that followed observers pointed out that the United States still had to adopt the unpopular changes in fiscal policy that the President had pledged to seek. The question

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had yet to be answered whether America could take forehanded action to avoid a crisis that was still over the horizon. Some thought that the U.S. political system could only function in reaction to a crisis that was clearly at hand, as in World War II and in meeting the Soviet threat of the late 1940s. While the Summit had underlined the need for a major change in U.S. fiscal policy, and had made clear that the allies would make responsive concessions, the outcome was by no means assured. The issue remained what it had been before the Summit: could the United States take difficult and important actions to avoid, rather than meet, a crisis? The Summit had not answered that question, only clarified the choices. Most were hopeful, but not certain, of the American answer.

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*Paul H. Nitze*

# LIVING WITH THE SOVIETS

In 1955, just after the summit meeting between President Eisenhower, General Secretary Khrushchev and Prime Minister Bulganin in Geneva, Chip Bohlen, then our ambassador to the Soviet Union, invited my family and me to stay at the American ambassador's residence in Moscow. At that time the British ambassador in Moscow was Sir William Hayter. There was a story that Hayter, when asked what it was like to negotiate with the Russians, had said it was rather like dealing with a defective vending machine. You put in a coin and nothing comes out. There may be some sense in shaking it, you may get your coin back; but there is no point in talking to it.

Hayter's statement, like most witty remarks, is a gross overstatement, but there is a kernel of truth in it. It can serve as a starting point for a review of the differences and difficulties that have beset the conduct of our relations with the Soviet Union.

## II

First, we have to consider how the Communists think that policy should be analyzed. They start with the proposition that there are certain fundamental theses that distinguish the Communist approach to the world from that of others, particularly from that of the capitalist world. Among these theses are the primacy of the class struggle and the continuing fight against "imperialism" in the formerly colonial world. These theses they hold to be unchangeable.

They also have a somewhat more flexible view with respect to strategy. They think that strategy should, from time to time, be altered to reflect changes in the "correlation of forces." In

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the correlation of forces they include not only military forces, but economic, political and psychological factors as well. When the correlation of forces is favorable to their ends, their doctrine calls on them to exploit that favorable correlation by moving forward. When the correlation of forces is negative, the doctrine calls upon them to hold or to retreat while they attempt to reverse the adverse trends. With respect to tactics, the Communists believe there should be great flexibility. The guiding thoughts should be deception and surprise.

They also hold that is it important at all times to decide upon what they call the "general line." By this they mean that it is necessary at all times to identify correctly the group that constitutes the major threat to their ability to carry their program forward. During the early years after the October 1917 Revolution, the general line called for concentrating their attack on the social democrats within the Soviet Union, that being the group having the greatest potential appeal to workers, the class the Communists claimed to represent but were in fact less close to than the social democrats. Later, after their victory in the civil war, the general line called for concentrating their attack on the social democrats in other countries, particularly Germany. In 1946 Stalin made it clear that he saw the United States as being the principal potential opponent, even at a time when President Truman and his advisers were striving hard to preserve in peacetime the wartime collaboration between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today the general line focuses directly on the United States (and particularly on President Reagan) as being at the heart of the only potentially effective opposition to the Soviet program.

A further Soviet Communist precept is not to let emotion interfere with what they call "scientific realism." One should never let anger influence one's judgment, although it may be advisable from time to time to show anger. For some time before 1960 we were flying U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over the Soviet Union, but the Soviets could not shoot them down. During that period they showed no anger. The moment they were able to shoot down a U-2, Khrushchev put on a tremendous show of anger and beat his shoe upon his desk at the U.N. meeting of that year (1960). I doubt that there is merit in the common thesis, prominent from time to time, that the Soviet leadership is "angry" at the United States. More likely is that Soviet propagandists tell the Politburo that it is astute to create that impression.

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A major point that emerges is that there is indeed a sharp contrast between the way the United States and other countries in the West approach foreign policy issues and the way in which they are approached by the Soviet Union.

This does not mean that we should not negotiate. Negotiations with the Russians can be important and sometimes in the past have achieved useful results. But progress is generally possible only if there has been a prior full Politburo decision favoring a deal on the specific subject matter or, in the case of arms control, a prior decision by the Soviet Defense Council. It is pretty well agreed that nothing can be done by the Soviet government, or by any of the other other organs of Soviet society subject to Party control, which is in conflict with decisions of the Politburo. Furthermore, it is generally agreed that decisions concerning the basic issues of defense, national security and arms control are made in the Defense Council, which is customarily chaired by the General Secretary of the Party and on which a certain number of the other members of the Politburo also sit.

The chief of the Soviet negotiating team at the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) told me there is also a subordinate body, chaired by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, which deals with the day-to-day operations concerned with arms control. On that committee are members of the military establishment; Leonid Zamyatin, who chairs the Central Committee section dealing with the media and propaganda; Vadim Zagladin, who chairs the Central Committee section dealing with relations with other Communist parties and with what they call "political action"; and representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the KGB. He left me with the impression that it was this group that formulated his instructions and coordinated them with the political action, propaganda, and other operations which were related to the objectives that their arms control positions and statements were designed to support.

Once there has been a prior high-level decision, it is up to the Soviet negotiators to get the best possible deal for the Soviet Union. Then, and only then, will they negotiate seriously with the objective of arriving at a deal. If there has been no such prior positive high-level decision, the United States will find itself negotiating with itself. It will offer one position, which will be firmly rejected, modify it in the hope that the new position will be more acceptable to the Soviet side, modify it again and again until finally it either comes down to a position

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so one-sidedly favorable to the Soviets that they cannot fail to accept it, or the United States has to draw back and wait until Soviet higher authority comes to the conclusion that other events in the world are evolving in such a way that it would, in fact, be advantageous for them to make a balanced deal on terms that take account of our interests, as well as their own.

## III

Much of our experience in negotiating with the Soviet Union has been on arms control. Arms control is not an end in itself, but a means. The object of arms control negotiations is to support foreign policy and security policy by negotiating agreements that will contribute to reducing the risk of war, primarily the risk of nuclear war. Many other purposes are discussed in the immense literature that now threatens to engulf the subject of arms control and make it incomprehensible. These other purposes—stopping the arms race, saving money, increasing stability, assuring predictability, providing the foundation for a better East-West relationship—may well be desirable, but they are desirable only *if* they contribute to the more important goal of reducing the risk of war and strengthening the prospects of peace.

At the heart of the matter are the twin concepts of peace and war. It is in one's understanding of these linked concepts that thought about arms control must be grounded. I am convinced that much of the difficulty that the United States has found in getting along with the Soviet Union stems from the contrasting meaning and connotations of the word "peace." It means one thing in the West: internally, a state of domestic order, and externally, equilibrium and an absence of war.[1] The Russian word for peace—*mir*—means something quite different, however, particularly as used by the Soviets since the October Revolution.[2]

[1] For a discussion of Western views of "peace," see Michael Howard, "The Concept of Peace," *Encounter*, December 1983, p. 18.

[2] In pre-October Revolution Russia there were two words, spelled МИР and МІР in the Cyrillic alphabet, both pronounced in the same way. In 1918 the Russian alphabet was simplified; "І" was abolished and became "И." Thereafter there has been a single word "МИР," transliterated as *mir* in our alphabet. Prior to 1918, МИР meant peace. МІР had two meanings: the universe or world and, its historical meaning, the village commune of elders which from time to time reallocated the cultivation of the village communal land among individual members of the village. (Isaiah Berlin in *Russian Thinkers* points out that for the pre-Marxist Russian revolutionaries and authors who created the foundations of the Russian populist, revolutionary, socialist movement in the 1840s, 1850s and 1860s—such as Herzen, Belinsky, Chernyshevsky, and Turgenev—"the village commune was the ideal embryo of those socialist groups on which the future society was to be based.") Thus, *mir* (МИР) now has three meanings: the world, the commune, and peace.

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Let me draw on another illustration from my visit to Moscow after the 1955 summit meeting in Geneva. Ambassador Bohlen took me to a session of the Supreme Soviet, at which Khrushchev and Bulganin were reporting on the "Spirit of Geneva," as the Western press had christened the apparent spirit of cooperation that resulted from that summit conference. Khrushchev and Bulganin took turns in making the presentation. As Bohlen translated for me, I found it fascinating to watch the faces of the delegates and their reactions to what was said. Whenever the speakers dwelled on the Geneva conference, its apparent success, and "the Spirit of Geneva," the audience was dead; people yawned, and some actually fell asleep. Whenever Khrushchev or Bulganin launched into an impassioned description of Western faults, errors and shortcomings, the necessity for *mir*, and the actions the party proposed to take to achieve *mir*, the audience became animated and broke into loud applause.

I asked Bohlen for an explanation of this apparently contradictory behavior. He said that the primary dictionary meaning of *mir* was "the world and those who live on it" and that "concord among peoples and nations and absence of war" was only the secondary meaning. He explained that, as the Soviets used the word in Party statements and writings, it meant a condition in the world in which socialism, the first stage of communism, had triumphed worldwide, class tensions had thus been removed, and the conditions for true peace under Communist leadership had come to pass. The reaction of the members of the Supreme Soviet to Khrushchev's and Bulganin's remarks therefore indicated a lack of interest in the relaxation of tensions exemplified by the "Spirit of Geneva" but enthusiasm for the continuing struggle for *mir*.

Thus the essence of *mir* in the Soviet concept is something quite different from what we in the West understand by *peace*. Two Dutch authors have described the Soviet concept:

> In the Soviet view, the masses in non-socialist societies are exploited and repressed; there is no class basis for *mir* and no real peace. Therefore, the source of all wars is "capitalist imperialism" which seeks to prevent the peaceful socialist world system from fulfilling its holy mission. The Soviets, indeed, believe in such a mission—*missiya*—to establish *mir* in all other societies, the populaces of which are believed to be longing for liberation and genuine peace.[3]

This is a peculiarly Leninist concept. Marx had developed

[3] Dr. J.A. Emerson Vermaat and Dr. Hans Bax, "The Soviet Concept of 'Peace'," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Winter 1984, p. 326.

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no real concept of international relations, for after the proletarian revolution and the "melting away" of the socialist governments, there would be no need for international relations in the accepted sense. Lenin, of course, was confronted by a situation not anticipated by Marx: the revolution was limited to one country. Thus, he had to elaborate a doctrine of the role of peace and war in Soviet policy, a doctrine which became a central part of Marxist-Leninist thought. This doctrine in large part reflected the problems and aspirations of the newly formed Soviet state, the single socialist entity in a world of capitalist states that were, by their very nature, hostile to it. Lenin's contention was that only a proletarian society could enjoy *mir*, which would be attained only with the establishment of socialism, the first phase of communism. At times, *mir* could only be achieved through "wars in defense of the fatherland." The Soviet encyclopedia states that the historical mission of communism is to end war and bring about everlasting *mir* on earth.

Thus, the Soviet concept of "peace" (or *mir*) has come to mean a continuing struggle, rather than a state of equilibrium, as peace is often defined in the West. *Mir* takes as a given that there is a natural and irreconcilable conflict of interest between the socialist and non-socialist worlds. In the long run, international equilibrium cannot be guaranteed in a world of competing social systems. True *mir* can be achieved only through the establishment of a worldwide classless Marxist society, which, given the nature of capitalism, will be achieved only through revolutionary struggle. Thus, over the long run, the pursuit of *mir* will come into conflict with the pursuit of international equilibrium.

That being said, it should be noted that Marxist-Leninist thought permits, indeed strongly encourages, unlimited tactical flexibility in the pursuit of *mir*. Moreover, Lenin counseled caution and calculation. International order based on equilibrium is not good in itself because it is a hindrance to the struggle to achieve a worldwide classless society. However, it may be an acceptable temporary policy objective if the prevailing circumstances dictate, that is, if the "correlation of forces" is unfavorable, or if the interests of the Soviet state will be served by abatement of international conflict or tension.

## IV

The Soviet interpretation of *mir* is related to the strategy of "peaceful coexistence," which was formulated by Lenin in

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1917 at a time when the Soviet Union desperately needed peace with Germany. This strategy stressed the avoidance of direct armed conflict with the capitalist states, while pursuing Soviet interests through other means, when the "correlation of forces" was adverse. Before World War II, Stalin continued to consider the Soviet Union weaker than its potential enemies. In 1927 he said:

> Hence our task is to pay attention to contradictions in the capitalist camp, to delay war by 'buying off' the capitalists and to take all measures to maintain peaceful relations. . . Our relations with the capitalist countries are based on the assumption that the coexistence of the two opposing systems is possible. Practice has fully confirmed this.[4]

In other words, caution and calculation prevailed; the circumstances permitted—and required—acceptance of an equilibrium with the principal European countries.

During the 1960s, when the United States enjoyed nuclear superiority but the principal European states were in the midst of the difficult process of dismantling their former colonial empires, the Soviet strategy of "peaceful coexistence" was further elaborated. A typical Soviet statement from those days was:

> Peaceful coexistence of states with different social orders does not mean the end of the class struggle. Peaceful coexistence not only does not exclude the class struggle but is itself a form of the class struggle between victorious socialism and decrepit capitalism on the world scene, a sharp and irreconcilable struggle, the final outcome of which will be the triumph of Communism throughout the entire world.[5]

During this period, emphasis was placed on supporting terrorism, guerrilla warfare and wars of national liberation, while direct confrontation with the United States was avoided.

Some in the West argue that, whatever the Soviet ideologues assert, the ruling group in Moscow no longer truly believes in the Marxist-Leninist dogma. Almost certainly, many in the Soviet leadership have serious doubts about various aspects of the doctrine. But what counts is that the Soviet rulers believe in their dogma in various ways. The former Soviet Chief of

[4] Stalin in "Political Report of the Central Committee to the 15th Congress of the CPSU (B)," December 3, 1927, as cited in Richard Allen, *Peace or Peaceful Coexistence,* Chicago: American Bar Association, 1966, p. 78.

[5] Khrushchev in June 21, 1963, speech at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, as cited in Richard Allen, *op. cit.*, pp. 86–87.

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Staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, for example, believes in its utility as a rationale for keeping the Soviet society bound to an unmatched level of effort in directing resources to the accumulation of military might. A Soviet counterpart of mine in the INF negotiations, though a thorough cynic, found it necessary to believe in the efficacy of the doctrine if he was to advance in his career. One of my Russian scientist friends was frank in expressing his disbelief in many important aspects of Marxism-Leninism but is a loyal Russian and believes in the contribution Russian science can make to knowledge and to the security of the state; he sees no alternative but to support the system. Foreign Minister Gromyko reiterated the dogma with force and clarity in an article published in Moscow this past spring entitled "Lenin's Peace Policy."[6]

This is not to say that Russian nationalist drives have had no role in forming Soviet policy. During World War II, patriotism for Mother Russia was officially invoked by Stalin, and became a strong and unifying force in checking and then defeating Hitler's armies. But immediately after the defeat of Hitler, Stalin quickly reestablished the primacy of the Party and Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist doctrine.

The objective situation has changed over the past 40 years. Internal opposition is weaker but dissatisfaction with the regime is widespread. The Soviet Union's control has expanded over some 110 million additional people in Eastern Europe, with both the advantages and the strains that such control brings. Soviet influence in remote areas of the world has increased but the attractiveness of its image as a model for emulation has eroded. Its military power has grown immensely. The mix of these factors in turn has had a bearing on the evolution of Soviet policy.

Marxist-Leninist ideology continues nevertheless to have an important influence on Soviet policymaking. Soviet leaders are schooled in that philosophy; it provides the prism through which they view the outside world. All of them believe in their dogma in the sense of ascribing to it efficacy and indispensability in underpinning the regime's hold on power. Concessions or compromise on the dogma would be suicidal for the regime; the effects throughout the realm of Soviet domination would be shattering and incalculable. The Soviet rulers believe in the Marxist-Leninist dogma because it is the linchpin of the system;

[6] *Moscow News*, April 29–May 6, 1984, p. 5.

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it alone gives the system legitimacy. Chip Bohlen once said that Marxist-Leninist doctrine is the fig leaf of the Soviets' respectability; without it they could not live with the reality of the crimes committed in its name.

V

These Soviet concepts and beliefs inevitably clash with our own. The experience of World War II reinforced the ideas, not only in America but also in Europe, that peace was the norm, that an international order should be based on equilibrium, and that war had become potentially so destructive as to be virtually unacceptable. But initially we hoped we would not be called upon to do much about it. Surely other states, including our wartime ally the Soviet Union, must similarly see the unacceptability of war.

As early as the spring of 1946 Stalin made it evident that he saw it otherwise. He proclaimed that the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the struggle for *mir* was to be continued into the indefinite future and that the United States was to be viewed as the center of the opposing capitalist world whose very existence made true *mir* impossible. By 1947 it became clear that England and the other Western countries that formerly had carried the Western burden of world politics and strategy had been too weakened by the two world wars to continue to carry the major share of that burden. The United Nations Organization had proved itself ineffective in the face of great-power disagreements. The United States had to take a lead or see the world accommodate to Stalin's view of the future.

It was under this impulse that the great shifts in American foreign policy of the late 1940s and early 1950s took place. At first, emphasis was placed on helping to create a world economic system based on the Bretton Woods Agreements, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, and backed by the ordering of trade arrangements through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. That work was supplemented by the U.S. aid programs, notably the Marshall Plan and Point Four. Germany, Japan and Italy were returned to the family of nations as free nations. A serious but unsuccessful effort was made to bring the atom under control through the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan and the Baruch Proposal. The United States later participated in the construction of a network of collective defense treaties intended to enhance security against aggression.

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The point of all this effort was to help extend to the world external to the United States the concept of a just and reasonable order, a condition of peace. A place in this structure was offered to the Soviet Union. That offer was consistently rebuffed; for the Soviets to accept a permanent position in such an order, however favorable the circumstances, would have been in diametric opposition to the very concept of the struggle for *mir*. Stalin and all of his successors have rejected such a concession from their ideology, and the opposition between the two concepts—peace and *mir*—continues unabated to this day.

Indeed, I observed it at first hand. The failure of the INF negotiations to date to reach an equitable and mutually acceptable solution can be seen to be grounded in this clash of concepts. American positions were designed to enhance the balance and equilibrium that we see as being basic to international order. The Soviet approach, on the other hand, was based on efforts to preserve and, if possible, enhance a "correlation of forces" that favored them. While exploiting available pressures in an attempt to cause us to accept an unequal and destabilizing agreement at the negotiating table, the prime Soviet interest in the INF issue was in using it to achieve wider purposes: to sow division within the North Atlantic Alliance, particularly between the United States and Europe, and to create tensions within individual countries, especially the Federal Republic of Germany. A NATO thus weakened would be less prepared to resist the expansion of Soviet influence, a situation that would both enhance the position of the Soviet state and contribute toward the future achievement of what it considers the true peace, or *mir*.

It was the hope of American policymakers during the late 1940s that the use of force in international affairs, or even the threat to use force, could be avoided. But just as in assuring internal tranquility the resort to force cannot be wholly avoided, so in support of order in international affairs deterrence through the threat of force, and on occasion the actual use of force, cannot be avoided. To paraphrase Clausewitz, the use of force exists for the benefit of the defender; the aggressor will always prefer to enter your country unopposed. The point is that the use of force, whether used internationally or internally, should be based on principle and a process giving it legitimacy.

The question then is which set of principles and which

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process of legitimization should be supported: (1) peace in its normal meaning—the absence of anarchy, terrorism and civil war internally, and, externally, an international system of order leading to the absence of war between nations; or (2) *mir*, the support of terrorism and guerrilla warfare in other countries under the banner of "wars of national liberation" leading to an increased risk of international war—what the Soviets would call a "just war"—followed by a worldwide regime of structured violence calling itself *mir* which would parallel the continuous process of intimidation that now characterizes the Soviet regime domestically.

On this question it is possible to be too impartial. There have been obvious shortcomings in the way the concept of peace has been carried out in practice by all countries, including the United States. Perfection is not obtainable in the real world. But imperfections in implementation do not invalidate a valid idea. Failure to choose between peace and *mir* can result in a Hamlet-like inability to act until it is tragically late, perhaps too late. It can lead to confusion, uncertainty and chaos, the very conditions most apt to lead to an unintended war. A clear and timely choice should be made.

Let us assume, for the moment, that there is in fact a consensus not only in the United States, but also in the rest of the world not controlled by Moscow, in support of peace in its normal meaning. What then should be the proximate aim of policy? I suggest that the key phrase describing the aim of policy be "live and let live." The Soviet phrase "peaceful coexistence" means exactly that to non-Communist ears. This is not the meaning Khrushchev and Brezhnev gave it, but for once let us take a phrase of theirs and give it the meaning we believe it should have.

## VI

"Live and let live" has been the actual aim of American policy toward the Soviet Union since the end of World War II. From time to time, we did adopt a different *declaratory* policy of "roll back," for example in the early 1950s. But our *action* policy has consistently been "containment"; in other words, let the Soviets be as they are if they will likewise let others be. In contrast, Soviet declaratory policy since 1945 has been "peaceful coexistence," which has given the impression of "live and let live," while in fact to Communist ears it called for an action policy of successive takeovers wherever and whenever this was

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possible without excessive risk. Whether "live and let live" can be fruitfully pursued as a policy for both sides therefore depends on whether there is any prospect for a change in Soviet action policy.

There are many indications that such a change is not impossible. A host of internal and external factors could combine to effect changes in Soviet policies and perhaps make possible a genuine peaceful coexistence between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Internally, these are not easy times for the Soviet leadership. They are plagued by a myriad of problems: the collectivized agricultural sector consistently fails to meet the country's food needs and substantial imports are required on a chronic basis; the stagnant civilian economy offers little hope of improving—and may prove unable even to sustain—a standard of living that is one of the lowest in Europe; corruption is rampant; the birth-rate of the Russian population is in sharp decline, raising the prospect that Russians will soon be a minority in their own country; average life expectancy for Soviet males has declined by three or four years since the early 1960s, a truly unique phenomenon; and Communist ideology is increasingly viewed as cynical and bankrupt, by many inside the Soviet Union and by most without. These problems appear to be not of a transient nature but endemic to the system.

Externally, Soviet foreign policy has not worked nearly as well as the leadership would have hoped and, in some cases, has been marked by outright failure. More than 100,000 Soviet troops have occupied Afghanistan for almost five years, yet gains against the Afghan people prove elusive and victory is nowhere on the horizon. Soviet efforts in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa have consumed enormous resources but have yielded little in the way of tangible benefits. The actions of their surrogates have often reflected poorly upon Moscow. Soviet propaganda efforts in Europe designed to generate opposition to NATO intermediate-range missiles failed to block those deployments, and their unjustified walkouts from various arms control fora have fostered an impression of Soviet intransigence and obstructionism throughout the world.

Ironically, what Soviet foreign policy *has* succeeded in doing is to generate a response from the outside world—in most cases to be on guard. There is now a more realistic recognition of the nature of the Soviet threat. Soviet activities and rhetoric have prompted alarm and defensive—rather than accommo-

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dating—reactions in the United States, Europe, Japan, China and elsewhere. The list of countries condemned by Moscow for "anti-Soviet" stances is large and growing. (The current Soviet leadership appears to consider this and ask, "What's wrong with the world that causes so many to oppose us?", rather than the more appropriate question, "What's wrong with our policies toward the world that cause so many to oppose us?".) In fact, this growing list testifies to the failure and ineptitude of much of recent Sovet foreign policy.

In sum, internal and external factors would appear to call for Moscow to consider revisions in its policies. Moreover, the time appears at last to have come when the older generation of Soviet leaders is being replaced by a younger generation. It seems that many of the abler members of the younger generation realize that internal reforms are necessary. The agricultural system needs to be freed up and adapted to market systems; the economy in general needs a healthy dose of decentralization; the legal system needs to be made to apply—and be seen to apply—to all, Party members as well as ordinary citizens; the non-Russian nationalities need to be treated more equitably and to be given greater autonomy in language and education; the health-care system requires urgent attention; and the political institutions and leadership must be made more responsive to the public will and needs. It is not at all improbable that younger Communist leaders who wish to get needed reforms under way will find their way to the top. And they may well come to the reasonable conclusion that it would be easier and safer to carry out such reforms under a foreign action policy of "live and let live" than by pursuit of the Leninist goal of *mir* and its concomitant exacerbation of international tensions.

The rest of the world would welcome such reforms and such internal progress. They would make the Soviet Union in many ways a stronger competitor but, hopefully, a less paranoid and more cooperative one.

## VII

It is unlikely, however, that such reforms would bring Soviet society to our view of a "just" domestic order; that society will in all likelihood continue to be characterized by intimidation imposed upon the people of the Soviet Union by a relatively small group at the top. But we are not in a position to change the Soviet Union and, as desirable as we might believe dramatic

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internal change would be for the Russian people, it may not be a prerequisite for a genuine peaceful coexistence between East and West. The United States and the Sovet Union can abide one another even if Moscow maintains a totalitarian order domestically. The key to a successful mutual "live and let live" policy is a willingness on the part of the Soviets to moderate their use—and threats—of force (either directly or through surrogates) in their dealings with the outside world. This would not be a perfect peace in the Western sense, but it could be an operationally livable peace.

How could the United States and the Soviet Union bring about such a peace? It is doubtful that much would come from an attempt to define and negotiate the terms of an agreement spelling out in detail the principles of "live and let live." But constructive discussion could lead to action on one side, concurrent with action on the other. If that initial step proved satisfactory to both, it could lead to further sets of complementary actions. Such an action-reaction process could conceivably provide a more solid foundation for progress in Soviet-American and East-West relations than a negotiated set of principles of conduct.

For example, a reciprocal "live and let live" policy would call for a Soviet response to the softening in tone of the Reagan Administration's rhetoric concerning the Soviet regime. The Soviets, on their side, could moderate the continuous vilification by Soviet spokesmen and publications of the United States and, in particular, of the President. Moderation by the Soviet Union could take the form of refraining from exacerbating the situation in the Middle East, blocking an improvement in relations between Bonn and East Berlin, threatening Pakistan, and supporting guerrilla warfare and terrorism in Latin America and elsewhere; such restraint could be reciprocated by a United States willingness to consult with the Soviet Union and coordinate policies which could lead to a true relaxation of tensions in many parts of the world.

A genuine peaceful coexistence between the United States and the Soviet Union could not help but have wide and important implications. As an example, one can speculate on its implications for Europe. It would imply a Western willingness, however reluctant, to go on living with the Communist governments in Eastern Europe. (It has long been evident that no acceptable action policy on the part of the West could realistically be expected to change this. No American admin-

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istration has been prepared to run the risk of such an attempt in the past, and it is unlikely one would be prepared to do so in the future.) A positive evolution of the situation in Eastern Europe is much more apt to develop from internal factors, particularly in the context of a "live and let live" world. The concomitant to a "live and let live" Western policy in Europe would be a build-down of the large and menacing Soviet military posture toward Western Europe.

Among the more important accomplishments that could flow from "live and let live" would be meaningful arms control arrangements that in fact reduce the risk of war and strengthen the prospects of peace. Under such a policy—as opposed to the pursuit of Lenin's *mir*—the maintenance of a force of large intercontinental ballistic missiles posing a first-strike threat against the United States would be unnecessary. Similarly, there would be no justification for the political-military threat to Europe and other Soviet neighbors embodied in the large Soviet SS-20 force. A number of significant and mutually advantageous trade-offs would be possible in the arms control context.

VIII

Is there anything the West, particularly the United States, can do to encourage such an evolution in Soviet foreign policy, especially as the next generation of leadership comes to power? Any attempt to influence directly the evolution of policy within the Soviet Union is apt to be counterproductive. We have not been successful in doing so in the past; it is quite unlikely we can achieve significant success by direct pressure in the future.

To the extent, however, that we can restore a consensus in the United States and the West in favor of a dual policy—a policy on the one hand of keeping our guard up against attempts to weaken and divide us internally and from our allies, and on the other hand of welcoming any evidence from the new Soviet leadership that they are interested in reciprocal action policies of "live and let live"—we will be headed in the right direction. Substantive progress will require movement, not merely from us, but especially from the Soviets, particularly in restraining their pursuit of *mir*, that is, in restraining their encouragement of anarchism, violence and anti-Americanism as the road toward revolutionary totalitarianism in an ever-widening area of the world.

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*John C. Loulis*

# PAPANDREOU'S FOREIGN POLICY

Relations between Greece and the United States are strained. From the anti-American rhetoric of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and his Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), and after a series of irritating incidents, tensions have developed that pose troublesome questions about the course of Greek policy and Greek relations with the West.

Last May, addressing his PASOK Party Congress, Papandreou launched a blistering attack on the United States, charging it with a strategy of "expansionism and domination." In July, his government decided to free a Jordanian terrorist despite U.S. intelligence reports that the prisoner had arranged for a bomb to be planted on an Athens-Tel Aviv passenger flight. A month later, the Greek government was unwilling to prevent striking workers from blocking the entrances to U.S. military bases. The United States retaliated by hinting that it would prevent the transfer of older F-5 jets from Norway to Greece and would instead divert them to Turkey. A Greek government spokesman responded angrily that Greece was "not a U.S. colony." In October, Papandreou lashed out at the United States again: he claimed that "the Korean 007 airliner was in fact performing a CIA spy mission," and boasted that "we were the only ones who did not become hysterical over the issue."

The prime minister underlines his anti-American declarations with frequent pro-Soviet statements. He has gone on record as saying that since the U.S.S.R. is not a capitalist country "one cannot label it an imperialist power." According to Papandreou, "the U.S.S.R. represents a factor that restricts the expansion of capitalism and its imperialistic aims." Papandreou is the first Western prime minister to visit General Wojciech Jaruzelski in Poland, and while in Warsaw last Octo-

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ber he praised the military dictatorship and attacked the Solidarity labor movement.

On the essentials of foreign policy, Papandreou and his party have maintained their links to the West. The strategic value of Greece remains undiminished. The U.S. bases in Greece hold considerable importance for the Western Alliance. A "neutralist" Greece would lead to the isolation of Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean, making it far more vulnerable to Soviet pressures. Yet one is entitled to ask of Greece's governing party, what are its true aims? What basic factors shape Papandreou's foreign policy and what is their relative importance? What course is Papandreou likely to take and what should be the response of the West, particularly the United States?

Any effort to understand the foreign policy of the current Greek Socialist government must begin by tracing the rise of anti-Western and anti-American feelings in Greece following the collapse of the military junta in 1974. Then the ideological evolution of PASOK since it came to power can be analyzed, in light of the continuing constraints of Greek public opinion and the international realities confronting Greece.

## II

After the defeat of communist insurgencies in 1944 and in 1946–49, the consensus was widespread among Greeks that their security lay within the Western Alliance. All major Greek political parties, with the exception of the extreme left, strongly backed the decision to join NATO. The leader of the Liberal Party stated in 1951: "Our experience has demonstrated that neutrality is neither possible nor acceptable. . . . Within the Alliance Greece is not isolated, but more secure."[1] Given Greece's long border with communist neighbors and the threat it has faced from the north, as well as its geographical isolation from Western Europe, it is hardly surprising that such sentiments were widely accepted within the country.

However, with the outbreak of the Cyprus crisis in the 1960s, anti-Western and anti-Turkish feelings mounted, and this consensus gradually evaporated. Public sentiment was irritated by particularly heavy-handed U.S. intervention in Greece's internal affairs. Many came to the conclusion that the country was most threatened not by Greece's northern communist neighbors but by Turkey, its NATO ally to the east. Greeks came to

[1] Quoted in K. Boura, "Greece and NATO: 1952–1980," *Epikentra*, No. 17, p. 38.

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feel that the Western allies were insensitive to Greece's national aspirations.

Such attitudes were strengthened in July 1974, after the coup in Nicosia inspired by the Colonels' regime in Athens, and the subsequent Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The further Turkish army advance of mid-August, which became known as the "second invasion," proved beyond any doubt that Ankara had little interest in reestablishing the status quo ante in Cyprus; rather, Turkey seemed intent on extending its influence on the island by sheer force. Following this second invasion, the center-right Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis withdrew in protest from NATO's military organization.

But anti-Western—and particularly anti-American—feelings should not be attributed solely to the Cyprus crisis of 1974. Well before, there was a widespread impression that the United States in particular, and NATO more generally, had tolerated, supported, and perhaps even conspired to bring to power the unpopular regime of the Greek Colonels. America's Realpolitik of the time was undoubtedly shortsighted, laying the groundwork for anti-American feelings. The collapse of the Colonels' regime in 1974 produced the conditions for a radical ideological shift in Greek society. As a perceptive Greek Marxist has noted:

> The lid was blown off the gas-tank with the fall of the dictatorship, and the radicalization showed its face in public. . . . There emerged a vague representation of society, a simplistic notion of history, a bipolar view of social conflict, an adulation of the achievements of the popular culture of the past, a romantic quest for the national roots, an equally utopian expectation of radical change, and a general messianic feeling. . . .[2]

Whether this emerging ideology was socialist, populist, or a combination of both is not critical. More important is that there was a growing reaction against what the Colonels had seemed to represent—the United States and NATO. The reaction was thus anti-Western, ultra-nationalist, isolationist and xenophobic. And these themes came to be represented, exploited and strengthened by Andreas Papandreou and his Panhellenic Socialist Movement.

## III

For much of his life, Andreas Papandreou was an American citizen. He served in the U.S. military during World War II,

[2] A. Elephantis, "PASOK and the Elections of 1977: The Rise of the Populist Movement," in H. Penniman, ed., *Greece at the Polls*, London and Washington: AEI, 1981, pp. 118–119.

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and later taught economics at the University of California, Berkeley. He returned to Greece in the 1960s. Initially active in the Center Union Party headed by his father, Papandreou was arrested during the reign of the Colonels, and subsequently freed upon the intervention of President Lyndon Johnson. He then formed the Panhellenic Liberation Movement, a radical leftist organization which in 1974 gave way to PASOK.

The years 1974–1976 marked PASOK's "ultra-radical" period. In its September 1974 founding charter, the movement called for the "socialization" of wide areas of the economy, as well as of education and health. Defining PASOK's foreign policy, Papandreou declared that Greece should "disengage itself from military, political and economic organizations which undermine our national independence," thus expressing his disapproval of NATO membership and of Greece's intention to join the European Community. He added that Greece should "refuse to recognize military agreements particularly with American imperialism," implying that he favored closing the U.S. military bases in Greece. The further implication was that this action should be taken immediately. He said:

> It has become clear to the Greek people that popular sovereignty cannot be conceived outside the realm of national independence. This is why Greece's disengagement from NATO and the U.S. . . . constitutes *the first and immediate aim* of our movement. Our national independence is the precondition for popular sovereignty. . . .[3]

During this period Papandreou was quite clear about his party's radical ideology. Social democracy was dismissed as "capitalism with a polite face" and accused of aiming "to preserve the system in order to establish monopolistic and imperialistic capitalism." He attacked Eurocommunism as a form of social democracy. "When we talk about the Communist Party of Italy," he said, "we really mean the social-democratic party of Italy." As for his own model for socialism, Papandreou dismissed Soviet-style "state socialism," but did not hide his admiration for "the genuine anti-imperialist" forces of the Arab world. "In North Africa and the Middle East," he said, "Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and, of course, the Palestinian Movement make up the progressive anti-imperialist front. . . . These countries are in the forefront of a struggle against monopolies and imperialism." After a trip to Libya, Papandreou described

[3] A. Papandreou, speaking to PASOK cadres, March 16, 1975, italics added.

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the Qaddafi regime as a "direct democracy" pursuing the "most revolutionary course of our time."

As it turned out, this brand of radical socialism held little appeal for the Greek electorate. In the 1974 elections Papandreou's party polled only 13.6 percent of the vote, the moderate Center Union—in spite of its unappealing leader, George Mavros—gaining 20.5 percent while the center-right New Democracy party won a landslide victory (54.4 percent). This severe and unexpected setback came as a shock to Papandreou and convinced him that if he were ever to gain power he would have to shed his own extremist image and moderate his party's positions.

Accordingly, by the 1977 electoral campaign, PASOK had smoothed over most of its radicalism. Marxism had disappeared from its vocabulary, and even the term "socialism" was used only sparingly. PASOK's foreign policy also became much more cautious. By 1977 Papandreou had endorsed a *gradual process* for the removal of U.S. bases.

Systematic projection of a new moderate image paid off handsomely. PASOK doubled its vote in the 1977 elections, gaining 25.3 percent and emerging as Greece's second largest party after New Democracy, which dropped to 41.8 percent. Following this line and with an eye to the 1981 elections, Papandreou attempted to reinforce the notion that PASOK was only a moderate party of the left, stressing its European dimension and shedding some of its Third World orientations. He gradually strengthened—at least ostensibly—PASOK's ties with all Western socialist parties (though never becoming a member of the Socialist International) and went as far as implying that the West German Social Democratic Party (previously branded an instrument of "American imperialism") was after all a "progressive party."

As the 1981 elections approached, Papandreou indicated that he did not intend to remove Greece from the European Community, and argued that, while PASOK's long-term aims included the removal of the U.S. bases and withdrawal from NATO, "tactical" short-term considerations called for a more cautious approach. He pledged that in all decisions affecting national defense he would consult the military leaders—and they were known to favor NATO membership and maintenance of the U.S. bases.

Papandreou's gradual shift to moderation came in clear response to Greek public opinion. A poll taken shortly before

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the 1981 elections showed that 28.2 percent of the voters characterized themselves as liberals, 15.3 percent as conservatives, 14.6 percent as socialist non-Marxists, 14.2 percent as socialist Marxists and 4.1 percent as Marxist-Leninists.[4] During the campaign Papandreou downplayed PASOK's long-term strategic aims—in both domestic and foreign affairs—and emphasized the short-term tactical options which provided his party with the moderate image it needed in order to take office. PASOK's vote rose to 48 percent while New Democracy dropped to 35.8 percent, a landslide victory achieved by a shift from the ND to PASOK among "liberal" voters.

The 1981 elections—as most elections—were won on domestic issues, primarily on the issue of inflation: 53.4 percent of the electorate mentioned inflation as "the most important problem" whereas only 6.3 percent mentioned "national security" foreign policy issues. Papandreou capitalized on the public's discontent with the performance of the economy, deemphasized foreign policy questions, and also succeeded in convincing the public that it had nothing to fear from PASOK's accession to power.

## IV

Papandreou's foreign policy is above all a function of Greek domestic politics. In particular, three domestic factors dominate his government's foreign outlook—the influence of PASOK Party activists; the role and influence of the Greek Communist Party (KKE); and the politics of populism. These factors pull Papandreou in different directions, provoking inconsistent and perplexing shifts. All are moderated or counterbalanced to a significant degree by the realities of Greece's international position.

The three domestic factors sustain Papandreou's radical anti-Westernism in both style and content. International realities, however, make it necessary for PASOK to rely on "tactical" accommodations in the major foreign policy options and postpone the realization of its longer-term "strategic goals" of breaking with NATO and expelling the United States.

The PASOK activists are mainly those who joined the party during 1974–1977, subjected to a heavy dose of Marxist and Third World slogans. They are the watchdogs of "orthodoxy,"

[4] All election data are drawn from J.C. Loulis, "Voters, Parties and Issues: An Analysis of the 1981 Elections," *Epikentra*, September–October 1981, pp. 9, 17.

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and constitute the backbone of an impressive and effective party organization. The role of the activists in Papandreou's victory in 1981 was surely decisive.

Although since 1975 Papandreou has summarily dismissed all vocal dissenters from PASOK, he cannot afford to clash openly with his party's activists, even if he would want to. Such a clash could lead to the rapid disintegration of PASOK's organization. Over the years, Papandreou has failed to dilute his cadres' radicalism and, indeed, in his rhetoric to the party faithful he has only reinforced it. He finds himself compelled, both on domestic and on foreign policy issues, to demonstrate his own radicalism. Thus it is no coincidence that the recent attacks against U.S. "imperialism" were launched from the forum of PASOK's Party Congress, which was of course packed with party activists.

The second domestic factor shaping Greek foreign policy is the influence of the KKE on the Socialist government. This factor, largely underrated, is of vital importance if one is to comprehend Papandreou's foreign policy decisions.

One is sometimes tempted to dismiss the KKE. Unlike the smaller, more moderate Greek Communist Party of the Interior, the KKE is Moscow-oriented; unlike the French Communist Party, it has never participated in the government. In Greece much more than in France, however, the Socialists are willing to appease the Communists ideologically, to articulate at times pro-Soviet and anti-Western rhetoric, and to endorse foreign policy stands pleasing to the Soviet Union.

Papandreou fears the Communists' ability to use their power in the trade union movement and consequently to disrupt the Socialists' economic austerity program. Détente with the KKE gives Papandreou more confidence in addressing the mounting domestic issues, and thus in fending off the challenge of the center-right New Democracy Party which he naturally fears the most. This informal understanding also allows him more leeway in pursuing "realistic" foreign policy options, the U.S. bases agreement, for example.

The KKE reaction to the base agreement of 1983 was low-key, and Communist mass mobilization against the "bases of death" never materialized. It is to a great extent in order to compensate for the KKE's "understanding" attitude on the U.S. bases settlement that Papandreou has since endorsed a series of positions on foreign policy which are blatantly pro-Soviet,

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and has at the same time increased the tone of his anti-Western rhetoric.

The KKE has been quite content with the local détente. During their Eleventh Congress the Communists made it clear that they seek to avoid an outright ideological confrontation with PASOK, choosing instead an approach of "constructive criticism." Confrontation would only make it more difficult for PASOK voters to switch over to the KKE in the future. Yet moderate criticism allows the KKE to undermine Papandreou's credibility among PASOK's leftist supporters by posing as the Socialists' true conscience.

The third factor that explains anti-Westernism in PASOK's foreign policy is populism. Ultra-nationalism and anti-Americanism are still strong in some segments of Greek opinion, and errors by Greece's Western allies over the years tend to reinforce them. It is hardly surprising that Papandreou would seek to appeal to these nationalist feelings. Since the KKE must be appeased, the PASOK activists mollified and some ideological purity maintained, the "Western powers" are convenient targets. As domestic problems mount, outbursts of ultra-nationalism in foreign policy help mobilize Greek public opinion on the side of a beleaguered government fighting against all odds for "national independence."

Thus, quite frequently, Papandreou uses foreign policy "crises" as a diversion from internal difficulties. During the general strike of the bank employees in the summer of 1982, the Socialist government dramatized disagreements with NATO. Papandreou appealed to the strikers "to take into consideration the crucial international crisis facing the nation." Following the municipal elections of 1982, in which PASOK suffered a debacle, Papandreou made a series of tragedian appearances close to the Greek borders, as if war was imminent. The prime minister urged Greeks, and particularly "those residing in large cities" (i.e., those who are hardest hit by inflation and who were evidently most disillusioned with PASOK), to "understand that the main issue that the country is facing at this moment is defending national integrity," rather than the issue of the economy which was cutting into the government's popularity.

Such populism, coupled with Papandreou's systematic attempt to uncover imaginary conspiracies against his government by Greeks and foreigners alike, has formulated a foreign policy characterized by strong elements of *jeu de théâtre*. Such a policy is unavoidably anti-Western in character.

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These domestic factors clash with international realities. The closer Papandreou came to power the more he indicated that he was willing to consider geopolitics and pragmatic solutions reflecting the balance of forces in the area. His visions of a nonaligned Greece had to be shelved, at least temporarily, in the name of a newfound "realism." Though Papandreou dismisses any threat from the communist north and seems to believe that Greece could survive as a nonaligned country in the Balkans, several factors seem to have convinced him that a break with the West is, for the time being, undesirable.

First, and most important, is the state of Greco-Turkish relations. Since 1974 all Greek governments, whatever their ideological orientation or their specific foreign policy approaches, have developed a consensus concerning "the Turkish threat." This preoccupation with Turkey arises over several key issues: the continuing Turkish occupation of Cyprus; ongoing disputes over the continental shelf surrounding Greek islands in the Aegean, especially where oil has been found offshore; and airspace rights over the Aegean. In all of these areas, most Greeks fear that Turkey is attempting, through military and political pressure (if not simple brute force, as in Cyprus), to change the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean.

The question is whether Greece can defend itself more effectively against Turkey by breaking with its Western allies or by remaining in the Alliance. In spite of his claim that NATO favors Turkey and encourages its expansionist aims, Papandreou seems to have concluded that a rupture of Greece's relations with its allies will, after all, benefit only Turkey. If Greece is to maintain a military parity with Turkey, it can ill afford to antagonize its Western allies and particularly the United States. Greece needs U.S. loans to modernize its armed forces and must convince the United States that a military balance between Greece and Turkey diminishes the possibility of conflict and thus serves the Alliance's long-term goals. By remaining within the Alliance, Greece can much more effectively mobilize Western support in order to discourage Turkish adventurism in the Aegean. Finally, the more Greece distances itself from the West the more it risks that the Alliance will view Turkey as NATO's sole reliable ally in the region.

Economics is another factor which convinces Papandreou not to attempt to break with the West. If Greece were to close down the U.S. bases and withdraw from NATO it would have

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to spend enormous sums in order to maintain the Greek armed forces' modernization efforts. A growing anti-Western climate in Greece, following the country's pursuit of the nonaligned option, would certainly discourage foreign investment, making it all the more difficult for Greece to secure loans from Western banks. With the country in the midst of a severe economic crisis, foreign policy adventurism hardly seems advisable.

Though most Greeks are dissatisfied with what they consider pro-Turkish bias in NATO and the United States, PASOK's centrist and center-left voters would hardly favor foreign policy adventurism in the absence of blatant provocation. A public opinion poll conducted on behalf of the Center for Political Research and Information showed that 48.7 percent of the population approved of maintaining the U.S. bases while only 26.6 percent disapproved.[5]

## V

Papandreou seems to have divided his foreign policy concerns into "essential" and "marginal" elements. The former are governed by international realities, the latter, almost exclusively, by the three domestic forces. Greece's basic commitments have not changed: maintenance of U.S. bases, membership in NATO and the European Community. But the overall image of PASOK's foreign policy—both in its style and in its handling of the marginal issues—is characterized by a strong anti-Westernism and, more often than not, a pro-Soviet inclination.

The first problem PASOK had to confront after gaining power in 1981 was negotiating with the Reagan Administration on the status of the U.S. bases in Greece. The importance of these bases for U.S. and NATO strategy in the Mediterranean cannot be denied. The most valuable installation is the complex at Souda at the northwestern edge of the island of Crete. Stored there are large quantities of fuel and munitions, mainly for the U.S. Sixth Fleet. The base has a good harbor, which can accommodate and protect the whole fleet, and a modern airport for reconnaissance flights in the region. At Heraklion, Crete, are an airport for reconnaissance flights and a listening-post for intercepting Soviet transmissions in the eastern Mediterranean. The Hellenicon base in Athens is used as a support

[5] Nationwide poll (unpublished) conducted by EMRB Hellas on behalf of the Center for Political Research and Information in October 1983 with a sample of 2,700.

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base for air transport, and as a base for intelligence flights. Finally, an important naval communications center, part of the U.S. world defense system, is located in Nea Makri, outside Athens, and is connected directly with similar stations in Italy and Spain.

Neither the United States nor Greece has complete freedom of maneuver on the issue of these bases. They are obviously important to the United States, though they are not irreplaceable; Greece, for its part, knows that the transfer of the bases to Turkey would dramatically increase Turkey's strategic value for the Western Alliance—at Greece's expense.

Papandreou is well aware that Greek troops, armed mainly with U.S. weapons, need a steady flow of spare parts. And he cannot ignore the fact that a large part of the cadres of the Greek armed forces have been trained in the United States to use certain modern weapons systems, and that Greece needs U.S. credits to modernize its forces and maintain a balance with Turkey. Despite some antagonistic rhetoric, sound military reasons made an agreement with the United States almost inevitable and Papandreou signed the U.S. bases agreement in September 1983.

However, this became an occasion not for an ideological rapprochement with the Alliance but for ever more violent attacks against it. The agreement itself was presented by Papandreou as a necessary evil: he argued that the bases limited Greek national independence and served only U.S., not Greek, interests. He was at pains to present the agreement as a timetable for the bases' "removal," and claimed that "we have the political will to terminate in five years' time the presence of U.S. bases in Greece."

Papandreou asserts that Greek participation in NATO's military branch has "become inactive." A more accurate term would be "selectively inactive," since Greece still participates in NATO exercises, except those in the Aegean, and Greek representatives regularly attend NATO meetings. Papandreou's grievance against NATO is not only ideological; it focuses as well on two practical issues. One concerns the Greek island of Lemnos; Greece has refused to participate in a series of exercises in the Aegean because they did not include the defense of Lemnos in their scenarios. Turkey claims that Lemnos cannot be militarized short of violating international treaties; Greece has rightly countered that it is inconceivable to exclude part of its territory from the Alliance's defense plans. This

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stand, it should be noted, is supported by all Greek parties, though disagreement exists concerning the style with which Papandreou's government has approached the problem.

The second issue concerns the interpretation of the Rodgers Agreement signed in 1980, which served as the basis for Greece's reintegration into NATO's military wing. Though this agreement was supposed to solve the issue of operational control over Aegean airspace through the establishment of a new NATO headquarters in Larissa, differing interpretations continue to exist concerning the division of Aegean airspace between these new headquarters and those in Izmir. Bearing in mind the deep-rooted Greek fears of Turkish ambitions in the Aegean, it is understandable that the Greek government is not willing to agree to any divisions of airspace in the Aegean—even in the context of a NATO exercise—that might create precedents for future Turkish claims vis-à-vis Greece.

Despite these issues and his own previous stands, Papandreou in office has made it clear that Greece's refusal to participate in NATO exercises "does not mean that we are thinking of withdrawing from NATO." In sum, one can argue that the Papandreou government does not seem to have a clear strategy toward NATO. There is no better proof of this than the issue of the so-called "guarantees" of the Greek borders.

Shortly after taking office, Papandreou demanded that NATO, "with a simple statement . . . guarantee Greece's borders from every threat, from whatever side it emanates," implying, of course, that the source of the threat is Turkey. He repeated this demand on numerous occasions, making it the cornerstone of his policy toward NATO. The question was even raised at the NATO defense ministers' annual summit in December 1981, but Turkey naturally vetoed any such NATO declaration which would have implied that it was threatening Greece. Suddenly, however, in August 1982, Papandreou dropped the whole issue without explanation. He claimed that "the greatest guarantee is our armed forces," adding, "I never spoke of guarantees. Guarantees are things which are easily forgotten."[6] This erratic approach damaged Greece's credibility; its allies were bound to wonder how seriously they should take Papandreou's future "demands."

On a related issue, Papandreou does not seem to question Greece's membership in the European Community and appears

[6] On the "guarantees" question see J.C. Loulis, "NATO's Guarantees: Diplomatic Irresponsibilities," *Epikentra*, July–August 1982, pp. 4–9.

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to have permanently shelved his demand for a referendum on the issue. Greece's economic benefits from the EC, some economists argue, have kept the Greek economy afloat. Actually, during January-July 1984, Greece had a net profit of $313 million (receipts minus payments to the Community budget). This net profit (during the same months) rose from $113 million in 1982 to $266 million in 1983.[7] The Papandreou government has submitted to the EC a memorandum asking for special treatment, particularly on agricultural issues, which has been the object of continuous negotiations since 1982.

The Papandreou government views the EC solely as an economic entity from which Greece can derive financial benefits. It has failed to promote—and in fact has hindered—political cooperation within the Community. The PASOK government has many times found itself isolated in opposition on a number of European foreign policy initiatives—for example, those concerning Poland, the Middle East, and the U.S.S.R.

## VI

On "marginal" issues, Papandreou's policy has been clearly anti-Western and often blatantly pro-Soviet. A prime example was Papandreou's hesitant response to the Polish crisis.

Following the declaration of martial law in Poland in December 1981, the Greek government maintained silence; the PASOK Secretariat expressed its "deep concern," while avoiding, however, any condemnation of the Polish regime. *Exormisi*, PASOK's weekly journal, offered its "support to the Polish people," but made it clear that PASOK had no "prejudices or enmities toward each of the struggling sides." The PASOK group in the European Parliament refused to join in a condemnation of the Polish regime. When Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Asimakis Photilas signed an EC communiqué condemning the Jaruzelski regime, obviously without Mr. Papandreou's approval, he was abruptly dismissed from the government while en route from Brussels to Athens. (Later reinstated, Photilas has since resigned.)

Finally, after nearly a month had elapsed, the Papandreou government felt it had no alternative but to condemn the Polish regime in a NATO communiqué. Subsequently, however, it not only opposed all sanctions against Poland, but officially endorsed the view (in a Ministry of Foreign Affairs circular)

[7] *Vima*, September 9, 1984.

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that "whatever solution would have been imposed on the Polish people, other than the Jaruzelski regime, would have been worse. . . ."

Papandreou, during his recent visit to Poland, claimed that the Jaruzelski regime "is making a truly serious and sincere effort." He argued that Solidarity pushed too fast for changes and became "a dangerous negation." He described Jaruzelski as "a patriot." He avoided—when questioned—calling the Polish regime a dictatorship, and accused Western countries of attempting to "undermine the political structures" of the Eastern bloc countries.

On the question of NATO's decision to deploy new intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe, the Papandreou government sided with the Soviets by demanding nondeployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles but not withdrawal of the SS-20s. The Papandreou government has also refused either to condemn the U.S.S.R. for its occupation of Afghanistan or to agree that there are strong indications that the Soviets are using chemical weapons in that country.

Papandreou has endorsed and promoted enthusiastically an old Romanian plan for a "denuclearized Balkan zone." PASOK has systematically avoided condemning the abuse of human rights in the Eastern bloc, though it has been more than willing to accuse right-wing military regimes elsewhere. In a typical example of such bias, the state-controlled television referred in the same newscast to José Napoleón Duarte of El Salvador as "the dictator Duarte" and to Jaruzelski as "the leader of Poland."

In the Middle East the Papandreou government has also been at odds with Greece's allies. It has adopted an extreme anti-Israeli stand (which provoked incidents of anti-Semitism in Greece) and endorsed the views of the most extreme Arab states. It was recently revealed that PASOK concluded an agreement of close cooperation with the Syrian Baathist Party aimed against "world imperialism and racist Zionism."[8] Interestingly enough, though the Papandreou government has been Yassir Arafat's most vociferous supporter, it failed to condemn the Syrian takeover of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Overall, Papandreou's tendency to take sides in the Middle East has earned him more enemies than friends in the area.

It is hardly surprising that the Soviet Union seems content

[8] The agreement can be found in *Gramma*, November 16, 1983.

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with Papandreou's foreign policy, in spite of the fact that Greece is still a member of NATO and a host to U.S. bases. Soviet Vice Admiral Kalinan recently expressed "Soviet satisfaction for the similar positions and the identity of views of the Greek and Soviet governments on the major issues of international policy. . . ."[9] A *Pravda* article also noted that "on important issues of foreign policy, the Papandreou government speaks with its own voice." The Soviet Communist Party paper heralded the new positive aspects of Greek foreign policy.

The U.S. response to Papandreou's anti-Western stance has been, until recently at least, extremely restrained. Monteagle Stearns, the U.S. ambassador to Greece, has insisted that Washington judge the Papandreou government on the basis of its deeds, not its words. Until the summer of 1984, the United States managed to ignore Papandreou's rhetoric. With the prime minister's attack against the United States during PASOK's first Congress in May 1984, irritation began creeping into American statements. Though the incident was contained, there is little doubt that U.S. impatience has been increasing since.

## VII

It is often argued that the "tone" of Papandreou's foreign policy is of little practical importance. What matters most, this argument continues, is that on essential foreign policy issues Papandreou has chosen to avoid a break with the West.

The anti-Western tone of Papandreou's foreign policy, however, may well have neutralized whatever benefits Greece might have gained from its realism on the central issues. The tone also affects Greek domestic politics. The more strident Papandreou's anti-Westernism becomes the deeper he sinks into the quicksand of his own rhetoric. If he is still in power when the U.S. bases agreement ends in September 1988 it will be very difficult for PASOK not to insist on closing them down. The more Greek foreign policy is ideologically anti-Western and pro-Soviet, the more the KKE's views will gain legitimacy and support in Greek society. If a PASOK-KKE coalition should come about, the Communists and PASOK's own left-wing could put pressure on Papandreou to implement his own party's long-standing "strategic aims"—including withdrawal from NATO.

Thus, the anti-Western tone of the Socialists' foreign policy

[9] *Kathimerini*, October 13, 1983.

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does matter. On the practical level, it leads to Greece's isolation from its allies (thus weakening its positions vis-à-vis its northern neighbors and Turkey). On the ideological level, it strengthens leftist tendencies within PASOK, encourages an anti-Western climate in the country, and allows the KKE to increase its influence.

The West, and particularly the United States, needs to demonstrate greater sensitivity to Greece's genuine alarm over Turkish actions and intentions. For PASOK, the only logic behind Papandreou's realism is that Greece needs Western assistance to counter the Turkish threat. The Turkish problem is, indeed, a matter of Greece's vital interests. In maintaining a balance of power with Turkey and pressing for a just solution of the Cyprus issue, any Greek government must stand up against any friend or foe. Anti-Westernism in Greece was not created in a vacuum; it was produced largely by actions, or lack of action, by Greece's allies.

The United States can maintain its sensible low profile in dealing with Papandreou. After all, he has not damaged any vital Western interests in the area. Of course, should Papandreou prove unable or unwilling to curtail his anti-Western outbursts, Greek-American relations could deteriorate rapidly, a development from which neither side stands to gain. However, a major rupture in the two countries' relations seems, for the time being, rather improbable.

One danger, however, is Washington's tendency to play the Turkish card. There appears to be a school of thought in the United States that since Papandreou is proving to be a nuisance, the West should "warn" him to return to the fold by tipping the balance of political and military support in favor of Turkey—a (supposedly) "loyal" ally.[10] If Washington does decide to punish the Papandreou government by altering in Turkey's favor the current ratio in U.S. military aid, and thus upsets the balance of power in the Aegean, the chances of a severe crisis in Greco-Turkish relations would significantly increase.

While the bulk of public opinion in Greece continues to support the country's "Western option," attitudes would change radically upon a U.S. decision to tilt toward Turkey. This would be viewed as a direct attack on Greek vital national interests and would provoke a wave of anti-Western resentment. These feelings would in their turn be easily exploitable

[10] This position has been endorsed by *The Wall Street Journal Europe*, in "Mediterranean Friends," December 8, 1983.

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by the left to push Greece even further—maybe irrevocably—from the West.

It must be recognized that Papandreou has not permanently shelved his anti-NATO and anti-American objectives. But his immediate options are limited, and an appreciation of reality will, more probably than not, continue to guide his policies. However, exactly because one should not underestimate the impact of the domestic political factors in shaping Papandreou's more radical tendencies, the West, and particularly the United States, should carefully nurture his realistic core commitment to the Western Alliance, despite his provocative and radical rhetoric—and particularly as Greece enters the national election year of 1985.

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*Robert A. Manning*

# THE PHILIPPINES IN CRISIS

The Philippines is enmeshed in the most severe political and economic crisis it has faced since gaining independence from the United States in 1946. In retrospect, the bullet that killed opposition leader Benigno Aquino on August 21, 1983, marked the beginning of the end of the Marcos era and the onset of a difficult and uncertain transition period. The aftermath of the Aquino affair has been a protracted crisis of confidence that has dovetailed with a financial crisis of Latin American proportions, a deteriorating economy, and the growth of a nationwide communist insurgency.

Current realities in the Philippines defy easy stereotypes. President Ferdinand Marcos has never been so isolated, nor his credibility so widely questioned, in 19 years of rule. Yet, barring further health problems, the 67-year-old leader will likely remain in office until the 1987 presidential election, and he is expected to run again. The brutal murder of Aquino and the subsequent attempt at cover-up transgressed the unwritten rules of Philippine politics, implying an absence of limits on official power, and a complete lack of accountability. Yet, by generating a massive backlash, in which much of the professional and business elite has turned against Marcos, the murder has forced the shrewd president to accept the beginnings of liberal reform.

The question is whether, at this stage, any reforms can save Marcos, or indeed prevent an eventual revolutionary upheaval in Philippine politics. Aside from eroding the traditional checks and balances of Philippine institutions, nearly two decades of Marcos' rule have witnessed a plunder of the economy, the monumental misallocation of resources, and a gross distortion of the free enterprise system. High-level corruption, documented by the findings of the Agrava Commission (appointed to investigate the Aquino assassination), has undermined the authority of the military, and a broad-based revolutionary insurgency, led by the communist New People's Army (NPA), has grown tenfold since martial law was declared in 1972.

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Robert A. Manning writes on international affairs for the *Far Eastern Economic Review* and other publications. He visited the Philippines in April and May 1984. Copyright © 1984 by Robert A. Manning.

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The turmoil in the Philippines has led some to see yet another disaster in the making for U.S. foreign policy, posing familiar policy dilemmas of how to deal with a fading authoritarian client in a Third World country where the United States has long-standing strategic interests. Unfortunately, U.S. policy has followed an equally familiar pattern of neglect, followed by belated and overcompensating concern. The challenge for Washington is to recognize the extent of the economic and political crisis which the Philippine government is now facing, and to work—with or without Marcos—to help achieve the kind of thoroughgoing structural reforms that are vital for the island nation's stability and development.

## II

Central to all aspects of the current Philippine dilemma, and perhaps the main obstacle to future reform, is a set of deep-seated economic difficulties. Some of these structural problems predate the Marcos era and have their roots in basic decisions made in the late 1950s and early 1960s to emphasize import substitution without adequate mobilization of the rural sector.[1] The country's economic difficulties were then magnified by external factors, particularly the second "oil shock" of 1979–80, accompanied by a downturn in commodity prices, followed by a period of global recession and rising real interest rates. But the major responsibility lies with the policies pursued by the Marcos government.

Prior to the Marcos period, Philippine administrations since independence had adhered to generally conservative economic policies. Government spending was minuscule in relation to gross national product (GNP), and although control of resources was highly concentrated in a landed oligarchy and a growing industrial stratum based largely on import substitution, the private sector was largely responsible for the production of goods and services.

By contrast, under Marcos, the past two decades have been characterized by dramatic growth in the direct and indirect role of the government in the economy, with economic power increasingly concentrated in the state. Embarking on an export-growth development strategy, Marcos pursued expansionist

[1] For an incisive analysis of the structural failures of the Philippine economy, see the testimony of Dr. Gustav Ranis in *The Situation and Outlook in the Philippines,* Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 98th Congress, 2nd sess., Sept. 20, 1984.

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fiscal and monetary policies. Through increased state intervention in the economy, he dispensed privileges to a coterie of family members, friends and associates—collectively known as the "cronies"—that has now become a new elite.

Initially, Marcos' policies had a modernizing and reformist thrust. His pre-martial law administration, from 1965 to 1972, invested heavily in infrastructure projects—roads, bridges, irrigation, schools. By the early 1970s, Marcos had used his power to dismantle provincial fiefdoms of local politicians and the landholding oligarchy, to enact a limited land reform in the rice- and corn-growing areas of central and northern Luzon province, modernize the economic infrastructure and the military, and curb energy dependency. Growth rates were respectable, in the range of six percent per year.

But the modest successes were overtaken by a combination of underlying structural problems—and an accumulating abuse of power. There was clear bias toward large-scale urban industrial projects, a failure to integrate manufacturing with the rest of the economy, and neglect of the agricultural base. By the mid-1970s, Marcos had replaced the old elite with a new system that might be dubbed "Marcos socialism." Through subsidies, credits and other supports, the government dramatically increased its role in the economy, distorted the private sector by granting monopolies in key areas to Marcos associates, and engaged in wasteful and sometimes garish public works. A report on the economic crisis completed recently by the University of the Philippines School of Economics lists 688 presidential decrees and 283 letters of instruction issued by Marcos since 1972 that represent various forms of government intervention in the economy.[2] Such orders by Marcos created vast fortunes for his associates by granting exclusive import or export rights, exempting favored firms from taxes, and creating monopolies.

Such kleptocracy is not unique in the Third World, but Marcos may have raised it to an art form. In the two most important agricultural sectors, coconuts and sugar, he created near-monopolies for two close associates, Eduardo Cojuangco, a longtime Marcos friend (and godfather to two of Marcos' children), and Marcos' former fraternity brother, Roberto Benedicto.

Several lesser Marcos cronies have also thrived, including

[2] *An Analysis of the Philippines Economic Crisis*, Manila: University of the Philippines, School of Economics, June 1984.

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Rodolfo Cuenca, whose Construction and Development Corporation received lucrative government contracts; Roberto Silverio, who owned the now bankrupt Delta Motors; and Herminio Disini, whose 50-company Herdis group benefited widely from Marcos' decrees. Major holdings of all three have gone bankrupt, with the government converting several billion dollars of collective debt into equity.

Marcos has seen the road to prosperity as a Philippine version of "Japan, Inc." His vision of a "new society" has centered on state-assisted efforts to emulate the Japanese "Zaibatsu," creating a stratum of aggressive Philippine entrepreneurs heading massive holding companies. But the result, aided by Western banks with billions in petrodollars to recycle, has been a serious distortion of the Philippine economy that has only exacerbated the unequal distribution of wealth, created a bloated, debt-ridden public sector, and left the economy in shambles.

From the mid-1970s to 1983, the composition of government spending shifted, with less going to infrastructure projects and the majority spent on corporate equity investment and other capital outlays. Prime Minister Cesar Virata recently put the number of government-owned corporations at 300, although it is not clear how many of those firms were bankrupt operations that had to be taken over by the state. The government's share of construction has risen to 40 percent, much of it for questionable projects such as the now abandoned $1-billion Manila Bay reclamation and building complex, official residences, overspecialized showcase medical centers, and a variety of buildings for government agencies and corporations. The list also includes more exotic projects, including a lavish arts and culture center, the brainchild of Imelda Marcos, wife of the president, and an uncompleted $8-million Mount Rushmore-style bust of Marcos erected in northern Luzon.

The government's role in financial markets has also grown substantially. Through government financial institutions such as the state banks—the Philippines National Bank (PNB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines—and through politicized policies of the central bank, the government has altered access to credit and used government-backed guarantees to facilitate questionable private lending. Limits on credit flows to both banks have been made a condition for new lending by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

It is difficult to quantify plunder and mismanagement. Several billion dollars of government funds certainly went to the

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bailing out of failed crony firms.[3] It is estimated that losses to sugar farmers resulting from underpayment by the sugar monopoly have been between $1.2 and $1.5 billion for the period 1974–1983.[4] The cost of waste and inefficiency can be measured partly in relative productivity. The productivity of Philippine workers (whose real wages have fallen by about 45 percent in the past decade) is less than half that of workers in other ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries.[5]

But not all of the country's $29 billion in foreign debt, roughly half of which accrued since 1979, can be attributed to plunder or shoddy lending policies.[6] The Philippines' terms of trade deteriorated by more than 40 percent in the past decade, an experience common to less-developed countries dependent on the export of basic commodities for foreign exchange. For the Philippines, the key commodities are (in order of relative importance) coconuts, timber, sugar and copper. In the case of sugar alone, the export market price has dropped to about five cents a pound from a high of 27 cents a pound in 1975. In addition, a serious recession in the United States, Manila's major trading partner, limited the country's export capability. Non-traditional exports—primarily textiles and semiconductors—manufactured in export-zone enclaves have accounted for a significant portion of exports, but because of the substantial cost of imported inputs in both areas, the value added, and therefore the foreign currency earned, is relatively small.

Such unfavorable trends, coupled with Marcos' mismanagement, helped facilitate an economic morass well before the Aquino assassination. A downward slide in economic growth began in 1979 with the second oil price hike. The last year of growth was 1982; the 1.3-percent growth figure for 1983 becomes negative when adjusted to account for increases in population. Both the IMF and independent analysts forecast that real GNP will decline by six percent in 1984 and that—even if the terms of the recently agreed $630-million IMF standby credit are met—a similar decline will be experienced in 1986. Bernard Villegas of the Center for Research and Communication, an independent Manila think tank, anticipates

[3] *The Washington Post*, August 16, 1984, p.1.
[4] *An Analysis of the Philippines Economic Crisis, op. cit.*
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] Though the Philippines' foreign debt is often put at $26 billion, senior Marcos advisers and U.S. banking officials involved in negotiations on the debt place the true figure at $29 billion.

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that during the coming year inflation will remain in the 50-percent range, interest rates will hover around 40 percent, imports will drop by some 40 percent, and industrial production will decline by at least 15 percent. Most economists agree with the Center's forecast that exports will not rise significantly above their current level of roughly $5 billion a year.[7]

The social and political costs of Marcos' excesses and the protracted period of austerity now facing the country are difficult to calculate. Demographic statistics are sketchy. Still, it is estimated that some 600,000 people, or nearly three percent of the workforce, have been laid off as a result of the economic downturn, and about 1,000 businesses have failed in the past year. Capital flight, which reached a peak of about $5 million at the time of the Aquino murder, has continued at a steady rate of about $2 million a day since mid-1982. According to official government estimates, gross domestic investment will decline by more than 30 percent in 1984.[8] The likely combination of increased hardship for the 70 percent of Filipinos who live below the poverty line and harsh repression of those opposing such bitter economic medicine is a dynamic that could lead to serious new unrest.

Traditionally the Philippines has had two major economic safety valves—the export of labor and the extended family network. More than 400,000 Filipinos work abroad, primarily in the Middle East, but the oil glut has shrunk this labor market. The extended family network is impossible to quantify, but it is perhaps the most important social welfare asset the country possesses. This network is likely to grow, moreover, as new efforts are made to expand the agricultural sector, where family relationships are traditionally strong. A senior Marcos adviser summed it up to me this way: "I don't know any successful Filipino who isn't helping at least one member of his family. That is why we can never be a South Korea, but it is also why nobody starves." But there are drawbacks to this process, such as the serious migration of underpaid Filipino teachers to places like Hong Kong where they take jobs as maids at substantially higher pay.

It is sometimes argued that the economic and political cloud hanging over the Philippines has a silver lining. According to

[7] Speech, Bernard Villegas, Center for Research and Communication, Manila, August 1984.

[8] Richard Nations and Guy Sacerdoti, "The Aquino Legacy," *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 30, 1984, pp. 22–28.

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this view, the declining availability of external credits, together with external and internal pressure for reform, will force Marcos to adopt appropriate economic and political reforms to restore confidence. However, recent events do not support such optimism. Most dramatic was the central bank's overstatement of reserves by some $600 million in order to deceive both the IMF and private banks as to the nation's financial health. This led to the resignation of central bank head Jaime Laya early this year. Despite a second major dispute with the IMF over excess liquidity during negotiations in April, Marcos borrowed roughly $300 million from the central bank to finance the election campaign for his own party, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), or New Society Movement.[9] Faced in July with a choice between bailing out a failing Banco Filipino or meeting IMF liquidity targets, Marcos pressured the new central bank governor, José "Jobo" Fernandez, into the bail-out.

III

Such instances of "politics in command" are not aberrations; they are indicative of Marcos' style of governing. His tactical energies have always been directed at consolidating and preserving his core support. His power base is a tripartite alliance which includes his network of cronies; the military, whose command is heavily weighted with men from Marcos' home province of Icolos Norte; and a cadre of highly educated technocrats, the most prominent of whom is Wharton-educated Prime Minister Virata. The likelihood that Marcos would voluntarily undercut his power base by implementing more than a small portion of the sweeping economic and political reforms that are being demanded of him is rather small. The prospect for repression in order to enforce austerity measures is a likely scenario.

Yet despite Marcos' intransigence, a new sense of political accountability has arisen out of the economic crisis and the new wave of unrest following the Aquino assassination. The Philippine press, largely dominated by Marcos associates, is nevertheless becoming increasingly bold in challenging the president. The moderate opposition, atrophied by Marcos' personal accumulation of power during nine years of martial law and three years of what is officially dubbed "authoritarian

[9] Villegas, *op. cit.*

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democracy," is displaying a new energy and vitality. Despite Marcos' efforts to manipulate the recent May 14, 1984, elections for the Batasang, or parliament, opposition candidates won 59 out of 183 seats. Marcos did succeed in having his election commission change the results to remove from parliament a leading member of the opposition, Aquilino Pimental, considered a potential contender for the presidency. Nevertheless, the new parliament already has become a forum for questioning Marcos' power and calling for an accounting of abuses. Even leading members of Marcos' own ruling KBL, sensing the end of an era, are displaying a degree of independence. Both Prime Minister Virata and Foreign Minister Arturo Tolentino have called for repeal of Amendment Six to the Constitution, which gives Marcos power to override legislation, to rule by decree, and even to abolish the parliament.

The Philippine political spectrum does not divide neatly into "moderates" and "radicals." Rather, it is a continuum, with Marcos and his ruling KBL at one end and the communist New People's Army guerrillas at the other. The most remarkable new development has been the emergence, since August 21, 1983, of the essentially spontaneous and somewhat amorphous "Aquino movement," comprised of what had been the Philippine "silent majority" of middle-class professionals, the noncrony business elite, and the Catholic Church. The thrust of this movement is toward peaceful change and a restoration of democratic institutions.

Beyond a return to pre-martial law institutions, the emerging opposition movement does not have a set agenda. The loose coalition that participated in the May elections—the United Nationalist Organization and the Philippine Democratic Party-Laban group—is united only in its opposition to Marcos. That it won 59 seats despite its lack of organization is a testimony to the deep-seated resentment felt for Marcos. According to NAMFREL, the citizen's group that mobilized 150,000 people to monitor the polling, the opposition might have won 90 to 100 seats had it not been for fraud, manipulation and intimidation in roughly half the 80,000 polling districts.[10]

Despite a well-organized boycott movement—the militant Coalition for the Restoration of Democracy (CORD), headed by Aquino's younger brother, Agapito—83 percent of the electorate voted. Still, CORD continues to be an important political

[10] NAMFREL Report on the Election, Manila, May 1984.

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factor. A loose coalition, it includes left-oriented human rights groups, church-linked social action groups organizing the urban poor, and the leftist Kilusang Mayo Uno union which claims 450,000 members. It also includes "sector" groups (e.g., teachers, health workers, fishermen) influenced by the Philippine Communist Party (CPP) and its front group, the banned National Democratic Front.

Spurred by the slow pace of reforms since the election and by the growing militancy of the left, the Philippine Roman Catholic Church and moderate business groups have also become increasingly active in the opposition movement. Though Cardinal Jaime Sin, leader of the country's Catholics, is a conservative figure, opposition percolating up from the parish level has pushed him and the Church toward a more activist posture. In a country whose population is 86 percent Catholic, the Church is perhaps the most important institution with the exception of the military. The Church's activism has been matched by increased unhappiness among middle-level businessmen, who have suffered heavily from Marcos' economic favoritism.

Marcos has not yet yielded any fundamental power. He retains his decree-making powers under Amendment Six, and he retains the loyalty of the military. Reneging on previous promises, he has reappointed his wife, Imelda, to her cabinet post as Minister of Human Settlements, despite a humiliating defeat in Metro Manila, where she was the KBL campaign manager; 15 of the 21 contested seats went to the opposition. The grudging concessions that Marcos has made thus far have been mainly procedural. He replaced the initial commission charged with investigating Aquino's murder with the more credible Agrava Commission. He altered election rules, meeting enough of the opposition demands to win the participation of a key grouping that went against the boycott movement. He agreed to a new succession mechanism, whereby the speaker of the Assembly would take over and call elections in 60 days if he were incapacitated.

How much time Marcos can buy with such limited concessions remains to be seen. It is difficult to see the businessmen of the Makati, Manila's Wall Street, or middle-level bureaucrats and white-collar workers moving toward direct support for the nation's radical left, as happened in Nicaragua. Neither is the Catholic Church's role comparable politically to that of fundamentalist Islam in Iran. On the other hand, the surge in

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middle-class activism does represent a serious new challenge to Marcos' position, particularly when viewed in tandem with the growing military threat from the communist New People's Army (NPA).

## IV

The remarkable growth of the NPA in both organization and influence has had little direct relation to Manila-based activism, or, indeed, to the assassination of Aquino.

The Communist Party of the Philippines was formed in December 1968 by a handful of young leftist intellectuals who had studied the failings of the old Hukbalahap guerrilla movement and its predecessor, the urban-based, Soviet-oriented Partido Komunistang Pilipinas (PKP). Shortly thereafter, in alliance with remnants of the Huks, they formed a military wing, the New People's Army. Since its inception, the CPP/NPA has been an almost textbook Maoist party.[11] The CPP's founding document criticized the PKP for focusing its activities in Manila and central Luzon, and failing to mobilize rural areas; it proclaimed a Maoist strategy of protracted "people's war."

The party's chief ideologue, chairman José Maria Sison, a former University of the Philippines literature teacher, called for adapting Maoist tactics to the particular geographic circumstances of the Philippines, a mountainous archipelago. His strategy focused on building a party infrastructure and organizing rural base areas from which to eventually "encircle the cities." Writing under the name Amado Guerrero, Sison argued that, in the scattered islands of the Philippines, it was not possible to establish a large liberated base as the Chinese Communists had done at Yenan. Instead, he argued, the Party should create guerrilla fronts in a few major islands first, then in other islands. His strategy was to develop well-trained cadres and send them to remote rural areas, creating in essence a decentralized leadership.

Beyond moral backing and minor material support in the early 1970s, the CPP/NPA has received no significant support from any communist or other outside power. While still main-

[11] For a detailed discussion of the history and origins of the CPP see David Rosenberg, "Communism in the Philippines," *Problems of Communism*, September/October 1984, pp. 24–46. For a comprehensive unclassified government analysis, see Carl Ford and Fred Brown, *The Situation in the Philippines*, a staff report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 98th Congress, 2nd sess., Sept. 30, 1984, Washington: GPO, 1984.

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taining a Maoist worldview, it has had little contact with Beijing, at least since the Chinese established diplomatic ties with Marcos in 1975 as part of a general reorientation of Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia which emphasized the improvement of ties with ASEAN nations. The post-Mao reforms in China have drawn the CPP's criticism. The present Chinese government actually supports U.S. military bases in the Philippines as a counterweight to growing Soviet influence in the region. Official Chinese-Philippine trade has grown steadily.

Current CPP publications are critical of both China and the Soviet Union, but appear to straddle the Sino-Soviet split. The Chinese are referred to as "anti-imperialist forces" who have mistakenly taken incorrect positions, such as establishing ties with Washington. Moscow is referred to as having mistaken "social imperialist policies," such as "its disregard for the right of nations to self-determination in Afghanistan and Kampuchea."[12] There is little indication that the Soviet Union is gravitating toward the NPA; indeed, Moscow maintains cordial ties with Marcos, and has recently stepped up cultural exchanges between the two nations. Overall, the Soviet Union appears to have little interest in or effect on the NPA's struggle.

The real focus of the CPP/NPA is internal. In the early 1970s, it gradually spread out across the Philippines, particularly in remote areas where there was little government presence. The NPA now operates in 62 of the country's 73 provinces. Perhaps its strongest and most visible presence is in eastern and northern Mindinao and Samar. The Philippine government, in the view of U.S. intelligence analysts, consistently underestimates the NPA's strength. In May, Marcos said there were at least 6,800 NPA guerrillas, but in recent congressional testimony U.S. officials backed the NPA's claims to have about 10,000 armed guerrillas and another 10,000 local militia members.[13] Some U.S. intelligence reports put the numbers even higher.

The scale and frequency of the NPA's operations have increased substantially since the early 1970s when it operated in 10- to 20-man platoons. By 1980, there were occasional reports of operations with company-level strength of 80–100 guerrillas. But in 1984, company-size units operate across the archipelago in the major NPA areas, and the Philippine Army has on

[12] *Ang Bayan* (clandestine publication of the CPP), March 1984.

[13] Testimony of Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage in *The Situation and Outlook in the Philippines*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Congress, 2nd sess., Oct. 4, 1984.

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occasion confronted 300-man battalions with more firepower than the government troops. NPA activity has increased in frequency to the point where it exceeds the number of government search-and-destroy missions. The more aggressive NPA tactics have led the often-demoralized government troops to abandon more remote outposts and consolidate in larger garrisons.

The bulk of NPA weapons has been captured in clashes with the army, in attacks on weapons depots, or from the poorly trained local government militia, the Civil Home Defense Forces (CHDF). Some are purchased on the open market, and some are reportedly purchased clandestinely from Philippine army soldiers. The NPA has a fairly sophisticated tax collection and extortion apparatus, obtaining payments from local mining and logging firms as well as from local businesses in areas where its influence is substantial. U.S. officials estimate that the NPA has influence or control in about 20 percent of the barrios in the rural Philippines.

The stifling of political expression during the martial law period, abuses by government officials, government land grabs, military abuses and economic strife have combined to fuel the insurgency. A map of NPA zones shows that they are strongest in all the coconut-growing areas. U.S. officials attribute NPA successes to the weakness and corruption of the Philippine military more than to NPA military prowess.

The corruption of civilian life is mirrored in the middle and upper echelons of the military. Once highly regarded in Philippine society, the military is now scorned and discredited, particularly in light of the findings of the Agrava Commission, which confirmed what most Filipinos have believed since August 1983—that there was a military conspiracy in the Aquino murder.

The two poles of the Philippine military have long been represented by Chief of Staff General Fabian Ver and Chief of the Constabulary Fidel Ramos. Ver, a former bodyguard and chauffeur to Marcos, is a longtime Marcos crony with little combat experience. Until he took a leave of absence following the revelations of the Agrava Commission, he headed the National Intelligence and Security Agency.

Ver symbolizes an unprecedented politicization of the military. Recently, 17 generals and 13 colonels were retired to clear the way for Ver (and thus Marcos) loyalists. Marcos created a 15,000-man Presidential Security Command headed

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by Ver's son, Lieutenant Colonel Irwin Ver, whose rapid promotion has raised many eyebrows. Ver himself is past retirement age, as are several dozen other generals, stifling the promotion prospects of younger officers.

At the other pole is Ramos, a West Point graduate who reflects the "loyal constitutionalist" tradition of the Philippine military. Around him is a coterie of middle-level officers—colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors—who are disillusioned and frustrated by the decay of the military.

The findings of the Agrava board have resulted in Ramos' promotion to acting Chief of Staff in Ver's absence. It remains to be seen how much actual power he will have to reform the military. While there is dispute over Ver's involvement in the Aquino murder, both the majority and minority Agrava Commission reports concluded that there was a military conspiracy. This runs sharply counter to Ver's personal testimony, thus, at a minimum, reinforcing suspicions that he participated in an attempted cover-up.

The shortcomings of the Marcos regime—civilian and military—have permitted the NPA to attain a "Robin Hood" image as protector of the urban poor and rural masses. The abuses of the Army, documented in the 1983 State Department human rights report and by Philippine church-based human rights activists, lend credence to this image. In many remote areas, the NPA is a shadow government, dispensing frontier justice. The NPA can be as brutal as the military, but its violence is more discreet and targetted while the military tends to act randomly. NPA "sparrow units" target abusive military authorities, landlords, or disagreeable local officials.

In areas where the NPA has a strong presence, such as Samar, Bicol and Mindinao, local officials have begun to develop working relations with the rebels. This is true in many small and medium-sized towns, and even in Davao City in Mindinao, the third largest city in the country.

Neither U.S. officials, outside analysts nor the insurgents themselves see the CPP/NPA as capable of toppling Marcos within the next five years. In a recent interview, communist leader Sison speculated that the CPP/NPA would be prepared to take power "around 1990 or a few years after," a projection similar to that of U.S. intelligence analysts. Pentagon officials believe the NPA is expanding at a rate of about 20 percent a year, and expect the trend to continue unless major reforms are implemented.

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At present the CPP/NPA is at what might be described as an advanced point in the first stage of guerrilla war. At its current level of activity, the NPA could sustain itself for the foreseeable future. But in an archipelago, with no significant external support, advancing to the more sophisticated stages of military activity is a problem that neither U.S. analysts nor the guerrillas themselves have answered. If current political trends continue, however, a steady erosion of the Philippine government could tip the balance in their favor.

V

The United States has long-standing interests in the Philippines flowing from a unique historical relationship. In the past century, the United States has twice liberated the country from foreign domination, acted as the colonial power for 50 years, and fought side by side with Philippine soldiers during World War II. Although U.S.-Philippine ties retain some neocolonial overtones, the special relationship between the two nations is also reflected in the presence in the United States of some two million Philippine-Americans, and the Philippine population's remarkable cultural identification with America.

The United States also has a large stake in the stability of any Manila regime. In the Philippines are located the two largest American overseas military installations, Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base. U.S. investments in the Philippines approach $5 billion.

American worries about stability led to Washington's acquiescence in Marcos' martial-law decree, at the expense of concern for human rights and democracy. Such an embrace initially posed no problems for the Reagan Administration, which strongly emphasized the strategic value of the U.S. basing agreements and, in line with its critique of Carter Administration policy toward the Shah of Iran and Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, the importance of demonstrating support for an old ally. The enthusiasm with which the Administration approached this posture reached a high point when Vice President George Bush, during a 1981 visit to Manila, told Marcos, "We love your adherence to democratic principles." Bush's accolade was all the more inappropriate since his visit occurred in the aftermath of widely publicized election fraud.

The Bush trip was followed by a triumphant state visit to Washington by Marcos in 1982, further underscoring Ameri-

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can support for his rule. In this pre-Aquino phase, Administration policy was focused on the renegotiation of the base agreements, completed by June 1983, which led to an almost doubling of U.S. economic and military aid to the Philippines. The previous accord reached by the Carter Administration included a $500-million aid package to be disbursed from FY 1979 to 1984. Under the new agreement, Reagan pledged his best effort to gain congressional approval for a $900-million package to be disbursed between FY 1985 and FY 1989.

Washington's ability to subordinate its democratic concerns to strategic necessity was fundamentally undone by the assassination of Aquino. The assassination and its aftermath, combined with a collapsing economy and a growing insurgency, abruptly thrust the issue of democracy back to the fore, making it central to the whole concept of Philippine stability. The rehabilitation of the Philippine democratic process and institutions has become not simply an end in itself, but a key to long-term U.S. security interests in the region.

The tragic events created a new sense of urgency in what has evolved into a pragmatic American posture of pre-crisis management seeking to maximize U.S. leverage. The Administration immediately distanced itself from Marcos, and the overriding concern of U.S. policy became accountability and restoring democracy. Michael Armacost, then U.S. ambassador to Manila, was a conspicuous mourner at Aquino's funeral.

Confronted with the dilemma of a troubled authoritarian ally with important strategic ties to the United States, the Administration has thus far avoided the extreme options—destabilizing Marcos (the "Diem scenario") or extending all-out support for the present regime. The presence of a middle-class-led opposition, whose pillars are the business and professional community and the Catholic Church, and a context of democratic traditions, have encouraged the adoption of a middle option: outspoken support for political and economic reforms, an activist stance of public and private dialogue with a broad range of opposition forces, and continued efforts to shore up the Philippine economy.

The immediate manifestation of this policy was public and private pressure on Marcos for a credible investigation of the Aquino murder. This was followed by vigorous U.S. lobbying to press Marcos for electoral reforms in the period prior to the 1984 elections, and at the same time, to press the opposition to participate. The elections were viewed as an important

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opportunity to legitimize the democratic process, and to reinvigorate a weak and divided opposition while steering post-Aquino popular wrath toward reform within the system.

From the elections the parliament emerged as a legitimate forum for challenging Marcos' policies. But the downward spiral was merely slowed, rather than halted. Fresh concern, which has moved the Philippines up in the hierarchy of U.S. foreign policy priorities, was triggered by a deeply pessimistic report prepared by Admiral William Crowe, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, after a trip to the Philippines in June. At about the same time, in early July, other U.S. studies produced similar conclusions about the urgency of the situation and spurred an interagency policy group to reappraise the U.S. stance.

The Administration has also demonstrated its concern about the need for economic reform. In August 1984, the Administration accepted a Treasury Department recommendation to vote against a $150-million World Bank agricultural loan to the Philippines, the first time the United States had opposed a World Bank loan to Marcos. Yet Washington continues to provide economic support above and beyond the aid linked to the base agreements.

These ambiguous actions highlight a key dilemma for U.S. policy in the two- to three-year period of extreme economic austerity the Philippines now faces: how to balance support for the Philippine people on one hand, with pressure on Marcos on the other. Critics argue that this behavior is sending a mixed message, thus reducing potential U.S. leverage. It could also be argued that the agricultural and food aid and trade financing benefit the people of the Philippines; cutting off such aid would not only reduce U.S. leverage, but benefit both Marcos, who would take a nationalistic posture in response, and the NPA.

There is increasing discussion in the Administration and Congress about offering a new aid package to Manila, contingent upon major reforms. Thus far, U.S. policy toward the Philippines in the post-Aquino period has been largely bipartisan. The Administration went along with a Democratic move to alter the mix of FY 1985 aid to Manila, removing $45 million from the military side and adding it to the economic aid package. In what may emerge as a new consensus when the Administration takes its FY 1986 aid request to Capitol Hill, conservative and liberal versions of this idea may converge—support Marcos, but insist that he be a "new Marcos."

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But arguably, a "mini-Marshall Plan" for the Philippines may be counterproductive. It would presume that Marcos is capable of changing his spots and making sweeping military and economic reforms that would undercut his political constituency. Such an aid plan would also assume that the United States is sufficiently able to monitor progress in the complex task of dismantling the system of "Marcos socialism," beginning with the coconut and sugar monopolies. It is more likely that Marcos would devise ways of giving the appearance of reform without much substance. To allow farmers to sell sugar on the free market, outside the Benedicto monopoly, while denying rural credit to farmers who do so, for example, would not tax Marcos' imagination.

There is clearly no simple solution to the complex situation in which U.S. policymakers now find themselves. Washington's preliminary efforts to promote political reform must be sharpened and directed toward specific institutional changes if they are to have lasting effect. These would include, at a minimum, the repeal of Amendment Six, the establishment of enduring mechanisms—including an independent election commission—to guarantee fair procedures in the coming 1986 local elections and 1987 presidential elections, and the rebuilding of a fair and independent judiciary. Of central importance, too, will be a thoroughgoing effort, already begun by the Agrava Commission, to expose and eliminate corruption in the military.

In the economic sphere, efforts to help reschedule payments on the interest as well as the principal of the Philippines' foreign debt would work to free up capital for development, thus reducing the period of austerity and lessening economic hardship. Such a move would also help restore a key ingredient now missing in the Philippine economy—investor confidence. Ultimately, however, the long-range value of any economic concessions will depend heavily upon the extent to which preferential economic and tax arrangements can be restructured to provide a fairer system of benefits and opportunities for middle-class business. This must include the cancelling of special trade concessions held by Marcos' friends and associates, as well as strict regulation of banking and credit relationships, particularly those involving foreign funds.

As a further step, a U.S. trade benefits package—in effect, a "supply side" foreign policy—could be more effective than direct economic aid. The United States could, for example,

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enlarge the Philippines' sugar quota, contingent on reform of the sugar sector. Washington could also push for a larger Philippine share in the international coffee agreement, or exempt Manila from new rules on textile imports. Such measures, similar to some of the provisions in the Caribbean Basin Initiative, would allow room for maneuver in adopting other economic reforms and, again, help restore confidence in the Philippine economy.

It is often argued that, given Marcos' entrenched position and the U.S. strategic military stake in the Philippines, any attempt to force change upon him is doomed to fail. Certainly it would be unwise to discount Marcos' political tenacity or guile, and he is not in imminent danger of losing power. There is at this point no political figure approaching Aquino's stature among the opposition. Nor is there a credible heir-apparent in the Marcos camp, though Cojuangco, who has maintained a low public profile while accumulating economic and political power, may emerge to fill this vacuum.

Still, America's long-term interest is not in the preservation of a friendly dictator, but in the preservation of Philippine stability, and, lacking that, in finding a suitable alternative for our strategic bases in the region—a difficult but not impossible task. The military facilities at Subic and Clark are important to the U.S. forward-basing network. There are no alternative arrangements that would not represent a setback to U.S. force projection capabilities. But ultimately, the bases are not vital. What is vital is strategic denial—that Clark and Subic not become Soviet assets—and the U.S. ability to project force in the Indian Ocean.

Alternative basing structures would, according to Pentagon estimates, cost in the $2–$3 billion range. Moreover, in terms both of projecting force into the Indian Ocean and servicing the Seventh Fleet, the Philippines bases could not be directly replicated. Their functions would have to be distributed among several different facilities. In congressional testimony, Pentagon officials have disclosed that the United States has taken out a 50-year lease on 18,000 acres in the Northern Marianas islands of Saipan and Tinian, which could be an option for "redeployment." Japan and Guam have also been mentioned as possibilities to assume some of the ship repair and servicing functions performed at Subic. Pentagon officials have also conceded that the idea of dispersing some of the functions of Clark and Subic throughout the Western Pacific would be

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feasible.[14] In light of the Soviet Union's increased presence in the North Pacific and Indian Ocean—particularly, its capability to project force from Cam Ranh Bay—it is not improbable that other allied or friendly countries such as Australia, Thailand or Singapore would permit some of the functions performed at Clark and Subic to be relocated to their territory.

Active consideration of basing alternatives, perhaps even the initiation of some contingency military construction, may be an even more effective lever on Marcos than an incremental aid package. If Marcos cannot or will not accept the reforms necessary to ensure stability, then we must be willing to call his bluff, and look even farther down the line, toward the inevitable emergence of a new Philippine leadership. Given the security which the presence of the U.S. bases provides against external threats, as well as the approximately $300 million in hard currency which they bring to the Philippine economy, it is unlikely that any Philippine government short of one dominated by the NPA would unilaterally terminate the base agreements.

Regardless of the options pursued by the United States, the ultimate fate of the Manila government will be primarily a Philippine affair. U.S. leverage should not be underestimated; U.S. efforts to shape the setting for the inevitable Philippine transition can almost certainly have some benefit. But above all, a profound sense of realism is essential to an effective U.S. policy, regardless of its impact on Marcos, or even on specific U.S. basing issues. The success of U.S. policy toward the Philippines will ultimately rest on how well it answers Philippine concerns, based on Philippine realities, in a framework of Philippine democracy.

[14] See testimony of then Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Forces in the Pacific, Commander Robert Long in *United States-Philippines Relations and the New Base and Aid Agreement*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 98th Congress, 2nd sess., June 17, 23 and 28, 1983.

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# RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

*Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard*

## *General: Political and Legal*

*John C. Campbell*

THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY. Edited by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson. New York: Clarendon Press/Oxford, 1984, 480 pp. $39.95.

A historical survey of the states system which grew up in Europe and then spread to the entire "civilized" world, only to be challenged after World War II by the anti-colonial revolution and the demands of Third World states for a new international order. Many of the authors are in less than perfect agreement and almost all are Western in outlook (the Third World is just barely represented, the Communist world not at all). It has no transcendent message, but the conclusions show at least a modest satisfaction that, despite much erosion, an international order with some accepted rules and institutions still survives.

THE UNITED NATIONS: REALITY AND IDEAL. By Peter R. Baehr and Leon Gordenker. New York: Praeger, 1984, 224 pp. $28.95.

Two observers intimately acquainted with the U.N., one Dutch and one American, give an outline of the world organization's origin, structure and potential, and review its record of 40 years. Without replying directly to the disillusion, criticism and complaints now current, especially in the United States, much of their text serves the purpose of rebuttal, although they point to failures and limitations as well as to achievements.

PEACEKEEPING IN VIETNAM: CANADA, INDIA, POLAND, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION. By Ramesh Thakur. Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1984, 375 pp. $30.00.

This book deserves high praise. It combines detailed study of the record of the international commission which functioned in Vietnam from 1954 to 1973, with analysis of the interacting foreign policies of the three states represented on it. The accomplishments, which came mainly in the early years, were real. The failures, both in military and political tasks, were inevitable given the intractability of the conflict, the outside intervention by big powers, and the makeup of the commission as representative of the world's division into Western and Communist blocs and the nonaligned. The author is thorough, fair, balanced, but not afraid to express strong views.

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MACRO-NATIONALISM: A HISTORY OF THE PAN-MOVEMENTS. By Louis L. Snyder. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1984, 308 pp. $35.00.

Professor Snyder, longtime expert on nationalism and author of a recent study of "micro-nationalisms," turns his attention to those movements which have tried to build loyalties and political institutions beyond existing national frontiers: Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism, Pan-Islam, Pan-Arabism, Zionism, Pan-Europe, Pan-America and many more. The studies are historically sound and quite brief. As the author notes, the cases differ widely, but in all of them "macro-nationalism," no match for the traditional nationalism of the nation-state, has had no more than limited or temporary success.

## *General: Military, Technological, and Scientific*

*Andrew J. Pierre*

DEADLY GAMBITS. By Strobe Talbott. New York: Knopf, 1984, 384 pp. $17.95.

This is the "unofficial" history of the Reagan Administration's dealings with arms control—the INF and START negotiations—by the remarkably well-informed diplomatic correspondent of *Time*. It follows John Newhouse's account of the SALT I negotiations in *Cold Dawn* and Talbott's telling of the SALT II story in *Endgame*. This genre of book has progressively improved even as the story that it tells becomes ever more dismal. Talbott has clearly had most unusual access, no doubt facilitated by the desire of many of the participants to look "right" in retrospect. Highly sensitive discussions at National Security Council meetings, even secret two-man conversations such as Paul Nitze's and Yuli Kvitsinsky's famous "walk in the woods," are placed in quotes. The story rings true and at this writing has not been challenged or disavowed.

At one level the story is exciting and richly detailed, high drama: thrust and counterthrust in bureaucratic warfare, with such odd alliances as State and the Joint Chiefs against ACDA and the Department of Defense, end runs around cabinet secretaries, a president who remains detached and somewhat uninformed. Ultimately, the story is profoundly disturbing: an American government that cannot break out of its internal disagreements, that consumes its energies negotiating with itself and presents little that is negotiable to the Soviets, that is divided about the very desirability of arms control. Surely the Soviets are tough protagonists and have a major share in the responsibility for the current deadlock. Yet, given the momentous stakes involved in controlling nuclear weapons, how might the historian of 50 years hence judge this political imbroglio? Were the players and the proposals they fought over equal to the importance of the issue? To Talbott he will turn.

THE REAGAN STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE: A TECHNICAL, POLITICAL, AND ARMS CONTROL ASSESSMENT. By Sidney D. Drell, Philip J. Farley and David Holloway. Stanford: Stanford University, 1984, 147 pp. A Special Report of the Center for International Security and Arms Control.

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This study by an eminent scientist, a former U.S. arms control official and a specialist on Soviet defense policy at Stanford, is strongly critical of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly known as "Star Wars," whether it is viewed as *transcending* deterrence through a nearly foolproof defense or, as more recently argued, as *enhancing* deterrence through a partial defense. The authors review the proposed technologies, as well as the countermeasures by which offensive systems could offset defensive systems, and question the technological feasibility and the cost assumptions. They confirm the findings of other reports. But the principal value of this one is in its discussion of the political effects upon the Soviet Union, U.S. allies, and arms control negotiations. Strategic stability would be impaired, it is argued, if in the absence of a major new arms control agreement both sides built up their offensive forces while simultaneously developing their new defense capabilities. The impact upon European and Asian allies would be decoupling, pushing them into new nuclear programs and to questioning American guarantees. One need not agree with the conclusions of this study to recognize its merits. A most useful contribution to what will surely be a growing debate.

FROM H-BOMB TO STAR WARS: THE POLITICS OF STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING. By Jonathan B. Stein. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1984, 118 pp. $20.00.

Sir Solly Zuckerman wrote in *Scientists and War* (1966) that "the decisions which we make today in the fields of science and technology determine the tactics, then the strategy, and finally the politics of tomorrow." Jonathan Stein contends that the reverse is true, that politics can drive technological development. He bases his argument on two case studies, Truman's decision in 1950 to build the hydrogen bomb and Reagan's 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative. In neither case were the basic technologies and much of the fundamental physics needed to build the weapons in hand; in both cases they were perceived by some of the participants as a technological fix to a political problem. The "Star Wars" case study, although necessarily incomplete, is nevertheless most interesting in the context of today's debate.

THE BISHOPS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE CATHOLIC PASTORAL LETTER ON WAR AND PEACE. By James E. Dougherty. Hamden (Conn.): Archon Books, 1984, 255 pp. $22.50.

This is an informed and thoughtful contribution to the Catholic debate over nuclear weapons, by an international relations scholar who teaches at a Catholic college. Dougherty is critical of the 1983 pastoral letter, arguing that it focuses too much on the dangers of nuclear war and the inadequacies of deterrence while giving insufficient attention to Soviet expansionism and the need for stable deterrence through a judicious mixture of military modernization and arms control. He is concerned by an increase in "Catholic nuclear pacifism," fearing that the pastoral letter could become a theological rationalization for neo-isolationism in the United States. The European bishops, he notes, take a more moderate view.

CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE: ALTERNATIVES FOR EUROPEAN DEFENSE. Edited by James R. Golden, Asa A. Clark and Bruce E. Arlinghaus. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1984, 245 pp. $27.00.

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An extended trans-Atlantic discussion, still in its early stages, over improving conventional defense in Europe is the natural follow-up to the debates of recent years over "no first use" and the INF deployments. The essays in this book, written mainly by faculty members at West Point, constitute an excellent framework or guide for the discussion. Ideas for developing new conventional technologies and for adopting new military tactics (such as "deep-strike" into the rear echelons of the Warsaw Pact forces) have now been tabled within NATO. But their political, economic and military costs and benefits need to be more fully examined. This book makes a useful contribution to that end.

THE 25-YEAR WAR: AMERICA'S MILITARY ROLE IN VIETNAM. By General Bruce Palmer, Jr. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984, 236 pp. $24.00.

The author, deputy to General William Westmoreland in Vietnam and Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army from 1968 to 1973, writes from first-hand experience. General Palmer notes some defects in the Army's operational performance in Vietnam, but his most severe criticism is of the wider strategy—too much faith in the effectiveness of air offensives, for example—and the lack of clarity in our political aims. He articulates admirably the by now conventional post-Vietnam wisdom that wars should not be entered into if they are not manifestly in the national interest and do not have adequate public support at home.

ARMS PRODUCTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. Edited by James Everett Katz. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1984, 370 pp. $30.00.

Separate chapters on the armament industries of such countries as Brazil, Israel, Argentina, Egypt, India and China make this a useful volume. Arms production is a growing phenomenon in the Third World, one that is by now recognized but little studied. A significant addition to the arms-transfer bookshelf.

## *General: Economic and Social*

*William Diebold, Jr.*

AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY. By Robert O. Keohane. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 320 pp. $30.00 (paper, $8.95).

In the postwar world there has been more international cooperation than ever before, but there is more discord than cooperation. Interdependence adds to both. Much of the past cooperation, and especially the "regimes" that have been created for money, trade and other matters—more or less lasting arrangements that involve rules, commitments and accepted ways of doing things—date from the time when the United States had a far more dominant position than it does now. Can cooperation increase if there is no hegemony? Yes, says Professor Keohane in this outstanding book. The case rests on the demonstration that states, by adjusting their national policies to one another, thereby enhance their ability to serve their national interests. The author's painstaking consideration of difficulties and objections should show how often narrow assump-

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tions and obscurantist jargon have led to loose thinking and worse policy conclusions.

EMERGING FROM POVERTY: THE ECONOMICS THAT REALLY MATTERS. By Gerald M. Meier. New York: Oxford, 1984, 256 pp. $29.95.

This is as fine a survey of the basic issues of development economics as we have had. It traces the changing ideas of the nature of the problem and of suitable policies, brings persistent difficulties into sharp focus, and relates contemporary experience to older ideas about economic growth. Among the causes for the persistence of poverty, says Professor Meier of Stanford, "is the underdevelopment of economics itself." To remedy this, he has suggestions about research, a better synthesis of ideas into theories, more "political" awareness in the shaping of economic policies, and a linking of economic goals with other values.

STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY. By Béla Kádár. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 287 pp. $25.00.

"Structural change" is broadly conceived in this excellent study by a senior member of the staff of the Hungarian Institute for World Economy. One chapter compares East-West economic relations with the industrialized West's relations with "moderately developed" countries elsewhere. A detailed examination of Hungary's efforts to adapt to change stresses how much a country's success depends on what other countries do. Countries that try to screen themselves from the disturbances of structural change elsewhere run the risk of falling behind in their own economic productivity and efficiency. The analysis comes to an end around 1980, so one looks forward to the next installment.

THE WORLD DEBT DILEMMA: MANAGING COUNTRY RISK. By Irving S. Friedman. Washington: Council for International Banking Studies/Philadelphia: Robert Morris Associates, 1984, 329 pp.

The author's experience in the IMF, the World Bank, two private banks and in a series of international debt negotiations makes this a most authoritative text. Sometimes almost a manual on how to deal with countries in difficulties, it spells out considerations and practices that will not have occurred to most outsiders, as well as providing judgments on a variety of major issues.

ADJUSTMENT CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD. Edited by Richard E. Feinberg and Valeriana Kallab. Washington: Overseas Development Council/New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1984, 186 pp. $12.95 (paper).

The debt problem has to be seen as a long-term issue inextricably linked to the growth prospects of the Third World, but it can be dealt with constructively. In support of this thesis, most of the authors of this good collection of papers offer concrete suggestions for policy in debtor and creditor countries and the international financial institutions. Of particular interest is Stanley Please's examination of the World Bank's structural lending activities and its possibilities.

INDUSTRIAL POLICIES: INTERNATIONAL RESTRUCTURING AND TRANSNATIONALS. By Jack N. Behrman. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1984, 254 pp. $23.50.

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Free trade does not provide international equity. Nationalistic policies reduce production and efficiency. Professor Behrman, a veteran inquirer into the ways of international business, proposes some routes toward "international industrial integration" that would use multinational enterprises in new ways to serve both private and public interests. He knows the obstacles are formidable, but his analysis is suggestive.

THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY DEBATE. Edited by Chalmers Johnson. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984, 275 pp. $21.95 (paper, $8.95).

A dozen good clear essays reflecting divergent but relevant views. The two most interesting are Aaron Wildavsky's consideration of the politics of various proposals and Paul Seabury's posing of somewhat neglected questions about national defense and industrial structure.

ECONOMIC SUMMITS AND WESTERN DECISION-MAKING. Edited by Cesare Merlini. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 212 pp. $25.95.

Eight scholars from several countries look at different aspects of the summits. As thorough as the examinations are, they do not go much beyond what others have said except in probing the relation of European Community processes to the summits. There is a good final essay by the editor that is both a summary and an expression of his own well-developed political sense.

THE SOVIET IMPACT ON COMMODITY MARKETS. Edited by M. M. Kostecki. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 271 pp. $27.50.

The Soviet Union looms larger in commodity markets than in other parts of the world economy so that this is a welcome collection. Even the papers on grains, gold and energy add to what has been said elsewhere. Those on cotton, asbestos, several metals, and terms of trade, commodity agreements and bargaining power often break new ground.

PARTNERS IN PROSPERITY: STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES FOR THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN. By Julian Gresser. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984, 432 pp. $15.95.

This ambitious book is uneven but original. It demands attention. The analyses of Japanese policies have a particular interest, not only because they diverge from other accounts, but because the author, an American lawyer, has lived and worked in Japan.

MAKING THE FUTURE WORK. By John Diebold. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984, 256 pp. $15.95.

This is a wide-ranging inquiry into "why things don't work anymore and what we can do about it." Government, business, labor, management, finance, the law, high technology, the handling of research and development, communications and leadership are all dealt with in a combination of analytical case studies and reasonably concrete proposals. The book contains both synthesis of widely held views and suggestions that are bound to prove highly controversial.

ECONOMIC CHOICES 1984. Edited by Alice M. Rivlin. Washington: Brookings, 1984, 171 pp. $22.95 (paper, $8.95).

The valuable Brookings annual gains special interest this year because of the guiding hand of Alice Rivlin who so recently dealt with most of its

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major issues as head of the Congressional Budget Office. The main international items concern defense and foreign trade, but the book's primary concern is with domestic measures to provide the sustained economic growth that would do so much to make public choices "less agonizing and divisive"—and, although the authors do not say so, would also improve the country's international position.

## *The United States*

*Gaddis Smith*

UNMANIFEST DESTINY. By T. D. Allman. New York: Dial Press, 1984, 468 pp. $19.95.

Prompted by his revulsion over recent episodes of U.S. foreign policy, and making good use of personal experience as a journalist, the author weaves past and present together in a heartfelt and imaginative indictment. Allman is one of those who believe that Americans have caused most of the problems they have battled around the world. The treatment of recent events, such as the 1980 murder of four American religious workers in El Salvador, is better than the treatment of distant history.

THE RIGHT HAND OF POWER. By U. Alexis Johnson. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1984, 634 pp. $24.95.

Alexis Johnson was a Foreign Service officer from 1935 until 1977. His steady, conventional judgment, administrative skill, and knowledge of Asia earned him a series of high posts at historically critical moments—the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina, Saigon in the 1960s, ambassador to Japan, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, and head of the SALT delegation in the Ford Administration. These memoirs are far more detailed and illuminating than the typical contribution to this genre.

THE TORCH IS PASSED: THE KENNEDY BROTHERS AND AMERICAN LIBERALISM. By David Burner and Thomas R. West. New York: Atheneum, 1984, 253 pp. $16.65.

The authors see John as a politician first and a liberal afterward; Robert as moving to the left out of conviction, not mere expediency; and Edward as the hardworking heir. The domestic side is handled with a surer touch than foreign policy.

HUBERT HUMPHREY. By Carl Solberg. New York: Norton, 1984, 576 pp. $19.95.

This fine biography is both a celebration of a politician driven toward high office by his commitment to liberal ideals and a tale of tragedy: Vice President Humphrey's brutally degrading treatment by President Johnson. The author believes Humphrey could have been elected in 1968 if he had detached himself sooner from Johnson's Vietnam War policies.

EISENHOWER. VOL. II: THE PRESIDENT. By Stephen E. Ambrose. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984, 752 pp. $24.95.

The second and concluding volume of the best biography of Eisenhower. The author is critical of the President's appeasement of Joseph McCarthy, his lack of deep commitment to racial justice, his expansion of the nuclear arms race, and his "penchant for seeing Communists wherever a social

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reform movement or a struggle for national liberation was under way." But, on balance, the assessment is favorable. Eisenhower's rising reputation for political skill will be further enhanced by this clear, beautifully written, and succinct book.

THE PRESIDENCY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN. By Donald R. McCoy. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984, 351 pp. $25.00 (paper, $14.95).

This is a balanced, comprehensive, competent survey of both the domestic and foreign policy developments of the Truman presidency, based on thorough scholarship. There are no startling revelations.

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AND ACADEMIC ENTERPRISE: A CHAPTER IN THE ENCLOSURE OF AMERICAN LEARNING. By Robert A. McCaughey. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984, 301 pp. $28.00.

This detailed and well-documented history of the growth of international and foreign area studies in the United States emphasizes the stimulus of World War II and the largesse of the Ford Foundation in the 1950s and 1960s. The "enclosure" in the subtitle refers to the concentration of such studies in the universities.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES. Edited by James A. Cooney, Gordon A. Craig, Hans Peter Schwarz, and Fritz Stern. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1984, 253 pp. $22.00 (paper).

Popular attention to the troublespot of the moment—whether Iran, El Salvador or Lebanon—tends in the United States to obscure the importance of relations with major allies. Thus, this excellent symposium by American and German scholars and officials is most welcome. The essays combine a sense of history with incisive comments and ample data on current problems.

THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: CONGRESS CONFRONTS THE EXECUTIVE. By Lock K. Johnson. New York: New York University Press, 1984, 206 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor, $30.00.)

Even those who are versed in the constitutional aspects of American foreign policy tend to divide international agreements into treaties requiring Senate approval and executive agreements entered into by the executive alone. This useful analytical study emphasizes that the majority of U.S. agreements with other nations are "statutory," i.e., entered into pursuant to legislative mandate although not put into treaty form. The book is filled with tables categorizing agreements in terms of variables. A valuable reference.

COLD WAR, COLD PEACE: THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA SINCE 1945. By Bernard A. Weisberger. New York: American Heritage, 1984, 325 pp. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, distributor, $17.95).

A very readable narrative for a general audience.

OUTGROWING DEMOCRACY: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By John Lukacs. New York: Doubleday, 1984, 423 pp. $19.95.

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An unorthodox, outspoken and occasionally brilliant monologue, filled with astonishing connections and tidbits drawn from unlikely sources. The author, a prolific historian, laments the substitution of publicity for real debate over political issues and the pervasiveness of bureaucratic mediocrity. In foreign policy he longs for the yesteryear of Churchillian heroics and is contemptuous of "the so-called Third World" nations who have turned the United Nations into "an instrument for a ritual comedy, for speeches and tales by hosts of idiots, signifying nothing."

"THE GOOD WAR": AN ORAL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR TWO. By Studs Terkel. New York: Pantheon, 1984, 589 pp. $19.95.

This book sustains Studs Terkel's reputation as the nation's foremost practitioner of the difficult (although seemingly simple) art of oral history. No one succeeds as he does in drawing eloquent memories from his subjects and arranging them so as to bring out deeper meanings about society as a whole. The "good war" theme of this book, voiced by so many of his witnesses, is an explicit counterpoint to the "hard times" recalled in Terkel's classic oral history of the Depression. Many of the witnesses, however, recall their somber thoughts in 1945 about the atomic bomb and future relations with the Soviet Union. Let us hope this is a forecast of a coming oral history of the cold war, thus completing a trilogy on the three momentous national experiences of this century.

THE WISE MEN OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: THE HISTORY OF THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. By Robert D. Schulzinger. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984, 326 pp. $27.50.

This fair, scholarly and readable book illuminates the origin and history (to 1980) of the Council and places the organization in the larger context of the shifting ideas of its members, and the foreign policy elite generally, about the place of the United States in the world. The author blends information gleaned from the Council's archives with a close analysis of its publications and a sure grasp of international events. While wittingly dismissing crackpot attacks from right and left, the author does find the Council guilty on occasion of being dull and pompous, and he maintains that its influence has never been as great as claimed by its friends or enemies.

## *The Western Hemisphere*

*Robert D. Crassweller*

GETTING AHEAD COLLECTIVELY: GRASSROOTS EXPERIENCES IN LATIN AMERICA. By Albert O. Hirschman. Elmsford (N.Y.): Pergamon Press, 1984, 101 pp. $13.95.

In this short and elegantly presented account, the author tells of his visits to grassroots development centers supported by the Inter-American Foundation in the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Argentina and Uruguay. Combining project histories with analysis, he describes the benefits and costs of cooperatives and the role of associations working in social or economic contexts. Hirschman's gentle optimism finds it "noteworthy . . . that private initiatives for social promotion have today come to occupy so prominent a place."

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NO TO RECESSION AND UNEMPLOYMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS. By Celso Furtado. London: Third World Foundation for Social and Economic Studies, 1984, 77 pp. $5.00.

A short, sharply worded analysis of Brazilian international debt by a well-known Brazilian economist who believes his country should make a complete break with the IMF, redirect investment, and change its development model. Furtado is the main economic adviser (and a potential finance minister) to the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, one of the strongest legal opposition parties in Brazil.

REBELLION IN THE VEINS: POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN BOLIVIA, 1952–1982. By James Dunkerley. London: Verso, 1984, 385 pp. (New York: Schocken, distributor, $30.00; paper, $9.50.)

A panoramic view, richly detailed, of three decades of political history in a land beleaguered by upheaval. Some of the rebellion memorialized in the title has entered the veins of the author, who concludes that a mass political movement for socialism in Bolivia "has acquired exceptionally strong roots and remains a vital possibility. Nowhere else in Latin America, perhaps the world, can one so easily perceive such an outcome flowing from the process of national liberation."

REVOLUTION AND COUNTERREVOLUTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. Edited by Donald E. Schulz and Douglas H. Graham. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1984, 555 pp. $35.00 (paper, $14.95).

A technical work, massive in treatment, covering structural and institutional sources of stability and instability, and a country-based inquiry into the workings of these phenomena in El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica and Jamaica. Also a section is devoted to international dimensions of the regional crisis.

THE IDEOLOGY OF THE SANDINISTAS AND THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION. By David Nolan. Coral Gables (Fla.): Institute of Inter-american Studies, University of Miami, 1984, 203 pp. $14.95 (paper).

Tracing the origins and development of Sandinista ideology and tactics, this volume concludes that representation of broad public viewpoints has never been the intent of the revolution, despite its patina of populism and democratic socialism. Rather, the leaders are an independent elite pursuing their own visions.

CUBA AND THE REVOLUTIONARY MYTH: THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF THE CUBAN REBEL ARMY, 1953–1963. By C. Fred Judson. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1984, 294 pp. $22.50 (paper).

Sympathetic to the Cuban and related revolutionary movements, the author seeks the source of the Cuban phenomenon in myths bequeathed by earlier Cuban history. Building upon those, the guerrilla struggles of the 1950s and early 1960s, which are described in detail, in turn provided a further mythology whose function was to sustain morale and consciousness.

GRENADA: REVOLUTION AND INVASION. By Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton and Tony Thorndike. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 233 pp. $19.95.

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The first section of this detailed and critical study treats of the revolution in the small island state and its impact, with reference to the Gairy years and to the reactions of the United States, Cuba and the Commonwealth entities. The second section recounts the invasion and its aftermath, seen by the authors as seminal in modern Caribbean history.

## *Western Europe*

*Fritz Stern*

THE FATEFUL ALLIANCE: FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND THE COMING OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR. By George F. Kennan. New York: Pantheon, 1984, 304 pp. $18.95.

The second volume of Kennan's magisterial study of the Franco-Russian Alliance, which he considers a principal cause of the Great War which, in turn, was the catastrophe that ushered in a still-continuing era of violence. Kennan concentrates on who did what when, with what measure of vision or blindness. This is a definitely personal book; it does not see history as the unfolding of broad anonymous forces. Kennan is a superb portraitist and a wise, elegiacal moralist.

His book is a grand history of the making of the alliance, 1891–1894, as reconstructed by a practitioner of diplomacy. It is also a cautionary tale, seeing in the errors of the past, still persisting today, the possibilities of a future and all-destroying disaster: "In the history of the negotiations of the Franco-Russian Alliance one can witness the growth of a whole series of those aberrations, misunderstandings, and bewilderments that have played so tragic and fateful a part in the development of Western civilization over the subsequent decades. One sees how the unjustified assumption of war's likelihood could become the cause of its final inevitability."

DECOLONIZATION IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE: THE DOMESTIC CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. By Miles Kahler. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, 426 pp. $40.00 (paper, $9.95).

A great theme: the effect of the loss of Empire on the internal politics of the major imperial powers. Kahler examines the British and French parties of left and right and the leverage that the *colons* and their analogues had in their respective metropolises. A valuable study that is marginally bolstered and seriously marred by dependence on—or efforts toward—overly elaborate theoretical models. Odd, too, that attention to these models leads Kahler to compress his own sense of the poignant human side of what he himself calls a great *drame*.

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR: VOL. III, PART 1. By F. H. Hinsley and others. New York: Cambridge, 1984, 693 pp. $39.50.

Hinsley, historian and himself a participant at Bletchley, was an inspired choice for writing this official history, for which he and his colleagues have been given unrestricted access to all government papers. This book, part one of the third volume, covers the period from mid-1943 to the eve of D-Day. It depicts how British intelligence gained knowledge of German dispositions in the Sicilian campaign, and in the air and sea war, and above

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all reconstructs British efforts to interpret scattered clues concerning German rocketry and the preparation of V-1 and V-2 bombs. Hinsley is also very good on how Britain finally decided to back Tito and break with Mihailovic, despite the reluctance of the Foreign Ministry. Intelligence gathering and interpretation were complex enough; the tactical, command, and political *use* of the evidence is another part of the story, and inevitably, failures and human rivalries came into play. Adopting Flaubert's recipe, "*pas de monstres, et pas de héros,*" Hinsley is scrupulously fair but forthright, and this book, as indeed the whole series, constitutes a triumphant achievement: an enviable task admirably executed.

SUCCEEDING JOHN BULL: AMERICA IN BRITAIN'S PLACE, 1900–1975. By D. Cameron Watt. New York: Cambridge, 1984, 302 pp. $34.50.

An ambitious reconstruction of the processes by which the United States replaced Great Britain as the principal oceanic power. A distinguished British historian analyzes the historic developments in light of domestic changes, including generational changes in policymakers in the two countries and the interaction between them. There is no Anglo-American piety here, but a sure sense of realism and an emphasis on the frequent misperceptions and misunderstandings that marred relations. He sees a recurrent strain of "moral imperialism" in American policy, one that inspired President Wilson to try to use American power "not merely to give America the leading part on the stage of world politics, but to make her playwright, producer, director and theatre owner as well." A compact, complex, and greatly rewarding book.

WHAT'S TO BECOME OF THE BOY? By Heinrich Böll. New York: Knopf, 1984, 82 pp. $11.95.

The 66-year old writer and sharp critic of the Federal Republic recalls his youth as a 15- to 19-year-old in the early years of Hitler's rule. He remembers school and, even more importantly, life outside school, in Catholic Cologne: the normality and the sense of doom, the manageable apprehensions of those days. The Böll family was insulated by a Catholic milieu and bouts of penury; for much of the time, National Socialism was a distant unpleasantness, from which one suffered, with which one made minimal compromises. A good evocation of a still-shielded life: the sorrows of young Böll against the background of approaching war. Splendidly translated—but would a few explanatory notes have been intrusive?

UNCIVIL WARS: IRELAND TODAY. By Padraig O'Malley. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1984, 481 pp. $20.00.

A first-rate, tough-minded but compassionate analysis of a historic tragedy. O'Malley, Dublin-born and now teaching in the U.S., examines the hopes of every party—and the contradictions within each position. He sets aspirations against demographic and economic realities, including the growing discrepancy between the South's dynamic progress and the North's difficulties. The impasse is epitomized by the interviewees: "Few talked of the future, fewer of their children, and none of hope."

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## *The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*

*John C. Campbell*

SURVIVAL IS NOT ENOUGH: SOVIET REALITIES AND AMERICA'S FUTURE. By Richard Pipes. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984, 288 pp. $16.95.

Professor Pipes, the Reagan Administration's guru on this subject, presents a cogent, consistent and comprehensive statement of his thoughts on Soviet grand strategy for global hegemony, together with some proposals on what to do about it. He places himself neither among the doves, with their faith in pragmatism, good will and détente, nor among the hawks, with their concentration on military strength and containment. A main theme is the connection between the U.S.S.R.'s internal system and its foreign policy, and the need for the West to intensify the crisis in the former in order to cope with the latter.

THE BREZHNEV POLITBURO AND THE DECLINE OF DÉTENTE. By Harry Gelman. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1984, 264 pp. $29.95 (paper, $9.95).

For many years Harry Gelman was a senior analyst of Soviet affairs in the CIA. His review of Soviet foreign policy in the Brezhnev era deserves careful attention because of that background and his obvious skills in the interpretation of the available evidence. The account of the continuing contention for power among the leaders is naturally of interest, but more important is the theme of the Politburo's consistent pursuit of political advantage in competition with the principal political adversary, the United States. Brezhnev is shown as led toward détente by his own political needs in relations with his colleagues, by objective factors, and by well-established priorities, and later led away from it for the same reasons. A book on this subject is bound to raise many controversial points, but it is not easy, on any sober reading of the evidence we have, to challenge the main line of argument presented here.

NOMENKLATURA: THE SOVIET RULING CLASS. By Michael Voslensky. New York: Doubleday, 1984, 455 pp. $19.95.

A clinical dissection of the Soviet system, in which a group of managers and bureaucrats (some 1.5 percent of the population) are engaged in ceaseless political maneuvering among themselves while maintaining total power, as a privileged class, over all the others. The author, who left the Soviet Union in 1977, follows his argument to its logical conclusion: the impossibility of basic change, either toward liberalization of the internal order or toward modification of an aggressive foreign policy. This study of Soviet experience since Lenin evokes Milovan Djilas's analysis of the "new class" published some 30 years ago; appropriately, Djilas contributes a brief preface to the book.

INSIDE SOVIET MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. By Viktor Suvorov. New York: Macmillan, 1984, 208 pp. $15.95.

Carrying on with his revelations about the Soviet military establishment (see *Inside the Soviet Army*, noted in *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1983/84), a former Soviet army officer draws a portrait of the military intelligence apparatus and how it works, especially its balancing role in relation to the

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Party and the KGB. Presumably Western intelligence agencies can judge this information, much of it quite detailed; the rest of us will have to take it on the author's say-so.

SOVIET POLITICAL SCIENTISTS AND AMERICAN POLITICS. By Neil Malcolm. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 225 pp. $25.00.

From the published output of the Soviet Union's Americanists, especially as it has increased in volume and in variety over the past two decades, Neil Malcolm illustrates their growing understanding of American political life and the sophistication of their analysis—albeit limited by their own preconceptions, the obvious restraints of official ideology and censorship, and by their heavy reliance on the writings of the American left. How much influence have they had on Soviet foreign policy? Some, perhaps, especially in the period of détente, but on this point, the author concedes, we are confined to educated guesswork.

THE U.S.S.R. IN THIRD WORLD CONFLICTS: SOVIET ARMS AND DIPLOMACY IN LOCAL WARS, 1945–1980. By Bruce D. Porter. New York: Cambridge, 1984, 225 pp. $29.95.

A reworked dissertation which, as one might expect, explores its chosen subject to the last available bit of evidence, and, as a welcome surprise, is written with clarity, good reasoning and style. Porter presents five case studies of Soviet intervention (in Yemen, Nigeria, the Yom Kippur War, Angola and Somalia-Ethiopia), applies various litmus tests, draws comparisons, and reaches some unassailable conclusions. The best book yet in this field.

THE U.S.S.R. AND THE MUSLIM WORLD. Edited by Yaacov Ro'i. Winchester (Mass.): Allen & Unwin, 1984, 298 pp. $37.50.

The first part of this book, discussing the Soviet Union's own Muslims and the problems they represent for the country's future, contains much solid meat. The second part is a series of historical and contemporary studies on Soviet relations with a number of Islamic countries; one of them, having little to do with Islam, is an interesting piece on the Syrian Communist Party. The general level of scholarship is high.

ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SOVIET UNION. By Ed A. Hewett. Washington: Brookings, 1984, 228 pp. $28.95 (paper, $10.95).

This well-researched book has the merit of looking at the Soviet energy problem (oil, gas, coal, other) as a whole, something that Western experts (and Soviet officials) have often failed to do. It makes fairly precise projections for the mid-1980s and cloudier ones for 1990. Hewett sees no crisis of the kind predicted by the CIA for the 1980s, but Moscow will face hard decisions imposed by the rising cost of energy, competing economic demands, and political constraints. On the connection between energy matters and foreign policy the treatment is more tentative and less satisfactory.

SOLZHENITSYN: A BIOGRAPHY. By Michael Scammel. New York: Norton, 1984, 1051 pp. $29.95.

In size this is surely a full-scale biography, but the author calls it "little more than a biographical chronicle," a "portrait from the outside." He

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uses all the published material he could lay hands on, plus interviews, including some with Solzhenitsyn himself (who cut them off in midstream). It is not an authorized biography but a sympathetic one. It does not attempt a detailed critique of the literary works. But it is an immensely informative and serious effort to portray the man Solzhenitsyn in the context of the Soviet system and of Russian culture.

THE VAVILOV AFFAIR. By Mark Popovsky. Hamden (Conn.): Archon Books, 1984, 216 pp. $19.50.

Nikolai Vavilov was a noted Soviet biologist who ran afoul of Stalin's favorite, the charlatan Lysenko, and was purged, arrested and imprisoned; he died in 1943. In the 1960s Popovsky was able to gain access to the NKVD file on the case and tells here a full story which throws light on the corruption of science in the period of Lysenko's glory, on the methods of the Stalinist terror, and on the character and life of Vavilov himself.

THE WARSAW PACT: ALLIANCE IN TRANSITION? Edited by David Holloway and Jane M.O. Sharp. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1984, 290 pp. $29.95.

A useful addition to the growing literature on Soviet-East European and also East-West relations, since the Pact is now "more than a mechanism for transmitting orders from Moscow." The authors, British and American specialists in Soviet bloc affairs, go beyond the purely military aspects to examine political relations, economic factors, and problems of crisis management within the bloc.

SOVIET POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by Sarah Meiklejohn Terry. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984, 375 pp. $27.50. A Council on Foreign Relations Book.

The importance Moscow attaches to its interests in Eastern Europe and its determination to maintain its dominant position there are documented in this collection. Among the contributors are John C. Campbell, Angela E. Stent, Andrzej Korbonski, Jiri Valenta, Pierre Hassner and Raymond L. Garthoff. L.D.

POLAND UNDER JARUZELSKI. Edited by Leopold Labedz. New York: Scribner's, 1984, 432 pp. $19.95.

A veritable potpourri of material on Poland since December 1981. Most of the selections are from the underground press; some are from the government side; some come from outside observers, Polish and non-Polish. All of them bear on the continuing resistance to the regime and on the debate concerning the nature of that struggle. The book would have benefitted from additional explanatory notes.

THE TRUTH THAT KILLED. By Georgi Markov. New Haven: Ticknor & Fields, 1984, 280 pp. $15.95.

Markov was a Bulgarian novelist who defected to the West in 1969. These are his memoirs, a personal narrative which is very revealing of the character of political and cultural life in Todor Zhivkov's Bulgaria. He broadcast them into Bulgaria over Radio Free Europe, and was warned that Zhivkov was enraged by them. In 1978 he was killed by a poisoned pellet from an assassin's umbrella.

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## *The Middle East*

*John C. Campbell*

ISRAEL'S LEBANON WAR. By Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984, 340 pp. $17.95.

Two talented Israeli journalists have done a stupendous job in tracking down the facts on the origins and the course of "Sharon's war." Published and secret documents, plus interviews with many key Israeli, Lebanese and American participants, provided the raw material for a dramatic narrative that reads like a historical novel, complete with conversations quoted verbatim. As there are no citations, a reader has to take the authors' statements more or less on faith, but they do inspire confidence. They are, incidentally, not neutral observers of this war which they describe as "anchored in delusion, propelled by deceit, and bound to end in calamity."

THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL: INFLUENCE IN THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP. By Bernard Reich. New York: Praeger, 1984, 236 pp. $29.95 (paper, $13.95).

The bulk of this book consists of a competent history of U.S. relations with Israel against the background of efforts to prevent war in the Middle East. The author, who is well acquainted with both the great quantity of published work on this subject and the political scene in Washington and in Israel, writes with a sure hand and cool judgment. A concluding chapter, "explaining" the special relationship and the influence each side exerts or refrains from exerting on the other, tends to be blandly descriptive and to play down the importance of domestic pressures, passing up many an opportunity for mordant comment on the performance of both parties.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1945–1951: ARAB NATIONALISM, THE UNITED STATES, AND POSTWAR IMPERIALISM. By William Roger Louis. New York: Clarendon Press/Oxford, 1984, 803 pp. $55.00.

A historical study of extraordinary value, based on extensive work in the British archives. The subtitle, clumsy as it is, gives a rough idea of the book's coverage: British efforts, with limited resources, to maintain historical positions in the face of the challenges of the cold war and of local nationalism; the shifting of burdens to America; the debacle of Palestine. It is told in fascinating detail by a scholar with the best of credentials.

SEARCH FOR PEACE. By Hassan bin Talal, Crown Prince of Jordan. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 152 pp. $16.95.

The Crown Prince is an effective spokesman for his brother, King Hussein, and for the moderate Arab outlook. He discusses Arab unity and division, Islam, regional economic development, and the record of Jordan under Hashemite leadership. Temperate in tone (except on the subject of Israel), he makes a strong plea for a more active American policy in search of a just Arab-Israeli settlement.

A STRANGER IN MY HOUSE: JEWS AND ARABS IN THE WEST BANK. By Walter Reich. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1984, 134 pp. $12.95.

An American psychiatrist, probing the feelings and complexes of Jews

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and Arabs, records his talks with a number of them on the future of the West Bank. He gets the anticipated reactions, then speculates on whether and how a political compromise can ever be found in the face of such deeply rooted and irreconcilable convictions.

THE PLO: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. By Jillian Becker. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 303 pp. $19.95.

The main lines of the PLO's turbulent story, including the many bloody events in which its factions have been involved, can be followed in this book by a novelist and publicist who has made a specialized study of terrorism. Much of it is based on extensive investigation and rings true. But the background history loses reliability by oversimplification, the author has strong feelings of her own, and the PLO is presented only as a terrorist outfit, never as a political expression or reflection of the Palestinian condition.

THOSE I HAVE KNOWN. By Anwar El-Sadat. New York: Continuum, 1984, 140 pp. $12.95.

Brief sketches written or recorded by Sadat during the last year of his life. Outspoken, personal and self-serving, they describe dramatic moments in Sadat's career and give sharp judgments on other leaders (fervently positive for Nasser, Faisal, Tito and Carter; scornfully negative for Assad, Qaddafi, and the men in the Kremlin).

THE REIGN OF THE AYATOLLAHS. By Shaul Bakhash. New York: Basic Books, 1984, 276 pp. $18.95.
"THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD": IRAN'S ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. By Cheryl Benard and Zalmay Khalilzad. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984, 240 pp. $25.00.
THE STATE AND REVOLUTION IN IRAN. By Hossein Bashiriyeh. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 203 pp. $27.50.

Five years have now provided additional perspective on the Iranian revolution and the nature of Khomeini's Islamic Republic. Bakhash's book is a detailed account of what happened in those years, and especially of the personal and political conflicts in which the clerical fundamentalists defeated all their rivals. In *"The Government of God"*, two political scientists begin by addressing their professional colleagues in the language of the trade, testing theories of development, modernization and revolution as they do or do not seem to apply to the reality of Iran; by the time they have finished, however, they have told us a great deal about the internal problems of the regime and its relations with the outside world. Bashiriyeh's study is concerned above all with how Iran's experience fits classical theories and patterns of revolution and class struggle: he finds the new regime, with its authoritarianism and mass mobilization, a continuation of existing indigenous nationalism re-expressed in terms of Islam. All three books make ample use of Iranian sources.

THE UNSTABLE GULF: THREATS FROM WITHIN. By Lenore G. Martin. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1984, 232 pp. $23.50.
GULF SECURITY INTO THE 1980s. Edited by Robert G. Darius, John W. Amos II, and Ralph H. Magnus. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1984, 134 pp. $21.95 (paper, $10.95).

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POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ISSUES IN THE GULF. By Sayed Hassan Amin. Glasgow: Royston, 1984, 327 pp. $29.95.

These three books are in the nature of background studies. None of them is an infallible guide, and all fall short of the coverage of Anthony Cordesman's weighty volume *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability* (noted in *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1984). Lenore Martin stresses the complexity of the region's problems and relates U.S. strategy to the existing "dynamic balance" and the prospects for destabilization. The Hoover Institution study links Gulf security to events in Afghanistan, the Iraq-Iran war, the prospects for the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the ability of the United States to adjust strategy to political realities. Amin, an international lawyer, ranges hither and yon but is at his best in covering the legal aspects of Gulf security.

## *Asia and the Pacific*

*Donald S. Zagoria*

CHINA POLICY FOR THE NEXT DECADE. Edited by U. Alexis Johnson, George R. Packard and Alfred Wilhelm, Jr. Boston: Oelgeschlager, 1984, 445 pp. $27.50 (paper, $12.50).

This report of the Atlantic Council's Committee on China Policy, two years in the making, is the most impressive collection of essays on U.S. China policy yet published. It is particularly strong on the security, defense and technology-transfer issues. There is an excellent overview by George Packard, followed by 25 other chapters. For those responsible for shaping the West's China policy during the next decade, this volume is "must" reading.

THE IRON TRIANGLE: A U.S. SECURITY POLICY FOR NORTHEAST ASIA. By A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang. Stanford: Hoover Press, 1984, 160 pp. $23.95 (paper, $9.95).

This brief but thoughtful volume is perhaps the best statement of the conservative view on U.S.-China relations yet published. It argues that it would be a mistake for the U.S. to proceed too far in its military association with China, and that the gradual enhancement of the military capabilities of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan would ensure that "any conceivable Sino-Soviet rapprochement would not materially alter the security circumstances in Northeast Asia." Therefore the U.S. is free to provide Taiwan with the military assets needed for its defense without anticipating prohibitive political costs. The conclusion is certainly arguable, but the authors at least face the issue without waffling.

CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE 1980s. Edited by Harry Harding. New Haven: Yale University Press (in cooperation with the Asia Society), 1984, 240 pp. $18.50.

Perhaps the single most important question about China's future foreign policy concerns the durability of the current economic reforms. In this volume, two China specialists come up with conflicting assessments. Kenneth Lieberthal believes that the domestic reform program will eventually run into political difficulties as bureaucratic interests reassert themselves; the military and a strengthened central-planning apparatus might then shift

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economic priorities back to machine-building and metallurgy; this would "sap some of the energy" from relations with developed countries including the U.S. Bruce Reynolds, on the other hand, sees some grounds for optimism. He thinks that the agricultural reforms have been extraordinarily successful and difficult to reverse. Indeed, their success has already emboldened the leaders to embark on similar reforms in the industrial sector. He believes that China's top leaders are genuinely committed to the reform process.

A CADRE SCHOOL LIFE: SIX CHAPTERS. By Yang Jiang. Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co./London and New York: Readers International, 1984, 91 pp. $9.95.

Between 1966 and 1978, some 20 million Chinese were exiled to the countryside—many of them because of Mao Zedong's view that China's intellectuals needed "re-education"—i.e., humbling. Among the exiles were the elderly writer and translator Yang Jiang and her husband Qian Zhongshu, one of China's most prestigious writers. Her memoir of life in the cadre schools was published with official approval, but not for wide dissemination, in 1981, and is now available in English. The book is yet another testimony to Mao's dogmatism in his later years and to the human and social catastrophe that this dogmatism inflicted on China.

THE QUALITY OF MERCY: CAMBODIA, HOLOCAUST, AND MODERN CONSCIENCE. By William Shawcross. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984, 464 pp. $19.95.

The "realists" who write about international relations rarely address themselves to moral issues. Shawcross is concerned here with how the U.S. and the world responded to the virtual extinction of the Kampuchean nation and the takeover of Kampuchea first by the murderous Pol Pot regime and later by the Vietnamese. He singles out former U.S. Ambassador to Thailand Morton Abramowitz and his wife, as well as former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke and several other U.S. government officials, for their determination to prevent a new holocaust. In the end, this compelling book demonstrates how officials who really care about humanitarian goals can and do get around lethargic bureaucracies.

INDIA'S SEARCH FOR POWER: INDIRA GANDHI'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1966–1983. By Surjit Mansingh. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1984, 398 pp.

The author, a former Indian Foreign Service officer now teaching in the United States, has produced one of the few comprehensive studies of Indira Gandhi's foreign policy. One of the book's themes is that Mrs. Gandhi's failures on the domestic front restricted her room for maneuver in foreign affairs. Another important theme, brought out by Selig Harrison in the introduction, is the persistent American tendency to underrate India's power potential. Yet India now has the fourth largest armed forces in the world. One of the weaknesses in the book is the failure to analyze the costs and benefits of Mrs. Gandhi's Soviet link. And there is an unsatisfactory section about the impact on Indian foreign policy of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The author quotes Mrs. Gandhi in 1981 as denying that the Soviet military presence south of the Hindu Kush mountains poses a threat to India's security, but comments only that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan "has raised many questions" about Mrs. Gandhi's conduct of foreign

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affairs which "have yet to be fully answered."[Reviewed prior to Mrs. Gandhi's assassination.]

SECURITY IN SOUTHERN ASIA. By Zalmay Khalilzad and others. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 242 pp. $37.50.
ASIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. Edited by David Hugh McMillen. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 226 pp. $29.95.

The first book, sponsored by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, contains an admirable overview of the sources of conflict in Southwest Asia by Khalilzad, and three equally impressive contributions on India's relations with China, the Soviet Union and the United States. The second volume, also of consistently high quality, evolved out of a conference organized by the Strategic and Defense Studies Centre at the Australian National University. Most of the essays are written by Asians, and the book is intended to convey a picture of how Asians view their own security dilemmas. In this respect, it is eminently successful.

## *Africa*

*Jennifer Seymour Whitaker*

THE DIPLOMACY OF ISOLATION: SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY MAKING. By Deon Geldenhuys. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 295 pp. $25.00.

This important book, almost an encyclopedia of South African foreign policy, focuses on the Vorster and Botha regimes (from 1966 to 1981). The depth and political acuity of the analysis raise what might have been a primer to a revealing anatomy of politics and bureaucracy in the foreign policy of the world's foremost "pariah" state. Candid but not critical of South African policy, the author, a South African political scientist, sees external pressure as often counterproductive regarding its stated aims, and in general much less significant than domestic forces in producing change.

SOUTH AFRICA: THE LIMITS OF REFORM POLITICS. Edited by Heribert Adam. Leiden: E. J. Brills, 1984, 115 pp.

In this collection a number of distinguished South African social scientists (including van Zyl Slabbert, Lawrence Schlemmer, Hermann Giliomee and the editor) delicately weigh—once again—the forces for inertia and dynamism within South Africa. Summing up conclusions derived from their very different approaches: stalemate looms. For this group of white liberals, what seems all-important in the equation of change is white cohesiveness and the will to maintain control. For the moment, however, so few cracks have appeared in the white facade that this factor lies almost outside the scope of discussion, and certainly of prediction.

THE PRESS AND APARTHEID: REPRESSION AND PROPAGANDA IN SOUTH AFRICA. By William A. Hachten and C. Anthony Giffard. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984, 336 pp. $27.50.

An American and a South African journalism professor survey South Africa's media, both offical and embattled. Their highly informative account of press evolution shows how government crackdowns prod privately owned newspapers toward stricter self-censorship, as government-con-

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trolled television aimed at separate white and ethnically divided black audiences gains increasing sway. Further discussion of the television revolution (television was introduced only in 1976) and the content and results of black programming would be of real interest.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND APARTHEID. By L. J. Boulle. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 270 pp. $27.50.

This authoritative volume details thoroughly and succinctly the process and product of South Africa's recent constitutional reform. The author, a South African lawyer, effectively disposes of its architects' "consociational" pretensions (claiming kinship with modes of government by consensus among groups, as in Switzerland). He also points to a future in which the distinction between "citizen" and "noncitizen" rather than between races will become the justification for white control over blacks in South Africa.

THE SOVIET IMPACT IN AFRICA. Edited by R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington Books, 1984, 271 pp. $27.50.

Viewing the present period of Soviet "retrenchment" in Africa as "an appropriate moment for scholarly reevaluations," this excellent collection takes a long look at Soviet intentions and achievements, as well as their consequences for Africa. Survivors of the regionalist-globalist debates of the Carter era will not find many surprises in its main theme: that African aims and policy always heavily constrain Soviet bloc activities in this sphere of limited interest. But first-rate essays by Colin Legum, Marina Ottaway, Christopher Cohen and Joachim Krause, in particular, shed broad illumination on many of the aspects.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko. New York: St. Martin's, 1984, 397 pp. $37.50.

Predicting a basic division of African states between those "in favour of further incorporation into the Western system and those in favour of disengagement from it," the editors see a few better-off African states opting for "state capitalism" and strong links to the West, while most others perforce become more "self-reliant." The case studies of individual states do not, however, prove the point. Rather, these often excellent analyses of African international and domestic economic transactions demonstrate the continued paucity and vulnerability of these states' economic options.

CONTINENTAL CRISIS: THE LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION AND AFRICA'S FUTURE. Edited by David Fashole Luke and Timothy M. Shaw. Washington: University Press of America/Dalhousie: Dalhousie University Press, 1984, 250 pp. $22.50 (paper, $12.25).

In this collection of essays, African development specialists at Canada's Dalhousie University evidently aim to foster tactical thinking on the Lagos Plan of Action; of real general interest, here, is a highly informative discussion by Barry Lesser of Africa's potential relation to the communications revolution. For the most part, however, the authors fail to avoid the usual pitfall of Plan proponents, and end up dwelling on what ought to be rather than what *might* be (most notably in considering the need for an African security system in terms of NATO's role in facilitating the European Community).

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NORTH AFRICA: REGIONAL TENSIONS AND STRATEGIC CONCERNS. By Richard B. Parker. New York: Praeger, 1984, 206 pp. $34.95. A Council on Foreign Relations Book.

Richard Parker has written a fine introduction to the countries of North Africa—Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya—drawing on his diplomatic experience as ambassador to both Algeria and Morocco, his knowledge of the Arab world, and the deliberations of a study group organized by the Council on Foreign Relations. The specialist will find little that is new, but the generalist could hardly ask for a better survey. As with any book of this sort, some parts of it will soon be dated, but the author's broad conclusions represent the best tradition of the regional specialist, as, blending realism with modest expectations, he urges the United States to adopt a more balanced policy vis-à-vis Morocco and Algeria and to worry less about Qaddafi.

William B. Quandt

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# SOURCE MATERIAL

*Edited by Janet Rigney*

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

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

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